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by Ozlem Gurses 
 
The Full Reinsurance clause by which a reinsurer agrees to be bound by the same terms 
and conditions as the original policy and commits to follow the reinsured’s settlements is 
widely used in London Market facultative reinsurance contracts. In most disputes the 
outcome depends upon resolving the fundamental question of whether reinsurance is 
either a further insurance on the subject matter insured or is a reinsurance of the liability of 
the reinsured under the direct policy. The interpretation of the clause had not been settled 
until the recent House of Lords decision on Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v 
Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40 where their Lordships adopted the view that 
reinsurance is not a liability insurance but a further insurance on the subject matter insured 
by the reinsured. 
 
Settlement clauses are also widely used in the United States, albeit with wording slightly 
different from that of the full reinsurance clause but there is broad consensus in the US 
courts that the words ‘follow the fortunes’ and ‘follow the settlements’ are 
interchangeable. There are both similarities and  differences between the two common law 
systems: in England the full reinsurance clause has to be express, whereas in the US there 
is a debate as to whether it may be implied; in England the nature of reinsurance remains 
unresolved, in the US the liability approach has been adopted; post-settlement allocations 
have created huge problems in the US but have scarcely been discussed in England; the 
US cases have not proceeded on the basis of incorporation whereas in England the scope 
of incorporation has been much discussed. These differences arise mainly from the 
understanding of reinsurance in the two systems, and the present thesis aims to explain 
these conflicting understandings by describing the relationship between reinsurers and 
reinsureds in the light of ‘as original’, ‘follow the form’ and ‘settlement’ clauses.     
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INTRODUCTION  
 
1.  Background 
 
In the London Market facultative reinsurance contracts have traditionally been made 
simply by appending to the original policy a cover page containing the full reinsurance 
clause, the typical formulation of which is “Being a reinsurance of…subject to the same 
terms and conditions as original and follow the settlements of the Company”
1. The cover 
page is described as a slip policy:
2 no other policy is issued and the full reinsurance clause 
is the only indication as to the scope of coverage under the reinsurance. The first part of 
the clause defines the terms upon which the reinsurance has been made and the second 
part obliges the reinsurer to indemnify the reinsured for settlements which have been 
reached with the direct policyholder. 
 
In English law the function of the words “as original” is unresolved: one view holds that 
they incorporate the original policy terms into the reinsurance; whereas the alternative 
view is that they simply confirm that in facultative reinsurance, in the absence of any 
express contrary provision, the two contracts offer identical cover. Clarification is 
fundamental to resolving problems such as whether incorporation is necessary to achieve 
common coverage, and how to interpret the two contracts when the applicable laws are 
different. Recently, these matters came before the English courts in in Wasa v Lexington. 
                                                 
1 The clause may also be abbreviated to “as original”. This kind of wording is still permissible under the 
Contract Certainty Code of Practice so long as the original policy terms are clearly identified by attaching or 
uniquely describing or referencing (Appendix 2: Sample checklist content).  
http://www.iua.co.uk/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Contract_Certainty1&CONTENTID=2791&TEMPLATE
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited on 27 July 2009). 
2 As an administrative practice in the London Market the slip may refer to a choice of forms, J1 or NMA 
1779. The J1 form contains the clause “Being a reinsurance of and warranted same gross rate, terms and 
conditions as and to follow the settlements of the [reassured].” The NMA 1779 form does not have a follow 
settlements clause. However it contains an obligation: “…to pay or to make good to the Reinsured all such 
Loss as aforesaid as may happen to the subject matter of this Reinsurance, or any part thereof during the 
continuance of this Policy.” In Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co. [2009] 
UKHL 40, the slip provided for a choice of forms at the option of the broker and also conditions were stated 
as to be “The Full Reinsurance Clause”. One commentator has strongly emphasised that one or other of 
these forms must have been chosen, as such choice must be made at the time when the reinsurance premium 
is closed to the market. The commentator is of the opinion that NMA 1779 was the chosen form. Weir, “A 
Matter of Forms and Substance”, [2009] LMCLQ 210, 217, 235. However, the House of Lords found this 
discussion irrelevant and accepted it as a  common ground that the wording of the clause was “Being a 
reinsurance of and warranted same gross rate, terms and conditions as and to follow the settlements of the 
Company and that said Company retains during the currency of this Policy at least ….. on the identical 
subject matter and risk and in identically the same proportion on each separate part thereof, but in the event 
of the retained line being less than as above, Underwriters’ lines to be proportionately reduced.”  
.   2
The House of Lords did not clarify the functions of the as original clause and classified the 
case as “exceptional”. Therefore the case should be read with caution.  
 
2.  Aims and Objectives 
 
The thesis focuses upon the construction of the “Full Reinsurance Clause”, which in one 
form or another is almost always found in London Market facultative reinsurance 
contracts and indeed in other markets. This thesis tries to clarify the nature of reinsurance 
and the implications of adopting the two different approaches to its definition.  
 
This thesis also aims to explain the function of settlement clauses in English law and in 
various jurisdictions in the US. Settlement clauses are sometimes used along with claims 
provisions, and the thesis also considers to what extent claims provisions and settlement 
clauses can be reconciled.  
 
Finally, the thesis analyses issues which are fully resolved in the US but await 
determination in England. For instance while the nature of reinsurance is uncontroversial 
in the US, the issue went to the highest court in the UK. Again implying a follow the 
settlements clause into all reinsurance contracts or applying the clause to reinsureds’ post-
settlement allocations have been heavily discussed in the US; in England the former has 
been rejected and the latter not considered. These similarities and dissimilarities are 
explained in detail and a summary will be provided in conclusion. 
  
3.  Structure and Methodology 
 
This thesis is in three parts:  
 
First, the thesis looks at the application of the phrase “as original”. Its function to a large 
extent depends on the correct interpretation of the nature of facultative reinsurance 
contracts, where the reinsurer assumes all or some part of the risk accepted by the 
reinsured. If that reinsurance takes effect as a further insurance on the insured subject 
matter, the words “as original” have the function of incorporating the terms of the original 
policy into the reinsurance. On the other hand, if reinsurance operates in a fashion similar 
to liability insurance, the function of the phrase “as original” is more limited, reinforcing   3
the presumption of back-to-back cover which applies to proportional reinsurance. At this 
point the thesis discusses that presumption, pointing out that in facultative contracts (and 
especially where the insurance is part of a fronting operation), unless the contrary is 
provided, reinsurance and insurance contracts are presumed to provide matching cover. 
Since the presumption allows the court to interpret the two contracts in the same way, 
unless the parties expressly agree otherwise, incorporation of the original policy terms is 
not necessary to a finding of identical cover. 
 
The thesis suggests that the latter approach is preferable and that reinsurance is a form of 
liability cover. However, the House of Lords in WASA v Lexington adopted the 
conventional view and stated that reinsurance is a further insurance on the subject matter 
originally insured. Accordingly the words effect the incorporation of the original policy 
terms. Therefore, it has been necessary to analyse the requirements for incorporation, in 
particular the classes of term that can be incorporated and the implications of 
incorporation for unusual terms, inconsistent terms and particular terms which may 
operate differently at the direct and reinsurance levels, such as waiver of defence and 
variation clauses.  
 
Secondly, the thesis examines the operation of the latter part of the “Full Reinsurance 
Clause”, the “Follow the Settlements” wording. 
 
This part of the thesis starts by tracing the genesis of the clause as, “to pay as may be paid 
thereon”. The issue here is the interpretation of the clause by the courts in the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. It has been found that the “to pay as may be 
paid thereon” clause was not construed by the courts in accordance with the likely 
intention of its draftsman and was held to add nothing to the common law rule that the 
reinsured must prove its loss. That wording was replaced by the words “to pay as may be 
paid thereon and follow the settlements”, subsequently altered to “follow the settlements”.  
 
It seems that almost all reinsurance disputes are referred to arbitration in the twentieth 
century, and it was as late as 1985, in Insurance Co. of Africa v SCOR (UK) Reinsurance 
Co. Ltd.
3, that the “follow the settlements” clause first came to be analysed. In that case 
the Court of Appeal held that when a reinsurer agrees to follow the settlements of the 
                                                 
3 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 312.   4
reinsured he agrees to trust both the reinsured’s honesty and professionalism, so that the 
reinsured is entitled to be indemnified by the reinsurer for liability incurred under a 
settlement unless the reinsurer can prove that the settlement was not made in a bona fide 
and businesslike manner or that the loss falls outside the terms of the reinsurance cover.  
 
Since 1985 this case has been applied and approved in a series of subsequent decisions. 
However the wording of the “follow the settlements” clause is not standard and the market 
sometimes uses variations on it. 
 
By way of example, the full reinsurance clause may be drafted: “…the reinsurer will 
follow the settlements whether the reinsured is liable or not liable”; “the reinsurer agrees 
to be bound by the reinsured’s settlement providing such settlements are within the terms 
and conditions of the original policies and within the terms and conditions of this 
reinsurance”; or “…the reinsurer agrees to follow without question the settlement of the 
reinsured except ex-gratia and/or without prejudice settlements.” It has therefore been 
necessary to examine the various forms of the follow the settlements clause.  
 
A closely allied point is the relationship of the follow the settlements clause with claims 
provisions. The problem arises where a reinsurance contract contains the two provisions 
side by side. The controversy here is that the follow the settlements clause expresses the 
reinsurer’s trust towards the reinsured whereas the claims provision restricts the 
reinsured’s right to settle the claim without the active involvement – to a greater or lesser 
extent – of the reinsurer. The reconciliation of these two clauses is also explained in this 
thesis.  
 
Thirdly, the thesis focuses on settlement clauses in the US reinsurance market. There is no 
standard full reinsurance clause in the US but the formulation of such clauses is different 
to that of the London Market. In this part of the thesis, the difference between the wording 
of the clauses is considered. The interpretation of the “follow the form” and “follow the 
fortunes/follow the settlement” clauses is discussed. The research demonstrated that there 
are major differences between the understanding of reinsurance in the two systems, which 
become apparent when the interpretation of the clauses is explained. The research was not 
limited to any particular State jurisdiction, as there are relatively few cases on the relevant 
clause and the US Courts usually refer to cases from all US jurisdictions.     5
 
 
4.  Outcomes 
 
As a result of the research the following points will be made clear in England and in 
the US:  
•  What is reinsurance  
•  The function of the full reinsurance clause  
•  Whether “as original” / “follow the form” clauses operate to incorporate the 
original policy terms into reinsurance and, if so, the scope of incorporation 
•  The presumption of back-to-back cover (England) and providing 
concurrent cover (US) 
•  Differences between “follow the settlements” and “follow the fortunes” 
clauses 
•  Nature and function of claims provisions, remedies for breach of such 
clauses and their relationship with the settlement clauses.  
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PART A : REINSURANCE UPON THE SAME TERMS AS ORIGINAL 
 
CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF FACULTATIVE REINSURANCE   
 
Facultative reinsurance is a contract “which consists of the reinsurance of a single risk 
reinsured on a proportional basis, in that the reinsured retains an agreed proportion of the 
risk and passes some or all of the remainder to the reinsurers”
4. The key issue is whether 
the “as original” wording carries the terms of the original insurance contract into the 
reinsurance agreement, a matter not judicially settled yet
5 but whose determination 
depends upon the nature of facultative reinsurance. Some of the cases have adopted the 
view that reinsurers insure the reinsured’s liability for his undertaking to indemnify the 
assured under the original insurance contract. For that reason the purpose is that of 
ensuring that the liability of the reinsurers matches that of the reinsured
6. This view gives 
a limited function to the words “as original”, unless it is clear from other policy terms that 
incorporation is intended. On the other hand, in a number of cases, and until recently these 
represented the accepted view, the suggestion has been that reinsurance is a further 
insurance upon the same subject matter as the original contract of insurance. This view 
means that the phrase “as original” incorporates the terms of the original insurance into the 
reinsurance contract. Both views are examined in detail below, and the author’s own 
conclusions are then presented.  
 
1.1  The View That Reinsurance is a Further Insurance 
In the early development of reinsurance, a contract of reinsurance was defined as “a new 
assurance effected by a new policy on the same risk which was before insured in order to 
indemnify the underwriters from their previous subscriptions”
7. This analysis has been 
adopted by subsequent authorities: In British Dominions General Insurance Company v. 
                                                 
4 Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, para 17-01; see also O’Neill and Woloniecki, The Law of 
Insurance in England and Bermuda, para 1-13. 
5 Lord Mustill in Charter Reinsurance Co. v Fagan [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 113, 117; Enterprise Oil Ltd v 
Strand Insurance Co Ltd [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 500. 
6 Butler and Merkin’s Reinsurance Law, para B-0116; Lord Griffiths in Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v 
Butcher [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331, 336; Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. v Unione Italiana Anglo Saxon 
Reinsurance Co. Ltd. [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476, WASA International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington 
Insurance Co [2008] 1 CLC 340. 
7 Mansfield CJ in Delver v Barnes (1807) 1 Taunt 48, 51.    7
Duder
8 Buckley LJ expressed his view that a reinsurance contract insured the subject 
matter of the original insurance
9. Later cases have expressly denied that a contract of 
reinsurance is one of liability insurance
10. In CNA International Reinsurance Co Ltd & 
Ors v. Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade SA, where the reinsured affected a policy 
against the cancellation of a series of concerts by Placido Domingo, Clarke J held that the 
subject matter of the reinsurance was not the liability of the original insurer to the assured 
but rather the non-appearance of the performer 
11.   
 
1.2  The View That Reinsurance is a Liability Insurance  
Despite these views, in other cases it has been asserted that the reinsurance is a contract by 
the reinsurer to indemnify the reinsured against liability under the original insurance 
policy
12.  
 
In D.R. Insurance Co. v. Seguros America Banamex Adrian Hamilton QC rejected the idea 
that reinsurance is a further insurance on the subject matter insured
13. Further, in Home 
Insurance Company of New York v. Victoria-Montreal Fire Insurance Company, in 
explaining the inapplicability of a direct insurance notice term to the reinsurance contract, 
Lord Macnaghten defined reinsurance as a contract which “against the liability or a 
portion of the liability undertaken by the original insurer or the insurer covering the 
original insurer’s direct liability”
14. 
 
                                                 
8 [1915] 2 KB 394, 400. See also Mackenzie v Whitworth (1874-75) LR 10 Ex 142; Uzielli & Co v The 
Boston Marine Insurance (1884) 15 QBD 11; Nelson v Empress Assurance Corporation [1905] 2 KB 281, 
285; Forsikringsaktieselskabet National (of Copenhagen) v Attorney-General [1925] AC 639, 642 (here the 
reinsurance contract was a treaty rather than facultative); CGU International Insurance v AstraZeneca 
Insurance Co [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 409; Simon J in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington 
Insurance Co [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 604. 
9 However, in the same case, Bankes LJ stated that as between the reinsurers and the reinsured the value of 
the subject-matter of the insurance was agreed, and the former had contracted to reinsure a certain 
proportion of the latter’s liability in respect of that agreed value [1915] 2 KB 394, 411. 
10 Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance, per Hobhouse LJ, [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 516, 522. 
11 [1999] CLC 140. See also Aegis Electrical and Gas International Services Co Ltd v Continental Casualty 
Co. [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 17.  
12 Lord Templeman in Vesta v Butcher [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331, 334; Western Assurance Company of 
Toronto v Poole [1903] 1 KB 376, 386; South British Fire and Marine Insurance Co v Da Costa [1906] 1 
KB 456; English Insurance Co v National Benefit Assurance Co. [1929] AC 114; Merkin, “Incorporation of 
Terms Into Reinsurance Agreements”, The Modern Law of Marine Insurance Vol 2, 64; Carter, 
Reinsurance, 115; Louw, Golding: The Law and Practice of Reinsurance, 13.  
13 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 120, 129. See also Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co v Western Australian Insurance 
Co. (1927) 28 Ll LR 243, 251. 
14 [1907] AC 59, 63. See also Waller J in Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 
CLC 1515 (a point not appealed to the Court of Appeal).   8
The leading authority is now Wasa v Lexington
15. Sedley LJ here expressed the view that 
the purpose of reinsurance was to cover the primary insurer against an agreed proportion 
of the loss it may incur under its own policy
16. Wasa v Lexington is significant in 
clarifying the nature of facultative reinsurance and the interpretation of the contracts 
where the terms are written in a more or less identical fashion
17. The case is discussed in 
detail later in this thesis.   
 
1.3  Controversies in the “Further Insurance” View 
In analysing the two approaches, the “further insurance” concept appears fraught with 
difficulties.  
 
1.3.1  Privity of Contract 
First, if reinsurance is a further insurance of the subject matter of the original insurance, it 
is arguable that a contractual relationship is established between the reinsurer and the 
assured. The test to determine whether a contract is one of reinsurance was expressed by 
Lord Atkin in English Insurance v. National Benefit
18 as “whether or not the re-insurers or 
the alleged re-insurers have assumed a contractual liability to the original assured, for such 
an original contractual liability is not an incident of re-insurance, and if such an original 
liability had been assumed then there would have been a contract of insurance…”. It is 
clear that in reinsurance contracts there is no privity between the assured and the 
reinsurer
19. Consequently, the assured cannot make a direct claim against the reinsurer and 
a reinsurance contract does not contain any undertaking in favour of the assured
20. This 
                                                 
15 [2008] 1 CLC 340. 
16 [2008] 1 CLC 340, 362. 
17 Merkin, “The construction of facultative contracts”, Ins LM, June 2008, 1-4. 
18 [1929] AC 114, 124. 
19 Marine Insurance Act 1906, s.9(2) provides: “unless the policy otherwise provides, the original assured 
has no right or interest in respect of such reinsurance”. See also Hobhouse J in Phoenix General Insurance 
Co. of Greece S.A. v Halvanon Insurance Co. Ltd. [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 599, 614; Re Law Guarantee Trust 
and Accident Society [1914] 2 Ch 617; Versicherungs und Transport A/G. Daugava v Henderson (1934) 49 
Ll LR 252, however, controversially Scrutton LJ also declared that the reinsured had insurable interest in the 
subject matter originally insured.  
20 It should be noted that a reinsurance contract may, by virtue of a cut-through clause, provide that the 
assured can make a direct claim against the reinsurer in the event of the liquidation of the reinsured. 
However as the clause is provided by the reinsurance contract where the assured has no privity with, the 
objection as to the enforcement of the clause may appear. The passing of the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 has removed this objection by allowing a person who is not a party to a contract to enforce 
its terms if it expressly provides that he may or it identifies him as a beneficiary of the contract (s.1(1)). A 
cut-through clause could thus be interpreted as an express clause providing that the third party can make a 
claim against the reinsurer. See Butler and Merkin, para D-0151-D-0177; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, 
para 17-02; Merkin, R, A Guide to Reinsurance Law, 259-261. There may, however, be problems under the 
general pari passu principle applicable to unsecured creditors with enforcing a cut-through clause where the   9
contradiction was recognised in Forsikringsaktieselskabet National v. Attorney-General
21 
where Viscount Cave LC pointed out that “… the reinsurer does not become directly liable 
to the original householder who insures against fire, but it does undertake with the ceding 
office to take over a part of its liability under those policies”. However if reinsurance is a 
further insurance, it is arguably the assured who could make a claim against the reinsurer 
for any loss resulting from the occurrence of the insured peril
22. It is also noteworthy that 
Viscount Cave LC’s comment that “the reinsurer undertakes with the ceding office to take 
over a part of its liability under those policies” clearly indicates that reinsurance is in 
essence a liability insurance.  
 
It is also worth noting that reinsurers are entitled to seek a declaration that they are not 
liable according to the reinsurance policy terms for the payment that the reinsured has 
made but they cannot seek declaratory relief as to the reinsured’s liability to the assured 
under the original policy. This was decided in Meadows Insurance Co Ltd v Insurance 
Corporation of Ireland Ltd
23 where the reinsurer sought declarations to the effect that the 
reinsured was entitled to avoid, or alternatively was not liable, under the original policy. 
Following dicta of Lord Diplock in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers
24 the Court of 
Appeal emphasised that the reinsurer was a third party to the relationship between the 
assured and the reinsured and consequently had no right to seek a declaration with respect 
to the rights of those parties.  
 
1.3.2  Insurable Interest 
The view that reinsurance is a further insurance also assumes that the reinsured has an 
insurable interest in the subject matter insured by virtue of the original contract of 
insurance
25. The Marine Insurance Act 1906 s.9(1) can be interpreted as supporting this 
interpretation as it provides that “The insurer under a contract of marine insurance has an 
insurable interest in his risk, and may re-insure in respect of it”. Referring to s.9(1), 
                                                                                                                                                   
reinsured is insolvent: in fact, cut-through clauses are by their terms only triggered by an insolvency, so their 
validity remains doubtful. 
21 [1925] AC 639, 642. 
22 Golding, 7. 
23 [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 298. 
24 [1978] AC 435, 501. 
25 British Dominions v Duder [1915] 2 KB 394, 400. See also  Mathew LJ in Nelson v Empress [1905] 2 KB 
281, 285; Forsikringsaktieselskabet National v Attorney-General; CGU v Astrazeneca; in Feasey v Sun Life 
Assance Co of Canada [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 492 Langley J was also prepared to adopt this view.   10
Hobhouse LJ in Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance Co.
26 expressed the view that the 
reinsured’s insurable interest has to be identified by reference to the original policy and 
the reinsurer should be entitled to the benefit of any protection that the reinsured has 
obtained under the original contract of insurance.  
 
The word “risk” within the meaning of s.9(1) of the MIA 1906 needs to be clarified. The 
risk may be interpreted either as the insurer’s financial risk of indemnifying the assured or 
the loss of the subject matter of the original insurance. In Mackenzie v Whitworth 
Amphlett B stated that “… the fact of the policy being a re-insurance is only a limitation 
on the liability of the second insurer, and does not make his risk cease to be a risk on 
goods”
27. However such early decisions were handed down at a time when reinsurance 
policies were effected as second insurance against the loss of the subject matter insured
 by 
another policy
28. As a result, what must be specified was held to be the subject matter of 
insurance and not an interest in it
29. Therefore it was immaterial for the underwriters to 
know that the policy was reinsurance
30. Secondly, by reference to Hobhouse LJ’s opinion 
in Toomey v Eagle Star, it can be argued that there is no need to afford to the reinsurer the 
reinsured’s protection under the original policy. It should be remembered that the 
reinsured has no actual legal interest in the property which is the subject matter of the 
original insurance, and therefore its interest must be confined to the nature and scope of 
the liability which it has undertaken under the direct insurance
31. To make a claim against 
the reinsurers, the reinsured has to establish and quantify its loss, ie, its liability to the 
assured
32. This means that if the reinsured is permitted to rely on an exclusion clause in 
the original policy but it fails to do so and makes payment, such payment would be 
classified as “ex-gratia” and accordingly outside the cover of reinsurance. Consequently, it 
                                                 
26 [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 516, 522-523. 
27 (1874-75) LR 10 Ex 142, 151. 
28 The parties manipulated the word “insurer” as “reinsurer” in the standard form of original insurance 
policies. See Merkin “Incorporation of Terms”, 61; O’Neill/Woloniecki, para 1-27. In Dalby v India (1854) 
15 CB 365 the insurers had insured the life of the Duke of Cambridge, and had taken out their own policy 
which they maintained in force even after the primary insurance had been surrendered. Merkin has argued 
that the second policy was in some form of reinsurance but this view was not considered in Feasey v Sun 
Life. 
29  (1875) LR 10 Ex 142, 148; see also Carruthers v Sheddon (1815) 6 Taunt 14; Crowley v Cohen (1832) 3 
B & Ad 478 where it was  emphasised that the nature of the interest did not need to be properly described. 
30 See Merkin, “Incorporation of Terms”, 61. 
31 Golding, 8. 
32 Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Plc. [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 607, 613.   11
appears that the insured risk is a concern of the reinsurers only because it forms the 
reinsured’s liability and not because it is the subject matter of the original insurance
33. 
 
Nevertheless after Feasey v Sun Life, it is apparent that  much depends upon the drafting 
of the the reinsurance agreement
34. In Feasey the majority of the Court of Appeal
35 held 
that the reinsured, Steamship Mutual, had an insurable interest in the lives of employees of 
its member shipowners, but this decision was based on the express wording of the 
reinsurance. Although SM had reinsured its liability up until 1994 under ordinary 
contracts of reinsurance, due to changes in reserving requirements relating to liability 
insurance policies at Lloyd’s new policy wordings were developed and the traditional 
liability wording was abandoned in favour of the formulation that the subject matter of 
insurance was personal injury or death suffered by employees of the reinsured’s member 
shipowners and others on board their vessels. Therefore the point at issue was SM’s 
insurable interest in the well-being of employees of its member shipowners. As this was a 
life policy, the court did not look for any legal or equitable interest in the subject matter 
insured and the majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that the Club had pecuniary 
interest in personal injury or death of employees and others. Such interest was held to 
exist at the outset as SM had legal obligations to members which could lead to SM having 
to pay substantial sums. Consequently the Feasey case supports the idea that insurers may 
have insurable interest in the subject matter of the original insurance but only if the 
wording of the policy so provides. The dispute settled before further appeal, so it remains 
open at the level of the House of Lords as to whether the majority view in Feasey is 
applicable to ordinary reinsurance cases.   
 
1.3.3  Co-insurance / Double Insurance   
It has been submitted that reinsurance should be distinguished from double insurance and 
co-insurance
36. Double insurance arises where the assured takes out more than one policy 
on the same subject matter, risk and interest
37. Co-insurance arises where there are two or 
                                                 
33 In some early authorities the reinsured’s insurable interest was regarded as loss originating from his 
contractual liability under the original insurance policy but they also held that reinsurance policy was on the 
subject matter of the original insurance: Brett MR in Uzielli v Boston Marine Insurance Co. (1884-85) LR 
15 QBD 11, 16-17; Bradford v Symondson (1880-81) LR 7 QBD 456. 
34 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, para 17-04. 
35 [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 637. 
36 Lowry and Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 390. 
37 Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, para C-0630.   12
more subscribing insurers to the contract
38. If it is correct to say that reinsurance is a 
further insurance on the original subject matter, it becomes possible to argue that 
reinsurance is a form of co-insurance, because both the reinsurer and the reinsured are 
insuring the same risk. However, the assured has no contract with the reinsurer, so the co-
insurance argument cannot stand. For the same reason, reinsurance cannot be regarded as 
double insurance, because the assured cannot be said to have taken out two policies on the 
same risk: it is simply the case that there are two policies on the same risk, but with 
different policyholders. 
In the London Market risks which cannot be insured directly by reason of local regulatory 
requirements are brought to the market via fronting arrangements where the local insurer 
acts as a front by underwriting the risk and reinsuring most or all of it with reinsurers
39. If 
reinsurance is a further insurance, it is possible to argue that reinsurance should be 
classified as co –insurance where the reinsured cedes most of the risk or double insurance 
where it cedes the whole of the risk insured
40. Admittedly, the view that reinsurance is a 
further insurance assumes that the relevant interest is the reinsured’s interest in the subject 
matter insured and this seems to be a feature which distinguishes insurance from 
reinsurance, but in fact the risk is the reinsured’s financial loss for its undertaking against 
the assured. Essentially it is only the assured who possesses an insurable interest in the 
subject matter insured by the original contract of insurance. Another distinguishing feature 
is that in the context of reinsurance the insurer handles and is responsible for settling 
original incoming claims which it then seeks to pass on to his own reinsurer, whereas  in 
co-insurance there is mutuality of interest between insurers
41. In addition to that, lack of 
privity of contract distinguishes reinsurance from double insurance
42. 
 
                                                 
38 The term co-insurance is also commonly used to refer to the situation in which there are two or more 
assureds insured for their respective rights and interests under a single policy. See Colinvaux & Merkin’s 
Insurance Contract Law, para A-600. The term is not used in that sense here. 
39 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, para 17-01. 
40 It should be pointed out that in Switzerland fronting arrangements are made by means of co-insurance 
where only the leading co-insurer (licensed in Switzerland) is named in the contract with the direct assured. 
While the co-insurers share the risk according to their proportion, only the leading co-insurer assumes the 
risk in full and the direct policyholder has no claim against the other co-insurers. This relationship is 
regarded as reinsurance. See Merkin, What is Reinsurance, 77. However this is not the form that the London 
market applies. 
41 Roar Marine Ltd v Bimeh Iran Insurance Co [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 423. 
42 Legh-Jones, Birds, Owen,  MacGillivray on Insurance Law, para 33-2.   13
1.4  The Preferable Opinion 
It has to date not been proved necessary to determine conclusively whether reinsurance is 
a further insurance or liability insurance
43. However in practice the implications are of 
some significance. Determination of the nature of facultative reinsurance is particularly 
important where the terms of the reinsurance and the underlying insurance are identical 
and the reinsured has been held liable in circumstances in which the reinsurer believes 
itself not to be liable. In such a case, if facultative reinsurance is regarded as an 
independent insurance of the same risk as that covered by the direct insurance, it is easier 
to argue that the reinsurance covers only those risks which fall within the terms of the 
reinsurance as construed in accordance with its own applicable law
44. However, if its 
purpose is to cover the primary insurer’s loss that may be incurred under the direct policy, 
then the reinsurer will be obliged to indemnify the reinsured on the ground that the 
reinsured’s liability to the assured has been established and quantified
45. Moreover the 
function of the phrase “as original” varies depending upon which theory is recognised: as 
seen in various parts in this thesis, acceptance of the incorporation point of view may have 
the effect of extending the reinsurer’s liability beyond that actually contracted for and in 
some cases could even amount to a re-writing of the contract of reinsurance by the 
courts
46. For these reasons it appears that it is crucial to ascertain the nature of reinsurance 
and this thesis puts forward the suggestion that the subject matter of reinsurance is the 
liability of the reinsured arising from his engagement under the original insurance 
contract. Beside the points raised above, additional reasons for this suggestion are as 
follows.  
 
First, the earlier authorities, such as Delver v Barnes
47 were decided at a time when 
reinsurance contracts were effected by a further insurance on the same subject matter as 
that of the previous policy and where the parties manipulated the word used to bring that 
about, eg, “insured” became “re-insured”. Such practice led to the understanding that 
                                                 
43 O’Neill and Woloniecki, para 1-35. Moreover, in Wasa v Lexington Longmore LJ noted that in accepting 
either view the result would be the same. [2008] 1 CLC 340, 358. 
44 Sedley LJ, Wasa v Lexington [2008] 1 CLC 340, 362. 
45 Sedley LJ, Wasa v Lexington [2008] 1 CLC 340, 362. 
46 See below, Heading nos 2.4.2.2. and 2.4.3. 
47 (1807) 1 Taunt 48.    14
reinsurance was formed as a further insurance on the subject matter insured
48. Obviously 
this is not the current practice of the London Market
49.  
 
Secondly, liability insurance is defined as a contract of indemnity which covers the risk of 
the assured incurring liability to third parties
50. Because such an agreement is a contract of 
indemnity, the assured cannot recover until loss is sustained and his liability for that loss 
has been established and quantified
51. In the same way, it is clear law that in order to make 
a claim against the reinsurer, the reinsured has to establish and quantify his liability, either 
by virtue of a judgment or arbitration award against him or a settlement binding on the 
reinsurer
52. In other words, the reinsured has no cause of action against the reinsurer until 
his liability to the assurd has been ascertained
53. Moreover, there is a strong presumption 
that the risks covered by the insurance and facultative proportional reinsurance are likely 
to be identical as the two policies are generally to be construed back-to-back. This 
assumption is based on the notion that the reinsured cedes the whole or part of the risk 
insured to the reinsurer in return for a proportionate part of the premium. The reinsured 
chooses this method with the object of reducing the amount of its possible loss
54. If 
reinsurance is a further insurance, in fact, there may be no reason for assuming that the 
provisions of the two contracts are identical. Furthermore, as is the case with contracts of 
liability insurance, facultative reinsurance policies may also contain claims co-operation 
clauses whereby the reinsured undertakes not to admit liability or to settle a claim without 
first obtaining the reinsurer’s consent. It appears that the only reason for the reinsurer to be 
concerned about the direct loss is that it will establish his liability. On this analysis it 
becomes clear that facultative reinsurance contracts cover the liability of the reinsured 
                                                 
48 See also Sedley LJ’s comment in Wasa v Lexington [2008] 1 CLC 340, 361-362. 
49 In the London Market  it is often the case that the facultative reinsurance policy is subscribed before the 
underlying insurance  has been concluded, eg Vesta  v Butcher, and this practice also indicates that  
Mansfield CJ’s definition in Delver v Barnes does not meet the modern practice of reinsurance. 
MacGillivray on Insurance Law, para 33-3. 
50 See Fletcher Moulton LJ in British Cash and Parcel Conveyors v Lamson Store Service [1908] 1 KB 
1006, 1014; Goddard & Smith v Frew [1939] 4 All ER 358.   
51 West Wake Price & Co v Ching [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 618; Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance 
Society [1967] 2 QB 363; Socony Mobil Oil Co Inc v West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd, The Padre Island [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 529; Bradley v Eagle Star Insurance Co. [1989] 1 
AC 597; Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
52  Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312;  Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Co v Western Australian Insurance Co Ltd (1927) 28 Ll LR 243. 
53 Per Maugham LJ in Daugava v Henderson (1934) 49 Ll LR 252, 254; Home Insurance Company of New 
York v Victoria-Montreal Fire Insurance Company [1907] AC 591. 
54 Golding, 17.   15
against its undertaking in the original policy
55. However, this conclusion should not be 
taken to mean that reinsurance is a form of general liability insurance in favour of the 
reinsured. That might be possible if the reinsurer was obliged to pay for the reinsured’s 
extra-contractual liability, as where the reinsured has been held liable to pay a sum to the 
original assured in excess of its contractual obligation to the assured in tort or for breach 
of contract
56. The reinsurer is under the duty to provide indemnity to the reinsured only 
within the limits of the reinsured’s contractual liability under the original policy
57.   
  
In terms of calculating the limitation period in liability insurance the date of the assured’s 
loss is the date at which his liability to the third party is established and quantified
58. If 
reinsurance is further insurance of the original subject matter, both the statutory – and any 
contractual - limitation period, should run from the same date for both the assured and the 
reinsured. Nevertheless, as emphasised in Dornoch Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance plc.
59, 
notification clauses are not suitable for use in liability insurance because such clauses 
assume that there has been actual physical loss whereas in the liability insurance and 
reinsurance contexts there is no loss until liability has been established and quantified. In 
Home Insurance v Victoria-Montreal the Privy Council also stated that the reinsurer could 
not act until the direct loss was ascertained between parties over whom he had no control, 
and in proceedings in which he could not intervene. This analysis also strengthens the 
argument that the reinsurer insures the insurer’s liability
60. 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 See Sedley LJ in Wasa v Lexington [2008] 1 CLC 340, 362; Merkin, “Incorporation of Terms”, 66; Carter, 
4.  
56 See Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp. 99 Wis 2d 635, 1981 discussed in Chapter 10 below. 
57 See Butler and Merkin, para C-0137. 
58 Sphere Drake Insurance plc v Basler Versicherungs-Gesellschaft [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 35; Halvanon 
Insurance Co Ltd v Companhia de Seguros do Estado de So Paulo [1995] LRLR 303; Baker v Black Sea 
and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd [1995] LRLR 261 (the point did not arise in the appeal). The same 
principle applies to excess of loss reinsurance, in that the date that the excess point is reached triggers the 
reinsurers’ liability to the reinsured: North Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v Bishopsgate Insurance Ltd. [1998] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 459, 462. However see Feasey v Sun Life of Canada [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 637 where the 
test was varied by express wording that the reinsurer’s duty to provide indemnity arose on the happening of 
a given event.  
59 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 544. 
60 See Edelman, Burns Craig and Nawbatt, The Law of Reinsurance, para 4.71.   16
1.5  Wasa v Lexington 
The effect of the nature of facultative reinsurance to the construction of this type of 
contract can clearly be seen in the recent Court of Appeal case, WASA International 
Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co
61, which shows how the outcome can vary 
according to the view adopted as to the nature of facultative reinsurance. Wasa v 
Lexington illustrates many of the points made above.  
 
Here, Lexington issued property insurance for Alcoa. The risk then was reinsured in the 
London Market, Wasa and AGF taking a 2.5% line. The insurance provided coverage 
from 1 July 1977 until 1 July 1980. The reinsurance policy contained the “Full 
Reinsurance Clause” and the policy period was stated to be 36 months from 1 July 1977.  
 
In 1990s Alcoa was forced by US regulators to clean up pollution and contamination of 
groundwater, surface water and soil at numerous of its US manufacturing sites. The 
damage arose out of continuing failures, starting in 1942 and going on at least until 1986. 
In proceedings brought by Alcoa, Lexington was held to be liable for losses which 
occurred before, during and after the period 1 July 1977 to 1 July 1980. In holding the 
reinsured so liable the Washington Supreme Court, applying the law of Pennsylvania, 
placed emphasis upon the insuring clause of the original policy, which defined the insured 
perils as “all physical loss of, or damage to, the insured property as well as the interruption 
of business, except as hereinafter excluded or amended.” The Court found the wording of 
the clause to be very broad, and concluded that it contained no limitation as to the time of 
the physical loss of or damage to property. The Court also drew attention to the fact that 
there was no exclusion in the policy for physical loss or damage occurring before the 
policy’s inception.  
 
Lexington thereafter settled the claim. However Wasa and AGF denied liability by 
asserting that it was never the intention that the reinsurance should respond to loss and 
damage occurring outside the reinsurance period and that, although a US court might take 
a different view, the reinsurance was governed by English law which did not permit 
recovery for loss or damage occurring outside the policy period. By contrast, the reinsured 
asserted that the two contracts were back-to-back, and therefore it was entitled to recover.  
                                                 
61 [2008] 1 CLC 340.   17
 
The reinsurers sought negative declaratory relief in England and at first instance Simon J 
decided in their favour. The learned judge accepted that the contracts were for the most 
part back to back, but the reinsurance was governed by English law whereas the 
insurance was governed by Pennsylvania law and the contracts were accordingly not 
back-to-back in that crucial respect. Therefore, the period clause in the reinsurance 
contract was to be construed in accordance with English law and was not automatically 
to be interpreted in the same way as that of the original policy. That was particularly the 
case given that it could not have been predicted in 1977 that Pennsylvania law would be 
applied to the direct policy and that Pennsylvania law would construe the policy as 
providing cover for more than three years. He declared that the reinsurance was not 
liability insurance but a further insurance on the subject matter originally insured. The 
two contracts therefore were to be analysed according to their respective applicable laws 
and under English law the point of focus was whether the loss fell within the reinsurance 
policy terms. The learned judge’s conclusion was that the time period was fundamental 
to the cover that the reinsurers were not bound by the construction afforded to the direct 
policy and that the reinsurers were as a matter of English law not liable for the loss that 
occurred outside the three year period of cover stated in the reinsurance policy. 
 
The reinsured appealed and the Court of Appeal unanimously reversed the first instance 
judgment. Longmore LJ, who gave the leading judgment, stated that even though the 
period was expressed in slightly different words, the two clauses were to all intents and 
purposes identical
62. However Longmore LJ added that reliance on the concept of back-
to-back cover was not helpful because it raised a circular argument: the reinsured argued 
that the parties intended that the period clauses in each policy were to be construed in 
the same way, whereas the reinsurers asserted that the contracts were not back-to-back 
in nature so that the period clauses meant different things.  Longmore LJ expressed the 
view that the back-to-back issue disguised the real question of whether the same period 
of cover should receive the same interpretation in both the original insurance and the 
reinsurance and he concluded that in this case they did. 
 
                                                 
62 [2008] 1 CLC 340, 352.   18
The Court of Appeal found Vesta v Butcher and Groupama Navigation et Transports  v. 
Catatumbo Seguros
63 - cases that will be discussed in detail below under the “presumption 
of back-to-back cover” heading – to be indistinguishable. In those cases warranties in the 
reinsurance and underlying insurance were construed in the same way even though the 
contracts were governed by different laws, for the reason that the presumed intention of 
the parties was that the two contracts were to provide identical cover
64. Longmore LJ also 
rejected the argument that the reinsurer could not have contemplated either an unexpected 
construction of the clause or a change in the law, years after the policy incepted: the 
reinsurers, by writing their policy in the same form as the direct cover, had agreed to take 
the risk of such change. The reinsurers also relied on Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v 
Sea Insurance Co Ltd
65 as authority for the proposition that the duration clause in the 
reinsurance was to be construed independently of the duration clause in the direct 
insurance. However, the Court of Appeal distinguished MMI as in that case there were 
three different reinsurance contracts with different reinsurers (or the same reinsurers but 
with different percentages). The loss occurred during an eighteen-month period straddling 
all three years of cover, and the reinsured made the claim without allocating the loss to 
any particular year. It was held in MMI that the fact that these facts made allocation 
crucial, and on that basis the losses had to be allocated proportionately by reference to the 
duration of the liability of each of the reinsurers. However in Wasa there was a single 
reinsurance contract for the same period as the direct policy, and the duration terms were 
equivalent. Sedley LJ pointed out that the purpose of reinsurance was to cover the 
reinsured’s liability as undertaken in the original policy
66. Accordingly, the reinsurers 
were held to be liable for the proportion of that liability that they assumed where the 
reinsured’s liability was established.  
 
In Wasa it is not clear whether the parties chose to use the J1 or the NMA 1779 Form, as 
the slip provided for an option by the broker. It stated “Form: J1 or NMA 1779 covering 
All Risks of Physical Loss or Damage …..as original”  and “Conditions: Full R/I Clause 
No.1 amended.” The distinction is potentially significant, because NMA 1779 introduces a 
warranty about the insurance terms, rather than their incorporation, and also uses the 
                                                 
63 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 350. 
64 In those cases it was also held that the original policy terms were incorporated into the reinsurance 
contract, although incorporation was apparently conceded in Wasa. 
65 [1996] CLC 1515. 
66 [2008] 1 CLC 340, 361-362.   19
words “...during the continuation of the policy”, giving rise to the argument that any 
liability would be limited to 36 months. It has been suggested by Weir that the J1 form is 
issued only where a full policy wording is to be provided, but in the absence of any policy 
the contract must have been in NMA 1779 Form.
67 
  
The Court of Appeal accepted that NMA 1779 did not contain a follow the settlements 
clause. However it contained an obligation: “... to pay or to make good to the Reinsured all 
such Loss as aforesaid as may happen to the subject matter of this Reinsurance, or any part 
thereof during the continuance of this Policy.” The Court also recognised the fact that the 
“Full R/I Clause No. 1 as amended” referred to in the “Conditions” had not been 
identified, but was a standard clause used in the London market in the following terms: 
“Being a Reinsurance of and warranted same gross rate, terms and conditions as and to 
follow the settlements of the ... Company and that said Company retains during the 
currency of this Policy at least ... on the identical subject matter and risk and in identically 
the same proportion on each separate part thereof, but in the event of the retained line 
being less than as above, Underwriters’ lines to be proportionately reduced.” Therefore the 
Court concluded that because the J1 form contained a similar provision, it could 
reasonably be inferred that the full reinsurance clause was specifically referred to in the 
slip in case the NMA 1779 form was to be used
68. Incorporation was not the ratio of the 
Court of Appeal’s interpretation. Longmore LJ also noted “Rather than asking whether the 
reinsurance was intended to be back to back or whether the reinsurance was intended only 
to apply to loss and damage occurring within the policy period (affirmative answers could 
be given to both questions), it is probably better to ask whether the parties intended that, to 
the extent that they used the same or equivalent wording in the reinsurance as in the 
underlying insurance they intended that wording to have the same meaning in both 
contracts.”
69 Longmore LJ noted that this was not quite the same as asking merely whether 
the intention was  back to back coverage because it was always possible that the 
reinsurance, while containing wording the same as or equivalent to that in the underlying 
contract, could contain wording relevant only to reinsurance
70. Turning to the original 
policy Lexington undertook to provide insurance “on property” as described “from the 1st 
day of July 1977 to the 1st day of July 1980 beginning and ending at noon”. The 
                                                 
67 Weir, 218, 235. 
68 [2008] 1 CLC 340, 346. 
69 [2008] 1 CLC 340, 352. 
70 [2008] 1 CLC 340, 352.   20
reinsurance was on “all property of every kind and description and/or as original” for a 
period “36 months at date 1.7.77”. The period, although expressed in slightly different 
words, was thus effectively identical. The Washington Supreme Court based its decision 
on the words “all risks or physical loss…”, words also contained in the reinsurance 
agreement. Accordingly it does not matter whether the terms are warranted, as suggested 
by Weir, or whether the contracts are to be construed back to back: those words are to be 
given a common interpretation. 
 
Longmore LJ also felt that even if Vesta and Groupama were to be distinguished, any 
distinction was of fact rather than principle
71. The Court also pointed out that proration 
of damage only makes sense by reference to the existence of different periods of cover 
or different years of cover. Thus Longmore LJ accepted that the policy period was an 
important part of the policy’s construction Washington Supreme Court and adopted 
Merkin’s comment in Ins LM in October 2007 that “By accepting premium on the same 
basis as the reinsured, and by using words which were more or less indistinguishable 
from those in the direct policy, the arguments put forward by Lexington appear to have 
great cogency”.  
 
Longmore LJ chose not to decide if facultative reinsurance was further insurance or 
liability insurance, because on either view the outcome would be the same. Phil LJ also 
did not express any opinion on the point. Sedley LJ, by contrast, emphasised the 
historical development of reinsurance and pointed out that since marine reinsurance had 
in its origins been regarded as a form of gambling, such contracts were banned in Great 
Britain by the Marine Insurance Act 1745 s.4 until the passing of the Revenue (No.2) 
Act 1864. Sedley LJ asserted that because of the ban -even though they were not 
forbidden- non-marine reinsurance contracts were ascribed to the insured risk rather than 
the to underlying insurance
72. Sedley LJ distinguished the current reinsurance practice 
from the old tradition and stated that now the vocabulary and practice of reinsurance 
indicate that “what is reinsured is the insurer’s own liability”
73.  
 
                                                 
71[2008] 1 CLC 340, 357. 
72 [2008] 1 CLC 340, 361-362.  
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It may be seen that if, as assumed by Simon J, facultative reinsurance is a further 
insurance on the original subject matter, the two contracts may be interpreted 
independently of each other according to their respective applicable laws, However the 
Court of Appeal did not adopt this view. In Wasa the Washington Supreme Court 
decided the case in reliance on the original policy terms, holding that the three-year 
period limitation did not preclude coverage for loss before or after that period. The 
reinsurance contracts contained no contrary provisions or exclusion, but were worded 
“as original”. Thus, the reinsurance contracts contained the same perils insured clause as 
the underlying policy, and the premium had been shared proportionately. It might have 
been argued that the Washington Supreme Court decision was manifestly perverse and 
accordingly not binding in establishing the reinsured’s liability
74 but no suggestion of 
that type was made
75. The point was that the Washington decision was unexpected and 
the question was whether the reinsurers should be bound by the outcome. The above 
analysis indicates that where the reinsurance contract is worded to all intents and 
identically to the underlying insurance, there is no reason why the reinsurance is to be 
construed differently from the original policy
76.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 There is authority to suggest that a “perverse” decision of a foreign court might not be regarded as 
binding: Commercial Union Assurance Co plc v NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600. 
75 In fact it is not clear what exactly “perverse” means; for the discussion see the second part of this thesis, 
Heading 5.2.1. 
76 See Merkin, “Back to Back Cover”, Ins LM October 2007 and Merkin, “The Construction of Facultative 
Contracts”, Ins LM June 2008, 4.    22
CHAPTER 2 THE FUNCTION OF THE OPENING WORDS OF THE FULL 
REINSURANCE CLAUSE 
 
As mentioned above, in the London Market, facultative reinsurance contracts are formed 
by appending to the direct policy a cover page which states that reinsurance is on the same 
terms “as original”. The comments on the purpose of using that wording are not 
consistent, and the judicial view has not been settled although the bulk of authority holds 
that the phrase carries the terms of the insurance contract into the reinsurance agreement. 
Nevertheless, it might be thought that acceptance of this view has created unnecessary 
controversies and sometimes superfluous and confusing analysis
77. This chapter will 
consider the arguments.   
 
2.1  Dispute That Incorporation is Not a Desired Aim 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries an underwriter who insured risks in 
which he was not an expert would refer to other policies that had already been taken out 
on the same subject matter and against the same risk. Such contracts contained a typical 
clause worded as “warranted to be on the same rate, terms and identical interest of 
…Insurance Company.” Such clauses were interpreted by the courts as conditions 
precedent to the liability of the underwriters that the terms of the later insurance contract 
were identical to the earlier policy referred to
78. As a result, disparities between the 
policies such as premium differences
79 or valuation of the policy
80 were held to be 
breaches of conditions precedent that relieved the insurers from liability
81.  
 
A similar attitude has been expressed in some modern reinsurance authorities where the 
full reinsurance clause was worded as “warranted same gross rate terms and conditions”. 
In Vesta v Butcher
82 Lord Griffiths expressed his reluctance to read the phrase as effecting 
the incorporation of the original policy terms into the reinsurance contract. His Lordship’s 
                                                 
77  Nicoll, “HIH Litigation”, (2003) 119 LQR 572, 581. 
78 Barnards v Faber [1893] 1 QB 340; Bancroft v Heath (1901) 17 TLR 425. However, see: Walker & Sons 
v Uzielli (1896) Com Cas 452; The Sulphite Pulp Co Ltd v Faber (1895-96) 1 Com Cas 146; Beauchamp v 
Faber (1898) 3 Com Cas 308. 
79 Barnard v Faber; Walker & Sons v Uzielli. 
80 Bancroft v Heath. 
81 It should be noted that while classifying such clauses as conditions precedent to the liability of the 
underwriters, the courts did not give any importance to the word “warranted”.  
82 [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331, 337. See also Kerr LJ’s speech in Phoenix General Insurance v Halvanon 
Insurance [1988] QB 216, 278.   23
view was that the clause amounted to a warranty given by the insurer that he had placed 
the risk on the same terms that he has disclosed to the reinsurers.  
 
Although the majority of the House of Lords did not agree with Lord Griffiths and held 
that the clause incorporated the terms of the original policy into the reinsurance contract,
83 
later authorities have accepted Lord Griffiths’ assertion. For instance, in AIG Europe (UK) 
Ltd. v Anonymous Greek Co of General Insurances, The Ethniki
84 Colman J confined the 
function of the “as original” wording as ensuring that the substantive or subject-matter 
terms of the reinsurance, matched the substantive or subject-matter terms of the primary 
cover. In parallel with this argument it is possible to affirm that the reason for appending 
the direct policy may be no more than to confirm that reinsurers have seen and understood 
the scope of the direct policy.  
 
Nevertheless as it appears that incorporation was seen as the intended objective from the 
early development of reinsurance law, and followed by the majority of modern 
reinsurance cases, it has become necessary to analyse requirements and scope of 
incorporation.  
 
2.2  Development of the Theory of Incorporation 
It seems that incorporation was seen as the intended objective from the early development 
of the reinsurance law
85. For instance, in Re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co. ex parte. 
Western Insurance Co
86, Joseph Walton QC stated in his address to the court that the 
policy containing the clause “Being a reinsurance…subject to the same terms and 
conditions as the original policy, and to pay as may be paid thereon” was in the usual form 
at Lloyd’s. He stated that the original policy may have been effected at various places, and 
may not perhaps be at hand, or cannot be copied in, so the incorporation of the terms of 
the original policy was effected by the use of this form
87.  
                                                 
83 Incorporation was indeed common ground between the parties, so the case proceeded on that basis. 
84 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 221, aff’d [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 343; However in Toomey v Banco Vitalicio De 
Espana SA de Seguros [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 354 the reinsurers relied on Lord Griffiths’ speech in Vesta; 
nevertheless Andrew Smith J expressly rejected their contention. 
85 The Imperial Marine Insurance Co. v The Fire Insurance Corp. Ltd. (1879) 4 CPD 166. In truth, 
reinsurance appears to be as old as insurance itself. However reinsurance was declared to be illegal by s.4 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1745 unless the insurer was insolvent, bankrupt or dead, a prohibition which lasted 
until the Revenue (No.2) Act 1864, s.1. 
86 [1892] 2 Ch 423, 425.  
87 [1892] 2 Ch 423, 425. The common nature of the form was also emphasised by Phillimore LJ in Street v 
Royal Exchange Assurance (1914) 19 Com Cas 339, 349.   24
 
There are also numerous modern authorities supporting this notion. For example, in 
Toomey v. Banco Vitalicio De Espana SA de Seguros, Andrew Smith J adopted the view 
that the clause “Being a reinsurance of and warranted the same gross rate, terms and 
conditions as …” incorporated the terms of the direct policy into the reinsurance rather 
than creating a warranty that the underlying insurance was on identical terms to those 
disclosed to the reinsurance
88.  
 
2.3  Requirements for Incorporation 
The specific requirements of incorporation of the terms of the original policy into the 
reinsurance were laid down in HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire 
Insurance Co.
89 Before considering these requirements some general principles should be 
considered. First, in a retrocession context, the wording “as original” refers to the primary 
insurance and not the reinsurance
90. Secondly, there is a question as to whether the 
reference is to the policy alone or other documents. In American International Marine 
Agency of New York Inc v Dandridge
91 it was held that “original policy” meant the slip 
policy or the policy itself, but not other documents such as a binder which provided for the 
insurer’s participation in the cover. Thirdly, there will be no incorporation if the original 
insurance contract is itself incomplete at the time the reinsurance is made
92. 
 
As laid down in HIH v New Hampshire, incorporation of a particular clause depends upon 
the construction of the reinsurance as well as surrounding circumstances
93. A term can be 
incorporated from a direct policy into a reinsurance agreement if:  
 
                                                 
88 On appeal the reinsurance contract was held to be voidable for misrepresentation. Thomas LJ who gave 
the only reasoned judgment in the Court of Appeal left open the meaning of the full reinsurance clause 
[2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 423. See also Andrew Smith J’s obiter comment in Prifti v Musini Sociedad 
Anonima de Seguros y Reaseguros [2004] 1 CLC 517. 
89 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161. 
90 Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. v Unione Italiana Anglo Saxon Reinsurance Co.Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
476. However, in an earlier case, General Insurance Co of Trieste Ltd v Corporation of the Royal Exchange 
(1897) 2 Com Cas 144, both the reinsurance and retrocession contracts were “as original” and Mathew J 
recognised the incorporation of a term from the reinsurance into the retrocession. 
91 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 643. 
92 For instance in Cigna Life Insurance Co of Europe SA-NV v Intercaser SA de Seguros y Reaseguros 
[2001] CLC 1356 the reinsurance slip provided that the reinsurance conditions followed those in the direct 
policy, and that other terms and conditions were as per the Intercaser Reinsurance Contract. However there 
was no such contract as referred to in the slip in existence at the time it had been entered into. See also 
Excess Insurance Co Ltd v Mander [1995] CLC 838. 
93 American International Marine Agency v Dandridge [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 643.   25
-  the term was germane to the reinsurance; 
-  the term made sense, subject to permissible “manipulation”, in the context of the 
reinsurance; 
-  the term was consistent with the express terms of the reinsurance, and 
-  the term was apposite for inclusion in the reinsurance. 
 
It is now settled that the phrase “all terms and conditions as original” is not to be read as 
comprising “all” terms of the original policy
94. More explicitly, the terms germane to 
reinsurance are confined to those provisions defining the period, the geographical limits 
and the nature of the risk undertaken by the reinsurer
95. Further, the incorporation clause is 
not to be interpreted as encompassing clauses which are inconsistent with the reinsurance 
agreement
96. Even if a clause complies with other requirements, incorporation is not 
allowed to the extent that it contradicts the express provisions of the reinsurance
97. It is 
also permissible to incorporate a term which refers to, eg, the “insurer” by manipulating it 
to read “reinsurer”
98. What is permissible by way of manipulation is considered below. 
 
2.4  The Scope of Incorporation 
It is now settled that the incorporation wording does not encompass all of the provisions of 
the original insurance contracts. The established factors determining which terms may be 
incorporated are as follows. 
 
2.4.1  Incorporation of Unusual Terms 
The position under general contract law is that a clause with an onerous or unusual nature 
cannot be regarded as incorporated unless the party relying on it proves that he drew the 
other party’s attention to it
99. In the reinsurance context it has been established that clauses 
that in common use can be incorporated
100. 
                                                 
94 Pine Top v Anglo Saxon Reinsurance; Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v  Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 
CLC 1515, 1527. 
95 Pine Top v Anglo Saxon Reinsurance. 
96 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd; Home Insurance Company of New York v 
Victoria – Montreal Fire Insurance Company [1907] AC 59. 
97 Australian Widows’ Fund Life Assurance Society, Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia 
[1914] AC 634; MacGillivray on Insurance Law, para 33-62.  
98 CNA International Reinsurance Co Ltd  v. Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade SA [1999] CLC 140. 
99 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433. See also Henderson v 
Stevenson LR 2 Sc & Div 470; Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163. 
100 Marten v The Nippon Sea and Land Insurance Co. Ltd (1898) Com Cas 164; Charlesworth v Faber 
(1900) 5 Com Cas 408; but see Franco Hungarian v Merchants Marine Insurance, Shipping Gazette, June 
7, 1888.   26
  
A modified approach was adopted in HIH v New Hampshire, where the reinsured 
expressly waived its right to rely on breach of duty of disclosure by the assured, and the 
question was whether this clause was carried into the reinsurance contract. At first 
instance David Steel J accepted expert evidence to the effect that such clauses were often 
requested and “sometimes agreed”; hence were not unconscionable or extortionate. This 
led the trial judge to hold that the waiver of defences clause was not standard or 
customary, but in no sense unique, and that in all the circumstances it was fair to regard it 
as incorporated
101.  
 
It has been suggested that the effect of an unusual clause might be assessed in terms of 
good faith
102. If the original policy contains a clause which the reinsurer could not have 
expected to find, the reinsured would be bound by the rules of disclosure to bring the 
clause to the reinsurer’s attention as a material fact in pre-contract disclosure, because the 
reinsurer is entitled to expect the reinsurance to be in usual form
103. Thus, the reinsurer 
may be entitled to avoid the contract in the absence of disclosure
104. In HIH v New 
Hampshire
105 Rix LJ accepted, obiter, that the appropriate question was not whether there 
had been incorporation, but whether the reinsured had broken its duty of disclosure in 
relation to the unusual clause in the original policy.  
 
Incorporation of unusual terms may also lead to an extension of the reinsurer’s liability 
beyond its agreed scope. A typical example is the purported incorporation of a held 
covered clause from the original insurance into a reinsurance policy whose period of cover 
                                                 
101 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 378, 387. David Steel J (Rix LJ agreed [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161, para 207) 
distinguished Marten v The Nippon Sea and Land Insurance and Charlesworth v Faber because they were 
only authority for the proposition that reinsurers are bound by usual terms even to the extent of overriding an 
inconsistency, and that whether general words of incorporation can import an unusual or uncommon term “is 
quite a different question”. 
102 Butler and Merkin, para B-0124; MacGillivray on Insurance Law, para 33-57. In contract law, in 
Interfoto v Stiletto Bingham LJ gave some indication of his willingness to rely on the civil law good faith 
principle in formation of contracts. However, see Star Steamship Society v Beogradska Plovidba, The Junior 
K [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 583. 
103 Maritime Insurance v Stearns [1901] 2 KB 912. See Axa v Ace Global Markets [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
683 where in approving incorporation of standard market wordings into the reinsurance contract, Gloster J 
took into consideration that although the wording of EXEL 1.1.90 was not attached to the slip, it was clear 
from the express terms of the slip that the authors of it clearly had the EXEL 1.1.90 wording in front of them 
when drafting the slip or alternatively, it was clear that they were extremely familiar with its provisions. 
104 See Property Insurance Co v National Protector Insurance Co, (1913) Com Cas 119, 122 where Scrutton 
J stated that an unusual clause might be a material fact which ought to have been disclosed.  
105 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161, 199; See Charlesworth v Faber where the reinsurer unsuccessfully relied on 
the unusual nature of the clause in arguing that he was entitled to avoid the contract.   27
is expressly limited. Evidence that a held covered clause was commonly used in the 
particular form of insurance would give a strong argument that the reinsurer could be 
assumed to have been aware of the existence of the clause, and his liability would be 
extended beyond the terms of the reinsurance
106.  
 
In the general law of contract, market evidence may be used to determine whether the 
clause is of a usual nature, in other words whether a reasonable person should expect its 
existence. In Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual  Programmes Ltd, the Court 
looked at the rates of ten other firms and found that none of them charged as much as 
Interfoto. If both parties work in the same business, it is somewhat easier to determine 
whether a clause could be expected to be found in the contract in question
107. In the same 
way, in reinsurance cases, other similar contracts may be evidence as to whether the 
reinsurer should have expected the existence of such a clause in the insurance policy, as in 
HIH v New Hampshire
108.  
 
2.4.2  Incorporation of Inconsistent Terms  
2.4.2.1  Construction of Inconsistent Terms 
While the Courts’ view was mechanical in the old authorities
109, their attitude has changed 
and the current position is that conflicting incorporated terms are disregarded if they are 
incapable of being given a sensible meaning in the context, although the Courts will seek 
to give effect to them if the conflicting clauses can live together
110. The reason for this 
principle is that in the ordinary course of events the parties may be assumed to have given 
express consideration to written terms and much less, if any, consideration to the 
application of the incorporated terms
111.  
                                                 
106 In Charlesworth v Faber Bigham J accepted incorporation of a held covered clause into the reinsurance 
policy as such a provision was not unusual.   
107 Per Bingham LJ, in Interfoto, at 445. 
108 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 378, 287. 
109 See Doe & Leicester v Biggs, (1809) 2 Taunt 109, 113 where Mansfield CJ held stated that “the general 
rule is, that if there be a repugnancy, the first words in a deed, and the last words in a will, shall prevail”. 
110 Finagra Ltd v OT Africa Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 622; Metalfer Corporation v Pan Oceanhipping Co 
Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 632; Sabah Flour and Feedmills Sdn Bhd v Comfez Ltd. [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 18. 
Quinta CommunicationSA v Warrington [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 81. In Adamastos Shipping  v Anglo-Saxon 
Petroleum [1959] AC 133 the charterparty incorporated the US “Paramount Clause”. The clause was worded 
as “This bill of lading shall have effect subject to… the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States... 
1936…”. The House of Lords unanimously held that it did not make sense to begin a clause of a charterparty 
with the words “This bill of lading”; therefore on the true construction of the charterparty the Paramount 
Clause must be read as if it was “This charterparty shall have effect…”.  
111 It is much the same principle whereby typed clauses prevail over printed clauses and handwritten clauses 
will ordinarily prevail over typed clauses. See Farmers’ Co-op Ltd. v National Benefit Assurance Co. (1922)   28
2.4.2.2  Inconsistency between Reinsurance – Insurance Contracts 
In some early cases the independence of reinsurance and insurance contracts was 
recognised, and each was construed in accordance with its own terms. For instance, in 
Franco-Hungarian v Merchants Marine Insurance
112 the direct policy contained a held 
covered clause, whereas the retrocession policy did not, and the reinsurance was “as 
original”. Day J stressed that incorporated provisions operated only until the retrocession 
cover ended, according to its own term.  
 
Nevertheless, in Marten v The Nippon Sea and Land Insurance
113 Bigham J read the full 
reinsurance clause as extending the reinsurance cover beyond that stated in the 
reinsurance. In this case the issue was related to the physical limits of cover: the insurance 
covered the risk from warehouse to warehouse while the reinsurance was stated to be 
“from loading …until …safely landed at …port”. The goods were damaged in the customs 
warehouse after being discharged from the ship. Bigham J held that because of the 
commonplace nature of the clause, it was carried into the reinsurance contract. Similarly, 
in Charlesworth v Faber
114 the issue once again was the unusual character of the held 
covered clause, but Bigham J ruled that a held covered clause was in common use in 
connection with that particular kind of time policy on liners. He distinguished Franco-
Hungarian by asserting that in Franco no evidence appeared to have been given to show 
that the clause was well known and in common use. It has been asserted that Bigham J’s 
reason is unconvincing
115 because in Franco Day J did not mention the degree of any use 
of the relevant clause and his decision was based on the point that incorporation would 
have extended the reinsurer’s liability beyond that for which he actually contracted. It is 
unfortunate that the inconsistency between the terms of the insurance and reinsurance 
contracts was not taken into account by Bigham J and the learned judge did not give any 
weight to the terms of the reinsurance policy indicating the limited period of the 
reinsurance cover. It can be deduced from Bigham J’s conclusions that if an inconsistency 
appears, the original insurance provisions can override the terms of the reinsurance 
regardless of the independence of these contracts from each other. Consequently, those 
                                                                                                                                                   
13 Ll LR 530, 533 per Atkin LJ; City Tailors Ltd v Evans (1921) 9 Ll LR 394; The Ion, [1971] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 541. 
112 Shipping Gazette, June 7, 1888. 
113 (1898) Com Cas 164. 
114 (1900) Com Cas 408, 412. However the case was ultimately decided on the basis that the reinsurance was 
unenforceable under the Stamp Act 1891 as it was made for a longer period than twelve months. 
115 Butler and Merkin, para B-0130.   29
authorities show that if a term of the original insurance is common in nature, the full 
reinsurance clause may carry it into the reinsurance, thereby extending the reinsurer’s 
liability beyond his own contractual terms. 
 
It is noteworthy that in Joyce v Realm Marine Insurance Co.Ltd
116, Blackburn J 
disregarded an express discrepancy between the provisions of reinsurance and insurance 
agreements. Here, the original insurance contained an extension clause providing that 
“outward cargo to be considered homeward interest twenty-four hours after her arrival at 
her first port of discharge”. The reinsurance policy which was affected after the vessel had 
arrived in Africa (outward destination) did not mention the extension clause and provided 
cover “from the loading thereof and thereafter while the cargo was being conveyed 
between African ports and on its homeward voyage”. The cargo was damaged after the 
vessel arrived at an African port and at a time when the cargo had remained on its outward 
journey for more than twenty-four hours. Blackburn J was of the view that the 
incorporation wording permitted him to use the original policy terms as evidence to 
construe the reinsurance provisions. Consequently “from the loading thereof” was 
interpreted as covering constructive loading, in line with the original insurance. 
Interestingly, this case pre-dated Franco Hungarian in which the independence of the 
reinsurance contract was emphasised. However Franco is so poorly reported that it is not 
clear whether Day J distinguished Joyce
117.   
 
In Joyce, Blackburn J referred to Bell v Hobson
118 where in fact incorporation was not the 
issue and the concern was construction of marine policy terms. Lord Ellenborough stated 
that where an insurer’s liability in respect of marine cargo is expressed as commencing 
“from the loading on board”, the phrase is to be confined to the place from whence the risk 
commenced. He also added that if there was anything to indicate that a prior loading was 
contemplated by the parties, it will release the case from that strict construction
119. 
Blackburn J adopted Lord Ellenborough’s view but modified, to the effect that bringing 
the construction of the terms of the original policy into the reinsurance contract by virtue 
                                                 
116 (1871-72) LR 7 QB 580. 
117 Butler and Merkin, para B-127. The authors also submitted that Joyce did not create a general rule and 
applies only to the particular facts of the case.  
118 (1812) 16 East 240. 
119 (1812) 16 East 240, 243.   30
of the full reinsurance clause was possible. It may be assumed that if there had been no 
words of incorporation, the decision in Joyce could have been different
120.  
 
In Stronghold Insurance Co Ltd v Bulstrad Insurance and Reinsurance plc
121 the 
reinsurance contained the words: “all settlements made by the Company shall be binding 
on their Reinsurers and the Reinsurers agree to pay to the Company any amounts that may 
be recoverable under this Agreement within 15 (fifteen) days after the receipt of the 
necessary papers proving the loss.” The retrocession agreement stated “all clauses terms 
and conditions as original insofar as applicable and to pay as may be paid thereon.” The 
reinsurer argued that the effect of the “all clauses terms and conditions as original” 
wording in the retrocession was to incorporate the “follow the settlements” clause into the 
retrocession. The latter clause overrode the “pay as may be paid thereon” clause so that, 
without proving actual liability, the reinsurer could make a claim against the 
retrocessionaire where the reinsurer acted in a bona fides and businesslike manner. HHJ 
Mackie QC applied the requirements of incorporation laid down in  HIH v New 
Hampshire Insurance and held that “pay as may be paid” and “follow the settlements” 
clauses produced opposite results so that the two clauses were inconsistent each other and 
the latter could not be incorporated into the retrocession agreement.  
 
It is suggested that, while examining the effect of the incorporation wording on construing 
inconsistent terms, it is crucial to bear in mind that reinsurance and insurance contracts 
should be read according to their own terms as they are independent from each other
122. In 
other words, where the parties to the reinsurance made a specific agreement, this should 
not be disregarded
123. Obviously, problems are sidestepped if it is accepted that the “as 
original” wording has no function other than confirming that the terms of reinsurance 
match the original policy unless the parties agree otherwise. Moreover, even if the 
incorporation purpose is accepted, the Privy Council’s declaration in Australian Widows’ 
                                                 
120 It is seen in some recent authorities that the full reinsurance clause has been construed in similar 
understanding to Joyce. For example in Vesta v Butcher [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331 the majority of the House 
of Lords gave the warranty in the reinsurance contract a meaning in the same way as of the original 
insurance. Furthermore, in Groupama Navigation et Transports & Ors v Catatumbo Seguros [2000] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 350 , the Court of Appeal held that the inconsistency should be overcome by construing the 
reinsurance terms in the same way as of the direct policy. It should nevertheless be noted that in both cases 
the back to back presumption underlay the decisions. That presumption and these cases are examined in 
detail below.     
121 Unreported, see the March 2008 issue of Insurance Law Monthly. 
122 See O’Neill and Woloniecki para 1-35 where independent feature of these two contracts is emphasised.  
123 Heath Lambert Ltd v Sociedad de Corretaje de Seguros [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 905.   31
Fund v. National Mutual
124 has made it clear that “subject to the same terms and 
conditions as original”  should be construed as if it were prefaced with the words “except 
as herein otherwise provided”. 
 
2.4.3  Incorporation of Claims Clauses 
In considering the possibility of incorporation, it is necessary to look at whether the term 
is potentially applicable in the reinsurance context. For instance, a time bar clause that 
requires the assured to make a claim in 12-month period running from the date of loss 
cannot be applied to claims made by the reinsured against the reinsurer, because a 
reinsurance loss differs from the direct loss. The consideration that such clauses cannot 
make sense in the reinsurance context led the Privy Council in Home Insurance v Victoria 
– Montreal to hold that the time bar clause was not applicable to  claims under a 
retrocession contract. Although the scope of the full reinsurance clause was not the issue, 
the Privy Council’s reasoning is equally applicable when incorporation is under 
consideration
125. 
   
A different approach may be arguably justified in respect of claims co-operation clauses. 
Under liability policies, and particularly those written on a claims made basis, 
underwriters specify that they are to be informed of all circumstances that may give rise to 
claims against them, and also that the assured is not to incur any expense without their 
assent. Accordingly, in British General Insurance Company Ltd. v Mountain the Lord 
Chancellor stated that the interest of the insurer in being kept closely informed of the 
making and development of claims was equally applicable to the relationship between 
reinsurer and reinsured
126.  
 
On the other hand, in Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v. Sea Insurance Co Ltd
127, Waller 
J found that a clause requiring the assured to seek the insurer’s written consent prior to 
incurring legal costs was inapt to the reinsurance contract and he held that in the absence 
of compelling words in the reinsurance policy, was not to be regarded as incorporated into 
                                                 
124 [1914] AC 634, 642. 
125 Butler and Merkin, para B-0138. 
126 (1919) 1 Ll LR 605. In this case the original insurance contained a clause which required the assured not 
to incur any expense without consent of the underwriters and the reinsurance policy was subject to the same 
terms and conditions as original. However, no mention was made of any incorporation or back-to-back 
point. 
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it. The sense of this approach is illustrated by the judgment of Clarke J in CNA 
International Reinsurance Co Ltd v Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade SA
128, where 
something akin to a rewriting of the contract could be discerned, although the decision 
was based on very clear and careful analysis. In this case a problem arose as to the 
meaning of a clause incorporated into the direct policy which stated, as translated, “This 
contract shall be subject to control claim if a claim arises”. Accepting the incorporation of 
this provision into the reinsurance
129, Clarke J found it appropriate to manipulate the word 
“insurer” as referring to “reinsurer”. He also described the clause in the direct insurance 
context as “obscure”; nevertheless the learned judge was convinced that the draftsman of 
the policy must have intended the claim to be controlled by someone and the only 
reference in the context was the reinsurer who took over 90% of the risk. Moreover, 
Clarke J took into account the fact that reinsurance and insurance contracts were assumed 
to provide back-to-back cover; therefore the terms of the reinsurance were to be 
interpreted in a way to fit the reinsurance although they were originally drafted for the 
purposes of insurance.   
 
It should be pointed out that this discussion might have been avoided by accepting that 
reinsurers reinsure the liability of the reinsured under the original insurance contract. In 
that case, if the assured is in breach of a claims condition, and assuming that the term is a 
condition precedent, the insurer would be relieved from liability to the assured; as a result 
the reinsurer’s liability would not arise either. Accepting the contrary view resulted in a 
complex and unnecessary discussion.  
 
2.4.4  Incorporation of Implied Terms 
It is accepted in contract law that terms may be implied in fact, law or custom, where 
express terms do not deal with every aspect of performance of the contract
130. The 
question is whether an implied term of the original insurance is to be incorporated into the 
                                                 
128 [1999] CLC 140. 
129 “As original” wording was not the issue, but the reinsurance slip incorporated various wordings and also 
provided under the heading “interest” that the policy was to indemnify the assured for loss in the event of the 
cancellation of the concert. Clarke J accepted the argument that the interest clause was a reinsuring provision 
in its own right which had the effect of incorporating the underlying wording. 
130 Unless the parties expressly excluded it. Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, per Lord Cross at 
257-258. For detailed information about implied terms see Butterworth’s Law of Contract, 3rd ed, Professor 
Michael Furmston with special editors, para 3.19 et seq.    33
reinsurance policy by means of the full reinsurance clause
131. On one hand the 
presumption of back-to-back cover seems to make incorporation of implied terms 
acceptable; on the other, it is possible to contend that the purpose of appending the 
original slip or policy to the reinsurance contract is to ensure that the reinsurer has seen the 
terms of the insurance and is aware of the nature of his risk. In HIH v New Hampshire
132 
David Steel J expressed the view that implied terms would be incorporated into the 
contract of reinsurance. However it should be taken into consideration that the reinsurer 
cannot see the implied term while examining the original policy before signing the slip. As 
was stated above, onerous or unreasonable terms have been held not to be incorporated 
unless they had been notified to the reinsurers. Likewise, it would not be fair to compel 
the reinsurer to be bound by terms that were not apparent at the time the reinsurance 
contract was made. 
 
2.4.5  Incorporation of Arbitration Clauses 
2.4.5.1  Incorporation from Charterparty into Bills of Lading 
It is settled law that a general incorporation clause only carries terms which are “germane 
to . . . the proper subject matter” of the incorporating contract, namely the clauses related 
to the receipt, carriage, or delivery of the cargo or the payment of freight
133. An arbitration 
clause governs dispute resolution and is not relevant to the performance of the contract of 
carriage; it takes effect as a self-contained contract collateral to the substantive 
agreement
134. As a result, because of the ancillary and separable nature of an arbitration 
clause, unless it is clearly and expressly provided, general words of incorporation do not 
operate on it
135. 
 
                                                 
131 Recently, a few insurance cases have recognised implied terms: Goshawk Dedicated Ltd v Tyser & Co 
Ltd [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 224. In reinsurance context see Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece S.A. v 
Halvanon Insurance Co.Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 599, but contrast the restrictive view adopted in Bonner v 
Cox [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 385. 
132 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 378. 
133 Wilson, Carriage of Goods By Sea, 242; See, eg: The Varenna [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 592; The Annefield 
[1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1. 
134 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik  v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd. [1981] AC 909; 
Heyman v Darwins [1942] AC 356; Black Clawson Internatiol Ltd. v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg 
A.G. [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 446; Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd v Kansa General International 
Insurance Co. Ltd [1993] QB 701. 
135 Hamilton and Co. v Mackie and Sons (1889) 5 TLR 677; Thomas & Co Ltd v Portsea SS Co Ltd [1912] 
AC 1; The Elizabeth H [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 172; The Njegos [1936] P 90; Federal Bulk Carriers Inc. v Itoh 
& Co. Ltd. [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 103. For incorporation clauses that expressly referred to the arbitration 
clause into charterparties: see The Rena K [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 545; The Oinoussin Pride [1991] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 126; The Nerano [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1; The Delos [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 703; Merkin, Arbitration 
Law paras 5.19 to 5.33; Todd, “Incorporation of Arbitration Clauses into Bills of Lading” [1997] JBL 331.   34
2.4.5.2  Incorporation from Direct Insurance into Reinsurance Contracts 
In Pine Top v Anglo Saxon Reinsurance the main purpose for rendering the reinsurance on 
the same terms as original was explained as being the provision of matching cover. For 
that reason, only the terms defining the period, geographical limit and the nature of the 
risk were held to be carried across, and an arbitration clause was held not to have been 
incorporated. The arbitration clause was classified as ancillary or collateral to the contract 
of reinsurance. This proposition is now well established
136.  
 
Incorporation of terms from the direct policy should be distinguished from incorporation 
of terms from other sources, such as standard market wordings
137. In the latter case 
problems may arise from inconsistency between the standard terms and the express terms 
of incorporating contract which the court will be required to resolve. For instance in Axa v 
Ace Global Markets
138 the reinsurance was on “Full wording as EXEL 1.1.90”. Gloster J 
found it possible to reconcile the arbitration clause in standard EXEL wording with the 
English choice of law and jurisdiction clause in the reinsurance slip by holding that the 
latter related to supervision of the arbitration and challenges to any award and, accordingly 
held that the arbitration clause was incorporated with other standard clauses in EXEL 
1.1.90.  
 
2.4.5.3  The Arbitration Act 1996 section 6(2) 
Pine Top and Excess Insurance v Mander pre-dated the Arbitration Act 1996. Section 6(2) 
of the Act provides that “the reference in an agreement to a written form of arbitration 
clause or to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration 
agreement if the reference is such as to make that clause part of the agreement”. The 
wording of the section seems to allow the incorporation of an arbitration clause from one 
document into another via general words of incorporation
139. The Departmental Advisory 
Committee on Arbitration Law (DAC) report paragraph 42 left the issue to the courts to 
decide, and was taken into consideration by Raymond Jack QC that this was a field that 
                                                 
136 Excess Insurance v Mander; American International Speciality Lines Insurance Co. v Abbott 
Laboratories [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 267; Cigna Life Insurance v Intercaser; OK Petroleum A.B. v Vitol 
Energy S.A. [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 160. 
137 For instance in CNA International Reinsurance v Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade SA Clarke J 
found that incorporation of terms from standard market wordings was inevitable; otherwise there would be 
no terms of reinsurance.  
138 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 683.  
139 Hunter and Landau, The English Arbitration Act 1996: Text and Notes 1998, fn.20.   35
the law should be clear, certain and well understood; therefore the Arbitration Act s.6(2) 
did not change the settled view
140.  
 
2.4.6  Incorporation of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Clauses 
Just as in the case of arbitration clauses, jurisdiction clauses are also defined as free-
standing provisions because they are related to resolving disputes rather than to the 
performance of the contract
141. Likewise, they are to be classified as ancillary provisions 
which the parties to the reinsurance would not normally intend to incorporate
142. Such 
clauses in direct insurance have nothing to do with defining the risk; thus they are wholly 
inappropriate to disputes arising between the parties to the reinsurance contract
143. It is 
settled that a jurisdiction clause is not incorporated unless there is express reference to it in 
the reinsurance agreement
144. The position at common law has been extended to 
determination of the validity of jurisdiction clauses in EC cases under Art 23 of the 
Brussels Regulation
145, which requires consensus to be clearly demonstrated
146. 
 
The same considerations have been taken into account in terms of incorporation of choice 
of law clauses
147. Under article 3.1 of the Rome Convention
148, a choice of law must be 
expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty, and a general incorporation 
provision is not to be regarded as having that effect. The position will be even more 
clearly stated when the Rome I Regulation
149 comes into force on 17 December 2009 to 
                                                 
140 Trygg Hansa Insurance Co. Ltd. v Equitas Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 439, applied in Cigna Life 
Insurance  v Intercaser. 
141 Excess Insurance v Mander; Trygg Hansa Insurance Co. Ltd. v Equitas Ltd.  
142 Assicurazioni Generali SPA v Ege Sigorta AS [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 480; The expression “all terms 
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Prifti v Musini Sociedad Anonima de Seguros y Reaseguros [2004] 1 CLC 517, 524. 
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contracts concluded after the same date, as article 3.1 that Regulation requires any choice 
of law to be expressly or clearly demonstrated, which is by its terms a stricter test
150. 
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CHAPTER 3 IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATION 
 
3.1  Waiver of Defences Clause in the Original Insurance 
It is difficult to see sometimes how a clause which is perfectly appropriate to a direct 
policy can operate between the parties to the reinsurance contract. An illustration of this is 
HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co
151 which raised 
the position of a waiver of defences clause by which the direct insurer waived its right of 
disclosure from the assured and of avoidance in case of misrepresentation. At first 
instance
152, David Steel J followed the analysis of Clarke J in CNA International 
Reinsurance Co Ltd & Ors v. Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade SA
153 and held that 
the provision in question could be incorporated in its manipulated form, namely the word 
“insurer” could be read as referring to the “reinsurer”. Accordingly, the term was 
incorporated into the contract of reinsurance, operating as waiver of defences between the 
reinsurer and the reinsured. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that construction. Rix LJ, 
delivering the leading judgment held that the judge’s conclusion did not answer the 
question of what the provision actually achieved as a term in the reinsurance agreement
154. 
If the clause was incorporated in its manipulated form, it would mean that any separate 
breach of duty by the reinsured would be waived by reason of the independent operation 
of the clause in reinsurance context. Moreover, incorporation in its manipulated form did 
not achieve back-to-back cover. Rix LJ expressed the view that the clause made perfectly 
good sense in its unmanipulated form as it operated as a follow the settlements provision. 
By that provision, reinsurers undertook to follow the reinsured’s settlements so long as 
they were bona fide and businesslike. When the reinsured, who contractually waived his 
rights to rely on breach of the duty of utmost good faith, made payment to the assured in 
circumstances where he would otherwise have had a good faith defence, the reinsurer 
would be obliged to indemnify the reinsured for the reason that he recognised such 
payment by the incorporation of the waiver of defences clause.  
 
The judgment of Rix LJ is significant in distinguishing the fact of incorporation and the 
effect of incorporation. Accordingly, while incorporation can be achieved by means of the 
“as original” wording, the incorporated clause may not create new rights between insurers 
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and reinsurers. The function of incorporation can be described as merely recognition of the 
effect of the clause in the direct policy and the clause may operate as no more than a 
follow the settlements provision. 
 
3.2  Alterations to the Original Policy 
The original insurance may be replaced with a fresh policy after the reinsurance has been 
effected. In such a case the question would be whether the new policy terms are covered 
by the phrase “original policy or policies” in the general words of incorporation. In Lower 
Rhine and Würtemberg Association v Sedgwick
155 the phrase “the original policy or 
policies” was held to embrace only the direct policy in existence at the time that the 
reinsurance contract was made. However, the phrase may cover the replacement policy if 
its provisions are not materially different from that of the previous agreement
156. This 
principle was applied in Scottish National Insurance v Poole
157 where the loss of the 
infamous Titanic was in issue. In this case two steamships, the Titanic and the Olympic, 
were insured in January 1911 while in shipyard for a period of twelve months after 
delivery. Following the original insurance, reinsurance and retrocession contracts had been 
effected. The Olympic was delivered in May 1911 but the Titanic was not delivered until 
April 1912. As it had not been at risk until after the twelve-month period ended, another 
policy was issued in January 1912 upon the same terms as the January 1911 policy. When 
the Titanic was lost shortly after her delivery in April 1912, the issue was whether the 
second policy issued in January 1912 cancelled the preceding year’s slip, so that there 
remained nothing in force to which the reinsurance could attach. Bray J’s answer to this 
question was in the negative and he emphasised that even if that had been the case, the 
result would not have changed as the two policies were not materially different from each 
other
158.  
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156 In Sedgwick, revaluation of the old original policies had been found to be a material change that did not 
bind the reinsurers. However see North Star Shipping Ltd and others v Sphere Drake Insurance plc and 
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158 (1912) Com Cas 9, 15. Emanuel v Andrew Weir (1914) 30 TLR 518 also based on the same facts but the 
parties were different. In this case the reinsurer issued the policy after the Titanic was lost and in order to 
make the Sedgwick case applicable the reinsurer stated in the policy that the original policy meant the policy 
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In addition to the replacement of the original policy, the same problem arises when the 
original terms have been modified without making a fresh contract. This was the point at 
stake in Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co 
Ltd
159 where the subject matter of insured was revalued without issuing a fresh policy. 
McCardie J rejected the argument that the Sedgwick case should be distinguished, as the 
original policy under which the reinsurer agreed to provide indemnity remained in force 
despite the revaluation of the subject matter insured. The learned judge recognised that 
alteration of the direct policy without the consent of the reinsurer would throw the 
reinsurer into a position of danger, difficulty and doubt
160. Moreover “valued as original 
policy” referred to the valuation in the original policy in respect of which the reinsurance 
was obtained and it was not to be interpreted “as valued in the original policy as amended 
from time to time”. Therefore he held that the materially changed policy was not the same 
as the original policy that the reinsurer had contracted.  
 
Consequently, it is now settled that a materially modified primary insurance contract, 
either by issuing a new policy or alteration of the original policy terms only, is not counted 
as the original policy within the meaning of the full reinsurance clause. 
 
Such disputes can always be avoided by an express term in the reinsurance contract which 
requires the reinsured to consult the reinsurers and obtain their consent to all amendments 
to the terms of the direct policies. In HIH v New Hampshire when classifying such a 
clause as “warranty” David Steel J declared that this provision gave contractual substance 
to the principle established by the abovementioned authorities
161. 
 
3.3  Alterations to the Original Policy and the Continuing Duty of Utmost Good 
Faith 
It may be asked whether amendments to the original policy without the reinsurer’s consent 
amount to a breach of the continuing duty of utmost good faith on the part of the 
reinsured. Two issues need to be considered. The first is whether the duty of utmost good 
                                                                                                                                                   
opposed to the approach of Bray J, the judge construed the first policy as coming into force on 18 May 1911, 
when the Olympic came under the risk and he stated that the policy had been in force until 18 May 1912. 
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faith can be extended to the period after the contract has been concluded. If so, the second 
question is determining the proper remedy in the event of breach.  
 
In the earlier authorities the continuing duty of utmost good faith was applied where the 
contract expressly required the assured to provide information material to the 
underwriter
162. The remedy for breach of the duty was regarded as either avoidance of the 
policy ab initio or the discharging of the underwriter from liability for any claim tainted 
by lack of full disclosure
163. However in K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Lloyd’s 
Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent)
164 the Court of Appeal stated that although the 
proper remedy for breach of the duty of good faith was avoidance ab initio, that remedy 
was disproportionate to the post-contractual situation
165; instead, it was appropriate to 
invoke the remedy of avoidance in a post-contractual context only where the underwriter 
had the right to treat the entire contract as discharged by reason of the assured’s 
repudiatory breach
166.  
 
The point at issue here is that there is no specific mention of any continuing duty in the 
MIA 1906. It was decided by the majority of the Court of Appeal in  Container Transport 
International Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd
167 that 
although ss.18 and 20 of the MIA 1906 dealt only with pre-contractual disclosure and 
misrepresentation, those sections were illustrations of the wider duty in s.17. It should also 
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be remembered that the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top 
Insurance Co Ltd
168 pointed out that the duty of utmost good faith was not based on any 
implied term and arose ex contractu. In Phoenix General Insurance Co. of Greece S.A. v. 
Halvanon Insurance Co.Ltd.
169 Hobhouse J declared that a continuing duty of utmost good 
faith could be implied into a proportional reinsurance contract, although his decision did 
not turn on that point and he ultimately decided that the reinsurers were protected by a 
series of implied terms. A narrower view of the continuing duty was adopted in Bonner v 
Cox
170 where Waller LJ in the Court of Appeal emphasised that good faith was purely a 
pre-contractual matter and that rights and obligations after placement were governed by 
the terms of the contract, and he implicitly doubted whether the implied terms suggested 
by Hobhouse J could be justified. It was also ruled in Bonner that neither a mere 
entitlement to cancel the policy by serving a notice of cancellation
171, nor a mere increase 
of the risk, would create a continuing duty of utmost good faith
172. The approach of Waller 
LJ now appears to represent the English law approach. In Goshawk Dedicated Ltd v Tyser 
& Co Ltd
173 Rix LJ held that the duty of utmost good faith was not free-standing but rather 
formed the basis for the implication of a term. In Goshawk the assured was held to be 
subject to an implied term to supply the insurers (through his broker) with placing and 
claims information which they had previously seen, and also premium information. The 
implied term was derived from the continuing duty of utmost good faith, but took effect 
contractually rather than on the free-standing basis that characterises the duty of utmost 
good faith.  
 
More recently, in HLB Kidsons v Lloyd’s Underwriters,
174 the duty has been discussed in 
relation to a notification of circumstances clause in a claims made liability policy. Toulson 
LJ accepted and Rix LJ agreed that under such circumstances “it is impliedly incumbent 
on the insured to see that any such notification is a fair, if summary, presentation of what 
the insured knows”. Both accepted that there might be an argument for a continuing duty 
of good faith in these circumstances. Toulson LJ felt that the appropriate remedy for a 
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breach of the duty was a holding that the notification is invalid; however, their Lordships 
did not express a firm view on the matter. 
 
This rather complex debate aside, the continuing duty of utmost good faith seems to have 
almost no practical significance in the insurance context since it is difficult to think of a 
situation in which failure to comply with an information clause could be repudiatory
175. In 
the reinsurance context, irrespective of any clause requiring notification of increase of 
risk, the better view is that if risk has altered materially, the reinsurers would 
automatically be discharged from any further liability as a matter of law
176 and there is no 
need to consider breach of contract. However, as was said in The Mercandian Continent, 
breach of such a clause is a breach of contract and does not necessarily amount to a breach 
of the continuing duty of utmost good faith because obligations regarding the duty of 
disclosure after placement are governed by the terms of the contract.  
 
It should be noted that the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report No 20
177 
suggested that the post-contractual duty should be treated as an implied term of the 
contract of insurance, and that recommendation was implemented as s.13 of the Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)
178. Consequently, the remedy for breach of duty of utmost good 
faith is contractual. This gives rise to a much wider and more appropriate range of 
remedies than are currently available under the MIA 1906, including damages
179. 
However in the reinsurance context, the implied term proposal approach should be viewed 
in the light of the definition of reinsurance as “a business between consenting adults”
180, 
and it is most unlikely after Bonner v Cox that the courts would imply a term that the 
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parties could have adopted themselves, and it is noteworthy that the 1984 Act does not 
apply to reinsurance
181.  
 
After the making of the contract, if the assured seeks to obtain additional cover and applies 
to the insurer for the appropriate extension by means of an endorsement, he is required to 
disclose material facts relating to the application and at this stage duty of disclosure will 
also be relevant
182. It has been suggested that the preferable approach is that breach of 
such duty renders voidable only the extension itself and does not vitiate the entire 
policy
183. This is consistent with The Mercandian Continent, where Longmore LJ stated 
that only the extended cover and not the entire policy would be voidable even though the 
breach occurred during the currency of the policy. Accordingly, the endorsement would be 
avoided and the claim would be looked at according to the agreement that was before the 
endorsement. In reinsurance context, consistently with the principles mentioned above, a 
materially altered original policy would not be binding on the reinsurers but the 
reinsured’s claim would be viewed according to the underlying policy terms before the 
alteration ie, in the form that the reinsured agreed to follow. The reinsurers would simply 
not be bound by the alteration because the altered original policy would not be the policy 
within the meaning of “as original”.   
 
3.4  Leading Underwriter Clause in the Original Policy 
In the London Market it is often the case that in insurance contracts a follow the leader 
clause confers authority on the leading underwriter to agree certain matters on behalf of 
the following market. The clause may authorise the leading underwriter to alter the slip
184 
and this raises the question whether the reinsurer is bound by the alteration of the original 
policy effected by the leading underwriter. This was the issue in American International 
Marine Agency v Dandridge
185 where the judge held that the leading underwriter clause in 
the direct policy could not be incorporated into the reinsurance agreement as this clause 
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did not meet any of the four criteria set out in HIH v New Hampshire. According to Mr 
Siberry QC, a leading underwriter clause was not germane to reinsurance because such a 
clause concerned the relationship between the leading underwriter and the following 
market, as well as that between the following market and the assured. There was no 
mutuality of interest between the leading underwriter and the reinsurers. For instance, 
reduction in insured value agreed by the leading underwriter where the policy covered 
total loss only might be very prejudicial to the reinsurers’ interest. The claimant did not 
argue that the clause was incorporated in its manipulated form and the trial judge 
commented that this clause did not make sense in the context of the reinsurance in its 
unmanipulated form since Axa, the leading direct underwriter, was not the leading 
underwriter of the reinsurers. Furthermore Mr Siberry QC found the clause to be 
inconsistent with the other terms of the reinsurance, because Axa reduced the value of the 
subject matter insured although its value was agreed at a higher figure in the reinsurance 
contract. He referred to Norwich Union v Colonial Mutual and held that the leading 
underwriter clause would bind the reinsurer to the valued policy amended from time to 
time.  
 
Unfortunately although the reinsured argued that the clause was incorporated in 
unmanipulated form with the same effect as that set out in HIH v New Hampshire, the 
judge rejected the argument for the reasons, inter alia, that the clause in HIH directly 
regulated the relationship between the insurer and the assured. To a certain extent Mr 
Siberry QC’s concerns are explicable but his reasons are unconvincing
186. The distinction 
between the fact of incorporation and the effect of incorporation could have been 
recognised for the incorporation of the follow the leader clause as well. As a matter of 
fact, the result achieved in HIH was that the function of incorporation could be described 
as merely recognition of the effect of the clause in the direct policy, and operates as no 
more than a follow the settlements provision. The effect of the follow the leader clause 
would be that the reinsured would be bound by alteration agreed to by the leading 
underwriter and consequently the reinsurer would be forced to accept the amended terms 
that the reinsured had secured according to the alterations of the policy. If the effect of 
incorporation was adopted as it had been in the HIH case, neither of the reasons of the trial 
judge would have been applicable to the case. 
 
                                                 
186 Butler and Merkin, para B-0149/2.   45
3.5  Obligations of the Assured under the Direct Policy 
It has not yet been settled whether the “as original” wording imposes upon the reinsured 
any duty corresponding to that to which the assured is subject under the original policy. 
All depends upon the nature of the obligation and the applicability or appropriateness of 
the clause at the level of reinsurance. For instance, in Sulphite Pulp Co Ltd v Faber
187 the 
same premises had been insured by various leading fire insurance companies including 
NBMC. Clause 6(d) of its policy provided: “So long as this insurance remains in force the 
insured shall notify to the company and have specified in the policy if some other 
insurance is taken out, or any insurance previously effected ceases”. Later on the assured 
took out a second fire policy from a Lloyd’s Underwriter which was “subject to the same 
terms and conditions as a policy or policies of the [NBMC] ... on identical interest, and in 
the case of loss it is hereby agreed to settle hereon according to the adjustment adopted by 
the said company or companies.” Failure to adhere to this clause was to render the policy 
void. The property insured was destroyed by fire but before the fire occurred, renewal of 
all of the earlier policies was declined, but this fact was not disclosed to the Lloyd’s 
underwriter, who sought to determine the second policy for breach of cl 6(d) in the earlier 
policy. Lord Russell of Killowen CJ held that the clause requiring the assured to notify the 
insurer if any insurance previously taken out ceased to operate was not inconsistent with 
the terms of the reinsurance agreement and the obligation was equally applicable to the 
assured of the later effected insurance policy. Consequently the Lloyd’s policy was held to 
have incorporated the terms and conditions of the NBMC policy, including cl 6(d), so that 
the Lloyd’s underwriter was entitled to regard the assured in breach of that condition.  
Similarly, in Home Insurance Co of New York v Victoria Montreal Fire Insurance Co
188 
the question was the applicability to the retrocession agreement of a time bar clause in the 
original policy. The assured made a claim in the twelve-month period  allowed by the 
original policy but, because of lengthy negotiations with the reinsured, the reinsurers 
could not submit their claim against the retrocessionaire before the twelve-month period 
had expired. The Privy Council considered the applicability of the time bar clause to the 
retrocession agreement and took account of the fact that a time bar clause made sense in 
an insurance contract as the assured is the master of the situation, but the reinsurer could 
not move until the direct loss had been ascertained between the assured and the reinsured. 
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According to their Lordships this rendered the clause inappropriate to the contract between 
the reinsurer and the retrocessionaire
189. Moreover, in Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v. 
Sea Insurance Co Ltd
190 the term requiring the assured to ask written consent of the 
insurer prior to incurring legal costs was found to be inappropriate to the reinsurance 
contract. 
 
Nevertheless, the court may be keen on giving some purpose to incorporation if the 
reinsurance is not on the same terms as original but incorporates the same standard 
wording as original
191. 
 
3.6  Other forms of Incorporation Wording  
The full reinsurance clause may be qualified to overcome the requirements of 
incorporation set out in HIH v New Hampshire. For instance, in Property Insurance 
Company Ltd v National Protector Insurance Company Ltd
192 the retrocession contract 
was “subject without notice to the same clauses and conditions…”. Scrutton J interpreted 
the phrase “without notice” as a declaration by the retrocessionaire that he would accept 
the terms of the original policy without notice of what the clauses and conditions were, to 
the effect that the retrocessionaire waived his right to claim to be informed about the 
unusual clauses in the policy
193. This case confirms the importance of the nature of the 
clause that is to be incorporated. As indicated above, in some cases the reasons for 
accepting incorporation are based on the usual nature of the clause. It can be said that the 
expression “without notice” can override the obstacle caused by its unusual character. In 
other words, while in the ordinary case, successful incorporation of an unusual clause is 
subject to the reinsurer being informed of the existence of that clause, the words “subject 
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without notice the same terms and conditions” overcome the problem and permit 
incorporation whatever the nature of the clause.  
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CHAPTER 4 PRESUMPTION OF BACK-TO-BACK COVER 
 
4.1  The General Principle 
4.1.1  Scope of the Principle 
In facultative reinsurance contracts, since the reinsurer takes over a proportion or all of the 
risk that the direct insurer has insured, it is presumed that in the absence of clear words to 
the contrary the risks covered by the two contracts are consistent
194. In line with the theory 
that the subject matter of reinsurance is liability of the direct insurer undertaken by his 
original contract of insurance, the back-to-back presumption can be construed to mean that 
when the insurer’s liability is established under the original policy the reinsurer will accept 
liability to pay whatever percentage of the claim he has agreed to reinsure
195. This makes 
it clear that the presumption ensures that the two contractual terms are identical without 
any need to carry the original insurance terms into the reinsurance. Nevertheless, it has 
been held that the incorporating wording amounts to an indication of the parties as to the 
intention of back-to-back cover
196. In conformity with this supposition, in most cases the 
presumption of back-to-back cover has been given a function which operates in 
conjunction with the incorporation wording. As will be seen below, this approach has 
caused not only artificial distinctions to be drawn but also sometimes has involved  
disregarding the express terms of the reinsurance agreement. 
  
4.1.2  Rebutting the Presumption 
The presumption of back to back cover is relevant only where the parties are to be taken to 
have intended that outcome. If identical words are used in the two contracts then the 
presumption will operate, even though the two contracts are governed by different 
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applicable laws
197. The same conclusion follows if the words are not identical but virtually 
indistinguishable
198. However, if the words used are quite different, and deliberately so, 
then the presumption may be rebutted. In Youell v Bland Welch & Co.Ltd
199 Beldam LJ 
did not allow the presumption to be used to modify the meaning of a reinsurance term. In 
this case, the claimant insurers issued policies against builder’s risks and other associated 
risks of three liquefied gas carrying vessels while under construction in the US. The 
reinsurance policy however contained a clause that limited the scope of reinsurance 
namely that “The reinsured shall cede to the reinsurers and the reinsurers shall accept by 
way of reinsurance of the reinsured their proportion of the reinsured’s liability in respect 
of risks attaching for periods as original (up to but not exceeding 48 months) . . . in respect 
of vessels . . . whilst under construction . . . and until handed over to and accepted by . . . 
owners.” When the vessels became constructive total losses as a result of perils insured 
against, 48 months had expired after each vessel had come on risk but the original cover 
was still in force. The reinsureds alleged that the reinsurance cover was still in force 
because the reinsurance policy should be so construed that the cover provided was co-
extensive with the cover contained in the primary policies. Beldam LJ noted that the 
presumption of back-to-back cover was inapplicable to this case as the reinsurers accepted 
the risk on special terms
200.  
 
Moreover, in Aegis Electrical and Gas International Services Co Ltd v Continental 
Casualty Co
201 the original insurance and reinsurance policies contained different 
definitions of “accident”. Original policy Clause 30 defined an accident as meaning “a 
sudden and accidental breakdown of an object or a part thereof and resulting in physical 
damage that necessitates repair or replacement of the object or part thereof”. Additional 
clauses attached to the reinsurance policy defined accident as “a sudden and accidental 
breakdown of an Object or a part thereof, which manifests itself at the time of the 
occurrence by physical damage that necessitates repair or replacement of the Object or 
part thereof”, but excluding loss or damage resulting “from explosion other than explosion 
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of the parts of steam boilers, steam turbines, steam engines, steam pipes interconnecting 
any of the foregoing or gas turbines”. The reinsurance also provided “To follow the terms, 
clauses, conditions, exceptions and settlements of the original policy wording as far as 
applicable hereto”. The reinsured argued that the follow the terms provision in the 
reinsurance slip favoured a match between the terms of the insurance slip and the 
reinsurance slip, and therefore any mismatch between them should be minimised. It was 
also argued that any ambiguity was to be resolved contra proferentem against the 
reinsurers both because they proposed the additional conditions for inclusion in the 
contract and because they sought to rely upon the exception in the “Additional 
Conditions”. Andrew Smith J emphasised that every case depends upon the proper 
construction of the particular reinsurance contract. He held that the reinsurance contract in 
this case was not back to back because the reinsurers reinsured only some of the risks that 
fell within the original cover and in that sense the insurance cover and the reinsurance 
cover were not back to back. Andrew Smith J described the Additional Clauses as 
modifying the extent of the reinsurance cover; he found no ambiguity in the effect of those 
Additional Clauses
202. 
It should be noted that in Wasa v Lexington even though the reinsurance and original 
insurance terms were more or less identical
203 and the question was stated to be whether 
those terms should be construed the same way, the Court of Appeal did not ground their 
decision on the presumption of back-to-back cover. Longmore LJ found that the 
presumption was not helpful, because the reinsured argued that the contracts were back-to-
back so the interpretation of the original policy was binding on the reinsurers, whereas the 
reinsurers asserted that the contracts were not back-to-back therefore the contracts fell to 
be construed differently, ie according to the different laws applicable to them. Longmore 
LJ (Pill and Sedley LJJ agreeing) noted that any distinction between coverage and 
warranties (the issue in Vesta v Butcher, discussed below) was one of fact rather than 
principle
204, as both warranties and coverage clauses had much the same effect and thus 
were to be treated in the same way. Accordingly, the construction of the reinsurance had 
to match that of the direct policy. 
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4.2  The Relationship between the Presumption and Incorporation  
4.2.1  Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta  v. Butcher  
In this –leading – authority, incorporation wording was given effect by virtue of the 
presumption of back-to-back cover. A Norwegian insurance company, Vesta, insured a 
fish farm against inter alia loss of living fish from any cause whatsoever. The original 
insurance policy contained a 24-hour watch warranty and the reinsurance policy was on 
the same terms and conditions as original. The reinsurance policy was effected by virtue 
of a standing offer and when the assured saw the warranty in the wordings of the 
insurance, he informed the brokers that he could not comply with it; however the brokers 
did not pass the information to the reinsurers. The fish farm was seriously damaged by a 
violent storm and even if the 24-hour watch warranty had been adhered to, the damage 
could not have been prevented. Under Norwegian law, breach of warranty provides a 
defence to the underwriters only if the breach was causative of the loss. Consequently, 
Vesta settled the claim but the reinsurer refused reimbursement on the ground that the 
reinsurance contract was governed by English law and the breach of warranty relieved 
them from liability even if there was no causal link between the loss and the breach. At 
first instance, Hobhouse J held that the parties’ intention was that the warranty in the 
reinsurance contract was to be governed by Norwegian law as the reinsurance policy 
incorporated the terms of the original insurance
205. More interestingly, he noted that if he 
had not concluded that, he would have held that both contracts were governed by 
Norwegian law. Nevertheless his latter comment was described as “quite unrealistic” by 
the Court of Appeal and it was concluded that two contracts were clearly governed by 
different laws
206. Finally, the House of Lords held that in the absence of any express 
declaration to the contrary in the reinsurance policy, the contracts were to be construed 
back-to-back; as a result, the incorporated warranty in the reinsurance contract was to be 
given the same effect as in the direct policy with the consequence that a breach of 
warranty which was not causative did not discharge the reinsurers from liability
207. It was 
common ground throughout the proceedings that the Norwegian warranty had been 
incorporated into the reinsurance, and the case proceeded on that basis: only Lord Griffiths 
in the House of Lords raised any doubt as to the correctness of the concession. 
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4.2.2  Groupama Navigation et Transports & Ors v. Catatumbo Seguros 
The Vesta decision has nothing to say about the effect of an express warranty in the 
reinsurance contract, although this may be considered as an indication contrary to the 
presumption of back-to-back cover, and the express warranty in the reinsurance agreement 
might be thought to be one which is to be given effect according to the law which 
governed that contract. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Groupama
208 confounded this 
analysis by deciding that even though there was an express warranty in the reinsurance 
contract, because of the assumption that the reinsurance cover was identical to the direct 
insurance, the reinsurance cover was to be construed so as to produce the same effect as 
the underlying warranty. In Groupama a fleet of vessels was insured against hull and 
machinery losses. The original policy provided for a warranty, “Guarantee of maintenance 
of class. . .”. The reinsurance contract contained the clause “All terms clauses conditions 
warranties. . .as original and to follow all decisions settlements agreements of same in 
every respect. . .Warranted existing class maintained.” Two vessels were heavily damaged 
in a storm and after subsequent investigation it became apparent that the vessels had not 
been classed during the currency of the policy. The reinsured was liable despite the breach 
of warranty because, in much the same way as in Vesta, the underlying contract was 
governed by a foreign law – that of Venezuela – which requires a causal link between the 
breach of warranty and the loss in order to discharge the insurer from liability. The 
reinsurers nevertheless argued that the reinsurance warranty was “free standing” and to be 
construed as discharging them from liability without regard to the construction of the 
original policy warranty, given that the contract was governed by English law. David Steel 
J and the Court of Appeal placed emphasis on the proportional nature of the reinsurance 
policy and the presumption of back-to-back cover. The Court of Appeal ultimately held 
that the presumption governed the case, because the terms of the original insurance were 
incorporated by virtue of the “as original” clause. As a consequence of incorporation the 
Court of Appeal stated that there were two warranties in the reinsurance contract: one was 
incorporated from the direct policy; and the other was expressly set out in the reinsurance 
agreement itself. The two warranties were identical except for the fact that the 
classification society was named in the insurance. Tuckey LJ stated that if the parties 
intended the two warranties to be construed differently in the two contracts they should 
have said so. The Court was of the opinion that the reinsurers were assumed to have 
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accepted the risk of such interpretation by writing international business
209. Mance LJ 
emphasised that had the two contracts contained warranties expressed in different and 
irreconcilable terms, or if the reinsurance had contained a warranty which had no 
counterpart in the insurance, different considerations could have arisen as it would then be 
clear that the two contracts were not and could not to that extent be treated as back-to-
back
210. Consequently neither the difference between the applicable laws, nor express 
warranties of the reinsurance policy was enough to rebut the presumption of back-to-back 
cover.  
 
4.2.3  Implications of the Relationship between Back-to-Back Cover and 
Incorporation   
As a result of the Groupama decision, it is now arguable that the courts may allow 
incorporation of inconsistent terms which override an express but parallel term of the 
reinsurance contract. In Groupama the facts were obviously different from Vesta as in the 
latter there was no express reinsurance warranty. However the Vesta case was not 
distinguished and no consideration has been given to the parties’ intention in putting an 
express warranty in the reinsurance policy. Instead, David Steel J stated that separate 
warranties did not produce any conflict at worst they were mere surplusage
211. On the 
other hand Tuckey LJ expressed his view that although it made it repetitive, having 
warranties in the reinsurance policy must have a purpose and this purpose was to provide 
identical interpretation with the original insurance
212. Mance LJ also commented that the 
reinsurance warranty could be regarded as provisional, designed to be effective only if 
there was no such warranty in the direct cover. More doubtfully, it was also stated that the 
reinsurance warranties were not “free standing”; their intention was no more than 
specifying terms which the reinsurers would have expected to be in the direct policy. 
Clearly this explanation is not consistent with the requirements of incorporation, as 
incorporation of the original insurance provisions is permitted only if incorporation does 
not create any inconsistency
213. Obviously, in both Groupama and Vesta, warranties, 
breach of which requires causative links with the loss, were inappropriate to the 
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reinsurance policies which were governed by English law
214. As a result of the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment it has become possible to say that an incorporated term can override an 
express term of the reinsurance contract, but perhaps only where there is something 
equivalent to the reinsurance provision in the direct policy. Although there are authorities 
indicating that the express terms of the reinsurance dealing with premiums could not be 
overridden by any incorporated provision
215, Groupama remains good law. On the other 
hand the principle stated in Groupama seems to be inapplicable to the cases where the 
insurance and reinsurance contracts contain warranties in different and irreconcilable 
terms. Moreover GE Reinsurance Corporation v New Hampshire Insurance Co
216 makes 
it clear that an express warranty in the reinsurance policy can be assessed independently 
where the original policy does not contain any equivalent clause. Langley J held that 
neither the presumption of back-to-back cover nor the incorporation wording could be 
used to oust an express provision in the reinsurance contract if there was no clause in the 
original policy which regulated the same issue
217. 
  
4.2.4  Independent Operation of the Presumption  
The presumption of back-to-back cover is simply a rule of construction
218 and if both 
Vesta and Groupama had been decided by taking into consideration only the back-to-back 
nature of the contracts, the same results could have been achieved with less complicated 
reasons. For example in Vesta, the reinsurer took over 90% of the liability of the reinsured 
under the original contract of insurance. There was no contrary indication in the 
reinsurance contract; therefore it could be presumed that the insurance and reinsurance 
were back-to-back. Hence because the original insurer was liable under Norwegian law, 
the reinsurer should have been required to reimburse the reinsured regardless of the 
different laws applicable to those two contracts. Nevertheless adopting the view that the 
“as original” clause incorporated the direct policy terms into the reinsurance contract led 
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the House of Lords into long and complicated discussion. Similarly, the incorporation 
point made the reasoning in Groupama more difficult, because the Court of Appeal first 
had to decide if the incorporated warranty was in conflict with the reinsurance warranty, 
and then it discussed the construction of the incorporated warranty in the reinsurance 
contract. If incorporation had been ignored and instead the terms of the two contracts had 
been compared, it could have been seen that the parties did not intend that the reinsurers 
should have any greater rights than the reinsured, so that the back to back cover 
presumption would have allowed the reinsured to succeed. Moreover because it is the case 
that in proportional contracts the reinsurers are in principle liable where the reinsured’s 
liability is established and quantified, again the same result could have been achieved with 
a more simple approach than that actually adopted. Consequently there would have been 
no difficulty from the conclusion that the contracts were governed by different laws and, 
furthermore, it would have been unnecessary to decide whether the terms of the insurance 
policy meant the same in Norwegian/Venezuelan and English law
219. 
The abovementioned analysis makes it clear that in fact incorporation adds nothing to the 
presumption of back-to-back cover as regards insuring clauses
220. These two cases aside, 
many other attestations can be shown to strengthen the view that the presumption is 
sufficient on its own to solve the disputes. For instance in Marten v Steamship
221 the 
dispute was simply resolved by applying the principle that the terms of reinsurance and 
insurance were identical. Even though the reinsurance contract contained no words of 
incorporation Bigham J found no impediment to holding that the object of the reinsurance 
policy was to indemnify the reinsured against the risk of total loss covered by the policy 
which they themselves had issued
222. Furthermore it has been decided that the 
presumption of back-to-back cover does not extend to ancillary terms such as claims 
control, law and jurisdiction and arbitration clauses
223. Consequently it appears that even if 
there are no incorporating restrictions, the presumption on its own has the same function 
as that created by the incorporation rules. Accordingly, whether or not the two contracts 
are back-to-back can be left to be determined by the wording of the agreements 
themselves and there is no need for incorporation.  
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It should also be noted that Lord Griffiths in Vesta called for urgent consideration of the 
redrafting of the London Market standard forms of reinsurance policy
224. However 
redrafting is not the only way of preventing the problems that the incorporation theory has 
so far created. The solution could be accomplished plainly by recognising that the “as 
original” wording only affirms that the terms of insurance and reinsurance are identical 
and that incorporation does not add anything to the presumption which can operate 
independently of incorporation, as can be clearly seen in Wasa v Lexington.  
  
4.2.5  Incorporation in Facultative Non-Proportional Reinsurance 
Although it is less commonly the case, facultative reinsurance agreements can be non-
proportional, as where the reinsurer reinsures a layer of the liability of the insurer on a 
single risk
225. The question whether incorporation is inevitable in such contracts that have 
been worded “as original” has not yet been tested.  
 
The main arguments, when rejecting the operation of the presumption in non-proportional 
agreements, were that, in contrast to proportional transactions, the parties cannot be 
classified as co-adventurers since reinsurers assess the merits of writing particular 
business on different criteria, depending on where they fitted into the insurance chain
226. A 
direct insurer may issue various policies under which he can fix the deductible and limit of 
liability according to his knowledge of the policy holders and of the likely size and 
incidence of the insured risks. On the other hand an underwriter who takes a line on a 
layer of an excess of loss contract must take a much broader view, as he cannot rate the 
individual policy holders and individual risks directly. Therefore if the parties intend to 
give the same effect to their respective contracts, they could write them in the same terms. 
Accordingly, it becomes arguable that, because the presumption does not operate in non-
proportional facultative contracts, general words of incorporation have the significant 
function of incorporating the provisions of the original insurance into the reinsurance 
agreement.  
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It should nevertheless be borne in mind that there may be cases in which the presumption 
can operate although the contract is not proportional. For example in Goshawk v XL 
Speciality Insurance an excess of loss reinsurance was worded “All as per original”. 
Morison J took into consideration that the reinsurer charged two-thirds of the premium set 
by the reinsured for the insurance, and held that the cover should match the underlying 
insurance as far as possible although it was not a classic fronting arrangement. This 
approach could be open to doubt if this assumption has no factual basis
227. However it 
appears that the answer much depends on the overall intention of the parties to be back to 
back based on the terms and incorporation.  
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PART B  FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS 
 
As it was stated in the previous part of this thesis, facultative reinsurance contracts 
subscribed in the London Market usually consist of a cover page that typically provides 
only the full reinsurance
228 clause by which the reinsurer undertakes to follow the 
settlements of the reinsured. The clause is widely used and has an important application in 
reinsurance practice. It has been a long process for the Market to establish the practice of 
the follow the settlements clause, but there remain further issues to explore. In this part of 
the thesis the historical development of the clause will be examined, followed by various 
issues that the English usage of the clause has established to date.  
 
CHAPTER 5  REQUIREMENTS TO MAKE PAYMENT AGAINST THE 
REINSURER 
 
5.1  In the Absence of Follow the Settlements Clause 
The principle of indemnity is said to be an essential part of reinsurance contracts
229. 
Accordingly, as held in Re London County Commercial Reinsurance Office Ltd.
230 a 
reinsured who wishes to make a claim against the reinsurer must prove his loss in the 
same manner as the original assured must have proved it against him, and even if the 
reinsured did not rely on them, the reinsurers can raise all defences which were open to the 
reinsured against the original assured. Lord Mustill has recently emphasised the same 
principle, by holding that the loss must fall both within the scope of the original insurance 
and the reinsurance contract
231. Consequently, it is now an established principle that the 
reinsurer is not obliged to indemnify the reinsured if the reinsured chose to make payment 
to the assured where in fact the original policy did not cover the loss in question
232.  
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5.2  Establishing and Quantifying the Reinsured’s Liability under the Direct 
Policy 
 
The reinsured can establish its liability to the assured by judgment, arbitration award or 
settlement
233. 
 
5.2.1  Judgment  
 
The reinsured’s liability is accepted to have been automatically proved where it is 
established by a judgment in favour of the assured
234. However it is often the case that the 
reinsured and the reinsurer are not in the same jurisdiction. Therefore the reinsured may 
make its claim against the reinsurer by relying on a judgment given by a competent court 
in its own jurisdiction which is not that of the reinsurer. In that case it may be argued that 
the judgment is not binding on the reinsurer as the reinsurer was not a party to the dispute. 
Nevertheless, it is accepted that there is an implied term that unless the contract contains 
any provisions to contrary effect, the reinsurer accepts to be bound by a foreign court 
judgment in terms of establishing the reinsured’s liability to the assured
235. This principle 
is subject to four requirements set out by Potter LJ in Commercial Union v. NRG:  
 
(1) The foreign Court is of competent jurisdiction in the eyes of the English Court,  
(2) That judgment has not been obtained in the foreign Court in breach of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause or other clause by which the original insured was contractually 
excluded from proceeding in that Court (eg, an arbitration clause),  
(3) The reinsured took all proper defences,  
(4) The judgment is not manifestly perverse.  
  
It seems that while the first three conditions are consistent with the general principles of 
law, the operation of the last requirement is questionable. The meaning of perverse is not 
clear. In the Commercial Union case Potter LJ did not find it necessary to clarify the 
situation in which a plea of perversity might successfully be raised in respect of the 
decision of a foreign court, because on the facts before him the point did not arise
236.  
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If “perverse” means very wrong, determination of a decision as perverse would require the 
English court to analyse the facts and the issues in the proceedings brought by the 
reinsured against the reinsurer. However this would mean making another decision on the 
same issue, an approach which is contrary to the usual rule that judgments of foreign 
courts must be recognised and enforced in England without regard to their substance
237. In 
principle a foreign judgment cannot be challenged in the English courts, so that findings of 
fact must be accepted and errors of law must be ignored
238. In terms of enforcing of a 
foreign court decision, there are limited objections available, eg, that the judgment has 
been obtained by fraud or its enforcement or recognition would be contrary to public 
policy
239. There is little authority on the meaning of public policy in this context and it has 
yet to be determined in England whether the enforcement of a foreign judgment which is 
for exemplary, punitive, or manifestly excessive damages should be refused on grounds of 
public policy
240. However it should be noted that the binding effect of a judgment on 
reinsurers is a quite separate question to whether a foreign judgment is enforceable in 
England. If the assured has been awarded punitive damages in the US against an insurer, 
the English courts may refuse to enforce that award on public policy grounds. However 
the question in reinsurance is not public enforcement, it is whether as a matter of contract 
reinsurers have agreed to be bound by a punitive damages award, and in practice they will 
not. Consequently, although the meaning of perverse is not clear, and it may be explained 
as very wrong, an English court would almost certainly refuse to make a determination on 
the correctness or otherwise of a foreign decision as to its substance. Therefore the 
requirement of not being manifestly perverse does not seem to be very useful or in 
practice, applicable.    
 
It has been suggested that the implication of a term in reinsurance contracts to the effect 
that the reinsurer is assumed to have agreed to be bound by a foreign judgment with regard 
to the proof of the reinsured’s liability is inappropriate
241. This opinion seems to suggest 
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that such a term could only be implied where there is a follow the settlements clause, and 
where the parties have chosen not to insert the clause in a reinsurance contract; this would 
also indicate that they have expressed an intention contrary to the effect of the implied 
term. Moreover it is claimed that implying such a term would bind the reinsurers to a 
judgment when they had not been involved in the proceedings. Besides that, implication 
would be inconsistent with the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Insurance Co 
of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd
242 that in the absence of a “follow the 
settlements” clause the reinsured would not have been bound by the Liberian Court’s 
decision as to the coverage of the original policy. Therefore it is suggested that the better 
view would be the decision of a foreign court should be taken as no more than evidence of 
liability that to be determined by the court which will also decide on the reinsurer’s 
liability towards the reinsured
243.  
 
However counter arguments can be brought against this suggestion. Where a reinsurance 
contract contains a follow the settlements clause the reinsurer will be bound by the 
reinsured’s bona fide and businesslike settlement even though the reinsurer was not 
involved in the settlement process
244. Moreover it was held in Scor that where the 
reinsurer agrees to follow the reinsured’s settlement, subject to the reinsured having acted 
bona fide and businesslike manner in assessing the assured’s loss, the reinsurer should 
follow the settlement of the reinsured if the loss also falls within the reinsurance policy. If 
a settlement that was entered into by the assured and the reinsured could be binding on the 
reinsurer, a decision that was given by a competent foreign jurisdiction with regard to the 
reinsured’s liability should also be accepted as evidence of the reinsured’s liability under 
the original policy. Therefore it seems reasonable to imply a term into a reinsurance 
contract that the reinsurer is bound by a foreign court judgment with regard to the 
reinsured’s liability. Moreover, as noted above, foreign judgments are in most 
circumstances recognised by the English courts and by so doing such decisions become 
binding on the parties. Additionally, it is not the case that in Scor the Court of Appeal held 
that in the absence of the follow the settlements clause the Liberian court decision was not 
                                                 
242 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312. For the Scor case see below, Heading no 6.1. 
243 O’Neill and Woloinecki para 5-29. It should be noted that in Commercial Union v NRG Potter LJ rejected 
the argument that the decision of a foreign Court could be no more than evidence of the reinsured’s liability: 
[1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600, 611.  
244 However this would be the case only where the contract does not contain a claims co-operation or claims 
condition clause or where there was no right for the reinsurer to be involved the settlement process. See: 
Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 607; Phoenix General Insurance Co 
of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 599.   62
binding. Even though it is the leading authority on the interpretation of the follow the 
settlement clause, in Scor the Court of Appeal did not need to apply their interpretation in 
the case as it was held that it was enough that the reinsured had proved its liability to the 
assured by a judgment. In this case a decision of the Liberian Court established that the 
reinsured was liable for the loss under the original policy; therefore the Court of Appeal 
did not need to discuss if the settlement was binding on the reinsurer and held that the 
reinsured, and therefore the reinsurer, was liable. This in fact shows that, contrary to the 
abovementioned argument, by recognising the Liberian Court judgment in proving the 
reinsured’s liability to the assured without mentioning the function of the follow the 
settlements clause, the Court of Appeal in Scor also reached a decision that is consistent 
with the later ruling in Commercial Union v NRG.  
 
It is also worth noting that in Commercial Union v NRG the Court of Appeal implied the 
term for all reinsurance contracts irrespective of any follow the settlements clause.  
 
Furthermore, Wasa v Lexington in the Court of Appeal also confirms the binding effect of 
a foreign court decision on the reinsured’s liability where the reinsurers were found liable 
to the reinsured in the light of the Washington Supreme Court decision as to the 
reinsured’s liability to the assured.   
 
Consequently, implying a term that was held in Commercial Union v NRG not only seems 
reasonable but also necessary in performance of reinsurance contracts. 
 
5.2.2  Arbitration Awards 
It is extremely common to find arbitration clauses in various types of contract, providing 
that any disputes arising from those contracts should be resolved by arbitrators. Unless the 
award goes to appeal,
245 it is conclusive between the parties to the dispute, so that the 
award establishes the reinsured’s liability to the assured. The difficulty here is that there is 
much authority for the proposition that an arbitration award is binding only on the parties 
to it and indeed that its contents are confidential
246. However, it has been accepted that 
where the original insurance contract contains an arbitration clause, it is implicit in 
                                                 
245 Only in exceptional circumstances can an arbitration award can be appealed; see the Arbitration Act 
1996, ss.67-69. 
246 Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Ltd v. European Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 253; Lincoln National Life Insurance Co v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada [2005] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 606.   63
reinsurance contracts that the reinsurer agrees to be bound by the arbitration award even if 
the award is not fully consistent with strict law, subject to the reinsured having argued its 
case properly in the arbitration and exhausted all rights of appeal
247.  
 
5.2.3  Settlements 
Assureds’ claims do not always lead to legal proceedings between assureds and insurers. 
In most cases the parties reach agreement as to the claim and settle the amount, and 
insurers make payment accordingly. In the absence of a follow the settlements clause, in 
order to make a claim against the reinsurer the reinsured is required to establish that the 
loss falls within the terms of the original policy and the reinsurance policy. As it was 
mentioned above, proof of the loss according to the original policy terms is assumed to be 
met automatically where there is a judgment or award relating to the loss in question. 
However where the reinsured and the assured settle the claim without a judgment or an 
arbitration award declaring the reinsured’s liability, it requires evidence of liability at 
law
248. In other words, where a reinsured reaches a settlement with the assured this 
settlement will be binding on the reinsurer if the reinsured proves that the loss was 
proximately caused by the insured peril and it had no defences to the claim
249.  
 
Where a reinsured makes claim against the reinsurer by relying on the settlement, being 
obliged to prove its liability and quantum may not always be appropriate to the 
commercial relationship between the parties. For example, where the reinsurer accepts one 
hundred per cent or most of the proportion of the risk, requiring the reinsured to prove its 
loss may cause unnecessary formality and delay in the reinsured’s recovery. The Market 
has accordingly formulated clauses that entitle the reinsured to an indemnity where it 
acted in good faith in assessing the original loss, in other words that it settled the assured’s 
claim honestly believing that the loss was genuine.  
 
                                                 
247 Butler and Merkin, para C-0007. See also CGU International Insurance v AstraZeneca Insurance Co 
[2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 142. 
248 Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co v Bovis Lend Lease Ltd. 
249 In this case if the reinsured can establish that the loss arose from insured perils and the settlement was  
reasonable, the reinsurer would not be able to challenge quantum: Traders & General Insurance Association 
Ltd v. Bankers & General Insurance Co. Ltd (1921) 9 Ll LR  223. The position is the same where the 
reinsurance policy provides “to pay as may be paid thereon” clause: Western Assurance Co of Toronto v 
Poole [1903] 1 KB 376, 386. See also Hong Kong Borneo Services Co v Pilcher [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 593, 
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In the late nineteenth century the formulation that was widely used was “to pay as may be 
paid thereon”. Nevertheless as will be seen below the clause was not interpreted in the 
way that it was apparently desired by the parties, and subsequently the market developed 
the “follow the settlements” clause.  
 
5.3  Settlement Clauses 
5.3.1  Early Formulation of Settlement Clauses: “To pay as may be paid thereon” 
The use of the “to pay as may be paid thereon” clause goes back at least to the late 19
th 
century
250. It is believed that the clause was adopted to provide the opportunity to the 
reinsured to make claim against the reinsurer where it settled the claim genuinely 
believing that it was liable to the assured. Hence the proof of actual loss would not be 
required so long as the reinsured could convince the reinsurer of its honesty and good 
faith
251.  
 
The leading authority on the construction of the clause is Chippendale v Holt
252 where the 
insured ship was stranded and the insurer paid on the basis that the ship was a constructive 
total loss. However the reinsurer denied liability by alleging that the reinsured had not 
proved that constructive total loss had occurred. Therefore the issue was whether the 
reinsured had to prove its legal liability to the assured before making a claim against its 
reinsurer. By relying on the “to pay as may be paid thereon”
253 clause counsel for the 
claimant argued that the clause should be construed literally, and that the sole condition of 
the defendant’s liability was that the claimant had been satisfied that it was liable and had 
made the payment in good faith. Mathew J rejected this argument and held that a contract 
requiring the reinsurer to pay the insurer if he chose to pay whether liable or not would be 
a wager and not reinsurance. He said that he saw no ground for supposing that the form of 
the clause was meant to create a liability outside the limits of the original policy. 
According to Mathew J’s interpretation the words “to pay as may be paid thereon” would 
                                                 
250 For example see Uzielli v Boston Marine Insurance (1884) 15 OBD 11. Clauses providing that the 
reinsurer would indemnify the reinsured upon mere proof of payment were used in French Reinsurance 
practice from the early 18th century. See Hoffman, “Common law of reinsurance loss settlement clauses: A 
Comparative Anlaysis of the Judicial Rule Enforcing the Reinsurer’s Contractual Obligation to Indemnify 
the Reinsured for Settlements”, [1994] LMCLQ 52. 
251 Gurney v Grimmer (1932) 44 Ll LR 189, 193, per Scrutton LJ; Hong Kong Borneo Services Co. Ltd. v 
Pilcher [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 593, 597, per Evans J. 
252 (1895) Com Cas 197. 
253 The retrocession policy provided: “Being a reinsurance subject to the same clauses and conditions as the 
original policy and/or policies, and to pay as may be paid thereon, but against the risk of total and/or 
constructive total loss only”.   65
seem to assume the existence of liability, proved or admitted, in respect of the loss 
reinsured
254.    
 
The suggestion in the Chippendale ruling that the clause required mere payment, subject 
to good faith, has been described as quite sensible, in that the clause in that case made no 
reference to liability.
255 Nevertheless, following Chippendale v Holt it was once more 
emphasised in Marten v Steamship
256 that the words “to pay as may be paid thereon” 
meant only to pay as the reinsured may have been compellable to pay; only having chosen 
in good faith to pay the assured’s claim was not enough to trigger the clause.
257  
   
Moreover, in Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co v. Western Australian Insurance Co
258 
Bateson J pointed out that the contract of reinsurance properly understood was a contract 
to indemnify against losses which the original underwriter had suffered, but not against 
gifts that the reinsured might choose to make to his assured
259. Having emphasised that the 
reinsurance policy was a policy covering the liability of the original insurer
260, the learned 
Judge pointed out that if there was no liability on the original underwriter there could not 
be any liability on the reinsurer. Subsequently, it was held that a “to pay as may be paid 
thereon” clause did not render the reinsurer bound by the reinsured’s settlement only 
because the original underwriter paid the assured’s claim by waiving its rights to rely on 
the unseaworthiness defence
261. 
                                                 
254 See also Nelson v. Empress Assurance Corporation [1905] 2 KB 281; Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co 
Ltd. v. Liverpool Marine & General Insurance Co, Ltd (1928) 31 Ll LR 45. In St Paul Fire and Marine 
Insurance Co v Morice (1906) 22 TLR 449, the “pay to be paid” clause did not feature as a part of the 
reasoning. However, referring to Chippendale v Holt, Kennedy J commented that the reinsurers were under 
no liability to pay unless the claimants could prove not merely that they were legally liable to the original 
assured under the original policy, but also that they were entitled to recover from the reinsurers under the 
terms and conditions and subject to the warranties contained in the policy of reinsurance. 
255 Hoffman, 60 fn 53. 
256 (1902) Com Cas 195. 
257 In Marten v Steamship the original policy was against total or partial loss (all risks), whereas the 
reinsurance was only against total or constructive total loss (CTL). According to the facts Bigham J found 
that the reinsured made payment for a large partial loss, therefore, the reinsurer was not liable. He was of the 
view that even if the reinsured classified that payment as CTL, the reinsured cannot claim payment by 
relying on “to pay as may be paid thereon” clause because in fact they were not liable for CTL. The same 
rule was applied by Bigham J in Western Assurance Co of Toronto v Poole. 
258 (1927) 28 Ll LR 243. 
259 (1927) 28 Ll LR 243, 251. In this case the reinsured paid the assured even though the ship was 
unseaworthy and therefore the loss was not covered by the original insurance policy. Bateson J found that 
the reinsured made payment before investigating the claim properly and with little information as to what 
had happened. 
260 (1927) 28 Ll LR 243, 250. 
261 Moreover Bateson J rejected the argument that the payment was morally obligatory because no reputable 
underwriter would rely on the unseaworthiness defence where the claim was small.    66
 
As a result of these decisions it became settled law that either as regards liability or its 
amount the “pay as may be paid thereon” clause added nothing to what would have been 
the parties’ position in its absence.
262  
 
5.3.2  Follow the Settlements 
Given that the “pay as may be paid thereon” clause was not construed by the courts in 
accordance with the likely intention of the draftsman
263, the Market looked for alternative 
formulations to bind the reinsurers by the reinsured’s settlements entered into by the 
reinsured in the belief that it was genuinely liable to the assured. 
 
An example of such an alternative clause was first seen in Excess Insurance Co. Ltd. v. 
Mathews
264 where the reinsurer agreed “to pay as may be paid thereon and follow the 
settlements of the reinsured”. It was held that this formulation carried the “pay to be paid 
clause” a step further and bound the reinsurer to a compromise on the question of liability, 
as he was already bound by a compromise on the question of amount.  
 
Nevertheless in a later case, Sir William Garthwaite (Insurance) Ltd. v. Port of 
Manchester Insurance Co., Ltd.
265, Scrutton LJ expressed an opinion contrary to that of 
Branson J. In this case the reinsurance policy provided: “… to follow settlement of the 
original underwriters subject to the same clauses and conditions as original policy or 
policies and to pay as may be paid thereon”. Scrutton LJ, who was undoubtedly familiar 
                                                 
262 It is noteworthy that it was held in Uzielli & Co v Boston Marine Insurance Co the “to pay as may be 
paid thereon” clause did not make the reinsurer liable for more than the amount reinsured; nevertheless 
Lindley LJ indicated that the clause may have caused a result that would not have otherwise been reached. In 
this case the interpretation of the clause was not the issue, but comments were made as to its function. The 
reinsurance and retrocession policies contained suing and labouring clauses, and the retrocession contract 
also provided “to pay as may be paid thereon”. The ship was lost and the original settlement was reached 
between the assured and the insurer for 88% of the loss. A direct claim on a vessel was settled for 88% of its 
insured value of £1,500, although the insurer’s liability for salvage costs resulted in an overall payment of 
112%. The vessel was reinsured for £1,000, and the insurers sought to recover 112% (ie, £1,120). The Court 
of Appeal held that the reinsured could recover only 100%; therefore the retrocessionaire was held liable to 
pay £1000, the whole amount retroceded. The reasoning of Brett MR and Cotton LJ is not clear as to why 
the retrocessionaire was obliged to pay 100% of the insured amount but not 88% or 112%. Nevertheless, it is 
seen from Lindley LJ’s judgment that the additional 12% recovery resulted from the “to pay as may be paid 
thereon” clause. However this case has not been cited as authority on the construction of the clause in later 
cases.    
263 The Market’s unhappiness as to the ruling in Chippendale v Holt was expressed in various proceedings. 
See for example: Gurney v Grimmer; Robert Goff LJ in Scor [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312, 330. 
264 (1925) 23 Ll LR 71. In this case the judge found that the original insurers were legally liable to pay their 
insured, so that his comments on the clause were obiter. 
265 (1930) 37 Ll LR 194.   67
with Branson J’s view in Excess v Mathews, nevertheless treated the two phrases in the 
same way and held that “to pay as may be paid thereon” was no different from “to pay as 
may be settled thereon”
266. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
266 Nevertheless the inconsistency between the two different types of clause came before HHJ Mackie QC in 
an incorporation context. In Stronghold Insurance Co Ltd v Bulstrad Insurance and Reinsurance plc 24 
November 2006, unreported, discussed in Ins LM March 2008, 1-4, the reinsurer agreed to follow the 
reinsured’s settlements whereas the retrocession agreement was worded “all clauses terms and conditions as 
original insofar as applicable and to pay as may be paid thereon.” The reinsurer contended that the clause 
was incorporated to the effect that the “follow the settlements” clause overrode the “pay as may be paid 
thereon” clause so that the reinsurer could make a claim against the retrocessionaire by proving that it acted 
bona fide and businesslike manner without need to show actual liability. HHJ Mackie QC held that the two 
clauses produced opposite results and therefore they were inconsistent with each other; consequently they 
did not meet the requirements of incorporation that were set out in HIH v New Hampshire [2001] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 161.    68
CHAPTER 6 CONSTRUCTION OF THE FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS 
CLAUSE 
 
6.1  The Scor Case  
It appears to be the case that between the 1920’s and 1984 almost all reinsurance disputes 
were referred to arbitration, and it was as late as 1985, that the “follow the settlements” 
clause first came to be analysed by the courts in Insurance Co. of Africa v SCOR (U.K.) 
Reinsurance Co. Ltd.
267 It should be noted that since the reinsured’s liability to the assured 
was established by virtue of a Liberian Court decision, the operation of the clause was not 
the basis of the decision in this case; however the comments of the Court of Appeal in 
construing the follow the settlements clause have been taken as definitive ever since.  
 
In Scor the reinsurance policy contained a “follow the settlements” clause and, in contrast 
to Excess Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mathews
268 the words “to pay as may be paid thereon” 
were not attached to the clause. The Court of Appeal emphasised this aspect of the 
wording of the policy and ruled that the settlements clause was not to be construed in the 
same way as the “pay as may be paid clause” because the absence of any reference to that 
clause showed that the parties wished to move away from the outcome in Chippendale v 
Holt
269. The Court of Appeal clarified that where the policy contains only a “follow the 
settlements” clause the reinsurers agree to indemnify the insurers in the event that they 
settle a claim by their assured if the claim so recognised by them falls within the risks 
covered by the policy of reinsurance as a matter of law, and provided also that in settling 
the claim the insurers have acted honestly and have taken all proper and businesslike steps 
in making the settlement
270. Subsequently, where the reinsurer agreed to follow the 
settlement, it was not appropriate to impose any higher duty on the reinsured
271.  
 
Scor established that the standard form of the clause relieved the reinsured of the 
obligation to prove that he was legally liable to pay to the assured. This aspect of the 
follow the settlements clause was also approved in Hill v Mercantile & General 
                                                 
267 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312. 
268 (1925) 23 Ll LR 71. 
269 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312,  330, Mortimer J; Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v Grand Union 
Insurance Co. [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 208. 
270 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312, 330. 
271 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312, 330.   69
Reinsurance Co Plc
272 where Lord Mustill expressed that the reinsurer cannot be held 
liable unless the loss falls within the cover of the policy reinsured and within the cover 
created by the reinsurance. However it was also pointed out in this case that the parties are 
free to agree on ways of proving whether these requirements are satisfied. The follow the 
settlements clause is an example of such an agreement
273.  
 
6.1.1  The First Proviso: Within the Scope of the Reinsurance Agreement 
In the reinsurance context the Market has tried to find a workable balance between 
conflicting practical demands, namely the wish to avoid investigating the same issues 
twice and the need to ensure that the integrity of the reinsurer’s bargain is not eroded by 
an agreement over which he has no control
274. Therefore while on the one hand the 
reinsured is given the right to make a claim against the reinsurer as long as it has acted in a 
bona fide and businesslike fashion in settling the claim, on the other hand it is necessary 
that the loss should be proved to fall within the reinsurance coverage. What the reinsured 
is required to prove is not that the original loss falls within the cover created by the 
reinsurance but rather that the claim so recognised by the reinsured falls within the risks 
covered by the policy of reinsurance as a matter of law
275. It is generally assumed that this 
condition is equally applicable where the two contracts provide co-extensive cover. 
Therefore the second limb of Scor is not automatically satisfied unless the reinsured can 
show that the claim so recognised by it fell within the scope of the reinsurance even 
though the contracts are back-to-back and the reinsurer is bound by the settlement under 
the first limb of Scor. However, taking into consideration the principle of back-to-back 
cover together with the operation of the full reinsurance clause, this proposition seems to 
be doubtful. 
As was explained in the first part of this thesis, facultative reinsurance contracts by their 
nature assume that the cover of the insurance and the reinsurance are identical. This 
                                                 
272 [1996] 3 All ER 865; Re London County Commercial Reinsurance Office Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 67. 
273 See also Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. CGU International Insurance plc [2004] 2 CLC 122, 126 Tuckey 
LJ; Faraday Capital Ltd v Copenhagen Reinsurance Co Ltd [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 23, 30; Simon J, Wasa 
International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 604; O’Neill and 
Woloniecki, 5-11. 
274 Hill v Mercantile. 
275 Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. CGU International Insurance plc [2003] 2 CLC 852,  870 (Gavin Kealey 
QC) aff’d [2004] 2 CLC 122, 127.    70
principle necessitates interpreting the two contracts in the same way
276. As Lord Mustill 
stated in Hill v Mercantile a follow the settlements clause operates in facultative 
reinsurance contracts where the terms of the two contracts are identical and where the 
parties share the risk and the premium, in order to avoid the investigation of the same 
issues twice. In this case the interests of the direct insurer and the reinsurer are broadly the 
same and it seems reasonable to hold the reinsurer to be bound by the reinsured’s 
settlements. However the question here will be whether the presumption of back-to-back 
cover or the incorporation clause will deprive the reinsurer of its own policy defences 
where the reinsured acted bona fide and businesslike in a commercial sense but was not 
liable as a matter of strict law. This was the issue in Hiscox v. Outhwaite
277 where the 
assureds were exposed to a massive number of asbestosis-related personal injury claims. 
Taking into consideration the potential quantum of liability in terms of both the number of 
parties involved and the amount claimed, in order to ease the procedure to handle such 
claims, in 1984, a number of asbestosis producers and insurers including the reinsured 
entered into the Wellington Agreement
278. From then until 1988 the Wellington Facility 
acted as a clearing house for all parties to the Agreement to the effect that the amounts 
paid in settlement of such claims to individual sufferers were shared rateably between all 
subscribing producers. Subsequently the reinsured made payment to the producers 
irrespective of whether that producer had been named as a defendant by a claimant and 
irrespective of whether that producer could have been legally liable to the claimant. 
Therefore the reinsured was in the position that it was acting bona fide and businesslike 
manner in a commercial sense but had made payments under the Wellington Agreement 
which it might not have been legally liable to make. The syndicate’s whole account stop 
loss reinsurance was on terms which were agreed to be the equivalent of a follow the 
settlements clause
279 and the reinsured argued that the reinsurers were precluded from 
                                                 
276 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331; Groupama Navigation et 
Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 350; Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v 
Lexington Insurance Co [2008] 1 CLC 340. 
277 [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 524. 
278 Named after Professor Harry Wellington of the Yale Law School. The Wellington Agreement represented 
an innovative effort by asbestos producers and their insurers to solve the asbestos litigation crisis. The 
Agreement established a non-profit claims handling centre that co-ordinated claim payments on behalf of 
producers. See also below Chapter 10.  
279 Article 6: The protection afforded by this Agreement shall as far as applicable be subject to the identical 
periods, terms, clauses, conditions and warranties as contained in the original policies of Insurance or 
Reinsurance and/or contracts of Insurance or Reinsurance and in all things falling within the scope of this 
Agreement the Reinsurers shall share to the extent of their interest the fortunes of the reassured. Article 7: 
The reassured shall exercise due diligence in dealing with all matters relating to this Agreement it being 
understood that all loss settlements made by the reassured whether by way of compromise, ex gratia or 
otherwise shall in every respect be unconditionally binding upon the Reinsurers.    71
requiring the Syndicate to prove which Wellington Agreement payments represented 
payments that would have been made in any event in order to discharge liabilities to 
insured producers under their policies of insurance. Evans J rejected the argument and 
held that the existence of the “follow the settlements” clause and the presumption of back-
to-back principle did not prevent the reinsurer from raising the defences provided by the 
reinsurance contract itself. The judge expressed the view that it was the only protection for 
the reinsurer if he was called upon to indemnify the reinsured for bona fide and 
businesslike settlements but the reinsured was not obliged to pay as a matter of law. 
Consequently even if the original policy and the reinsurance are back-to-back the reinsurer 
can still argue that he is not liable for the claim that the reinsured paid without legal 
liability under the original policy and therefore does not fall within the reinsurance 
agreement
280.  
 
Evans J pointed out that the disputed claims in this case were of the kind that no liability 
would have existed without the agreement, the claims being asserted against non-insured 
producers only, who by definition were not within the scope of the reinsurance contract. 
They did not become insured, and therefore reinsured, claims merely because the 
Syndicate agreed to treat them as if they were. For these reasons, Evans J found that 
payments made in respect of claims asserted against non-insured producers were outside 
the scope of the reinsurance contract.   
It is suggested that Evans J’s decision is correct but his reasoning is questionable. It is the 
case that bona fides in commercial sense does not equate to bona fides in legal sense
281. 
Wellington payments could not fall within the second proviso, ie acting bona fide and 
businesslike, because even though the reinsured’s liability might be reduced in some 
respects by reason of the sharing of losses, the reinsured knew that under the Wellington 
Facility it would have to make payments for which it was not legally liable to make. 
Consequently the payments were not within the original policy and therefore did not fall 
within the reinsurance. Where the contracts are back-to-back, if the loss falls within the 
original contract, it is also assumed that it falls within the reinsurance policy terms given 
that the contracts provide identical cover. If the reinsurance policy contains anything 
contrary to the original policy or any additional clauses, the contracts are not back-to-back 
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in those respects and naturally the reinsurer can rely on its own policy defences. If the 
settlement is not bona fide and businesslike, it will be outside the first limb of Scor and 
automatically outside the reinsurance policy terms. On the other hand if the loss in fact did 
not fall within the original policy but the reinsured acted in a bona fide and businesslike in 
assessing the original loss, the reinsurer would be obliged to pay even though it can be 
subsequently established that the reinsured was not genuinely liable
282. This is the case 
because the reinsurer agreed to follow the settlements of the reinsured and the construction 
of follow the settlements clause entitled the reinsured to be indemnified in such cases. 
Therefore where the contracts provide identical cover and the reinsured has acted bona 
fide and in a businesslike manner, contending that the reinsured was not genuinely liable 
thereby enabling the reinsurer to rely on its own policy defences would be tantamount to 
undermining the construction of the follow the settlements clause.  
Nevertheless in Assicurazioni Generali v. CGU
283 the Court of Appeal adopted the 
principle laid down in Hiscox v Outhwaite. In Assicurazioni the reinsurance was “as 
original” and the reinsurer agreed to “follow without question the settlements of the 
reinsured except ex-gratia and/or without prejudice settlements”. The reinsured’s 
argument was that where the insurance and the reinsurance are on back-to-back terms and 
where the first proviso of Scor is satisfied, the settlement was binding on reinsurers and 
they could not raise the same coverage issues in defence of the claim on the reinsurance. 
Therefore the question in Assicurazioni became: to what extent does the second proviso 
preclude reinsurers from raising coverage issues relating to terms which are the same in 
both the insurance and the reinsurance contracts?  
At first instance Gavin Kealey QC
284 stated that being “as original” and providing an 
identical cover together with a “follow the settlements” clause did not mean that the 
reinsurer was “dictated” to, in the sense of having to indemnify the reinsured for a 
settlement made in a bona fide and businesslike fashion. If the claim settled was as a 
matter of law not within the coverage of the original policy, it would also be outside the 
cover provided by the reinsurance contract. Therefore the judge concluded that in such a 
case, even though the settlement was bona fide and businesslike, the reinsurer would not 
be obliged to follow the reinsured’s settlements.  
                                                 
282 Potter J Baker v Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd 1995 LRLR 261. 
283 [2004] 2 CLC 122. 
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The Court of Appeal dismissed the reinsured’s appeal. Tuckey LJ, who gave the only 
reasoned judgment, relied on Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance plc
285 and 
Baker v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd
286 in each of which it was  ruled 
that “the reinsurer is not liable if the claim settled does not fall within the risks covered by 
the policy of reinsurance as a matter of law” where the contracts were assumed back-to-
back. He also relied on Pennsylvania v. Grand Union
287 where Mortimer J was convinced 
that, with regard to the first proviso of Scor, Robert Goff LJ had referred to the 
reinsurance policy terms but not those of the original insurance which were incorporated 
into the reinsurance. The judge stated that adopting otherwise would be nullifying the 
conclusion that Robert Goff LJ reached.  
 
It is true that Robert Goff LJ referred to the reinsurance and not to the original policy 
terms for the purposes of the first proviso in Scor but where the contracts are back-to-back 
the terms will be identical and there will be no differences between the terms of 
reinsurance and original insurance. If the reinsurance contains any terms contrary effect to 
the original policy terms, the contracts will not be assumed back-to-back in that respect 
and therefore the reinsurer can rely on its own policy terms that differ from those of the 
original policy.  
 
It is also worth noting that the first proviso of Scor was not in issue in the Charman case 
and Webster J in fact concentrated on the second proviso because of the variations in the 
wording of the follow the settlements clause. In Baker v Black Sea Potter J indeed stated 
that “the reinsurer is not liable if the claim settled does not fall within the risks covered by 
the policy of reinsurance as a matter of law” but as it is seen in the judgment –like 
Webster J in Charman- Potter J confirmed the construction of the follow the settlements 
clause which was adopted in Scor. More significantly, Potter J stated that the first proviso 
of Scor is subject to the qualification that, where the contracts provide back-to-back cover 
and the reinsured has settled the claim genuinely believing that it was liable, the reinsurer 
is obliged to indemnify the reinsured even if it is subsequently proved that the reinsured 
was not liable.  
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Reverting here to Gavin Kealey QC’s reasoning, the judge held that even though the 
settlement was bona fide and businesslike, if the loss did not fall within the original policy 
terms, according to the back-to-back principle, it will also be outside the cover afforded by 
the reinsurance, and the reinsurers would not be obliged to indemnify the reinsured only 
because the settlement was bona fide and businesslike. This approach treats the 
reinsurance contract as if it did not contain a follow the settlements clause. Where the 
contract contains such a clause, the rule is that if the reinsured has settled in a bona fide 
and businesslike manner, be able to make claim against the reinsurer even where it was 
later proved that the reinsured was not as a matter of law liable to the assured. In other 
words as long as the reinsured genuinely believed that there was a serious possibility that 
the loss was covered by the original policy, the settlement is a valid one for reinsurance 
purposes. Therefore, it appears that the rule adopted in the Assicurazioni and Hiscox v 
Outhwaite cases undermines the operation of the follow the settlements clause.  
  
6.1.2  The Second Proviso: Acting in Bona Fide and Businesslike Manner in 
Settling the Claim  
 
The result of Scor is that where the reinsurance contract provides a “follow the 
settlements” clause the reinsured is relieved from the obligation of proving the actual loss. 
All that is necessary is that the reinsured took proper and businesslike steps in determining 
whether there was a serious possibility that the policy covers the assured’s claim and there 
is no defence available against it
288.  
 
The issues then become, in what circumstances can the reinsured use the opportunity 
provided by the settlement clause and who has to bear the burden of proof that the 
settlement was bona fide and businesslike?  
 
6.2  Burden of Proof 
As to the evidentiary effect of the clause, it was stated that the reinsured is entitled to call 
upon the reinsurer to follow his settlement upon proof that the reinsured has paid his 
original insured and that the claim against the reinsurer falls within the reinsurance 
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policy
289. In the absence of any express wording imposing further duties on the reinsured 
the reinsured’s burden of proof is discharged by providing the reinsurers with information 
and documents which show, but not necessarily in detail, how the claim arose and dealt 
with; in other words it needs to demonstrate only that the claim and its records were in 
proper form
290. Subsequently, if an issue arises either as to good faith or as to the fact that 
the settlement was not made in a business-like fashion, the burden must lie upon the 
reinsurer
291. The reinsurer must prove either that the compromise was dishonestly arrived 
at, or that the reinsured has failed to take all the proper and businesslike steps to have the 
amount of the loss fairly and carefully ascertained
292. 
 
The most obvious situation in which it may be argued that the reinsured did not act bona 
fide and businesslike is where it disregarded defences available under the original policy 
terms. It was held in Commercial Union v. NRG, in the context of a judgment rather than a 
settlement, that if the reinsured failed to take proper steps to defend the claim in the 
proceeding the judgment might not be binding on reinsurers. For instance if the reinsured 
had defences against the assured’s claim, such as breach of warranty or duty of utmost 
good faith but waived the right to rely upon such defences and chose to pay the claim, the 
follow the settlements clause does not automatically bind the reinsurer by the settlement 
that was entered into by the reinsured
293. Nevertheless where the assured is in breach of 
duty of utmost good faith, Morison J in Bonner v Cox
294 held that given the policy is valid 
until the insurer avoids it for breach of utmost good faith, the reinsurer is bound to follow 
the settlement of the reinsured if the reinsured chose not to rely on the breach of the duty 
of utmost good faith defence. This view is not supportable for two reasons:
 295 First, it is 
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difficult to conceive why the good faith defence should be treated differently from other 
defences no matter if the policy is valid until it is avoided. Secondly the reinsured who 
paid by waiving the available defence cannot be said settled the claim on the basis of 
liability.  
 
The rule that imposing the reinsurer the burden of proof that the reinsured did not act in 
bona fide and businesslike is justifiable because obliging the reinsured to prove that it was 
not negligent in settling the claim would be in fact requiring it to prove its genuine 
liability
296. Moreover, essentially, by a follow the settlements clause the reinsurer puts his 
trust in the reinsured; therefore, obliging the latter to prove that reliance is justified would 
be quite inconsistent with the existence of any such trust
297.  
 
6.2.1  Appointing a Reputable Loss Adjuster 
Reinsureds are to be identified with the conduct of their loss adjusters and any other 
agents they employ for the purpose of making the settlement
298. Therefore reinsureds will 
be responsible for a failure of the loss adjusters to act with good faith or in a businesslike 
manner
299. This means that the reinsured’s conduct will not be regarded businesslike if it 
simply slavishly follows the loss adjuster’s report. When any report is produced by the 
loss adjuster the reinsured is under a duty to take appropriate steps to put matters right 
where it is obvious or should be obvious to the reinsured that the report has been prepared 
inadequately, perhaps because the loss adjuster has assumed something which the 
reinsured knows to be incorrect or where the report appears to be defective for any other 
reason
300. Consequently, a reinsurer may defeat the application of a loss settlement clause 
on the ground that the reinsured’s loss adjuster failed properly and carefully to investigate 
and ascertain the loss
301. The burden of proof that the loss adjuster or any other agent of 
the reinsured did not act in a businesslike manner will, as stated above, be on the reinsurer. 
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6.2.2  Ascertainment of Liability in Settlements 
Where more than one claim has arisen under a reinsurance agreement,
302 the parties 
usually enter into a global settlement agreement where they conclude various claims 
including the claim that is subject to the dispute. The question is that if the settlement does 
not indicate the method as to the calculation of figures under the agreement is the reinsurer 
entitled to reject the claim?  
 
In the insurance context it is generally accepted that a global settlement is binding so long 
as the assured’s liability is established and the settled amount is reasonable
303. The point is 
not, however, entirely free from doubt. In Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bovis 
Lend Lease Ltd.
304, a case involving a direct liability policy, Colman J held that such a 
settlement was not binding. In this case the assured and the third party entered into a 
settlement for $15 million but the settlement did not contain any indication as to the 
method by which the parties calculated that amount. Colman J looked for any identifiable 
loss in respect of any identifiable insured eventuality and the lack of those led him to 
conclude that a global settlement agreement of the nature of that found in the present case 
did not satisfy the requirement of ascertainment of loss. Moreover, the judge took into 
consideration that the settlement also covered various counter claims that made identifying 
the figures more significant
305. 
 
Nevertheless, in a later case, Enterprise Oil Ltd v. Strand Insurance Co Ltd
306, Aikens J 
stated that there was no precondition that specific claims should be allocated in the 
settlement itself, so that the assured could recover under the global settlement of insured 
and uninsured losses so long as it proves the liability. According to the learned Judge if an 
allocation was required in settlements, it should equally be applied to judgments or 
awards; consequently, a judgment which also did not meet the requirement would be 
rendered invalid. He emphasised that judgments rarely descend to the level of particularity 
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which Colman J appeared to suggest therefore, his ruling would cause commercial 
inconvenience
307. 
 
Colman J’s decision is not appropriate to commercial practice because the parties usually 
settle multiple and cross-claims in a global agreement where they do not make any 
admission of liability or attempt to allocate sums to the various claims. Therefore it was 
said in the later cases that Colman J’s ruling is likely to militate against the global 
agreements between the parties. It was also described as “technical” for the reason that if 
the failure to allocate each sum prevents the assured from making a claim, it also deprives 
him from the ability to prove liability. This view suggests that Colman J’s ruling could be 
applicable where the settlement covers both insured and uninsured losses, so that the mere 
fact of settling counterclaims would not affect the binding feature of the settlement
308. 
 
It should be noted that these two authorities were not in reinsurance cases
309 and in fact 
Aikens J reserved his position as to whether his analysis would be applicable to 
reinsurance, given that it is not certain if reinsurance is liability insurance
310. However it 
was submitted that these rules are equally applicable to the settlements entered into by 
reinsureds because the logic of the reasoning is that a settlement that not allocate the each 
claim does or does not establish and quantify the reinsured’s loss
311. It should also be 
remembered that in Re London County Commercial Reinsurance Office Ltd
312 it was held 
that the reinsured must prove the liability in the same way as the assured had to do. 
Therefore there seems to be no reason why these principles should not be applicable to 
reinsureds’ settlements. Because Enterprise is a High Court decision, it cannot be said that 
Colman J’s view was overruled but on the other hand it should be borne in mind that it has 
been rejected by trial judges on two separate occasions
313.  
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6.2.3  The Assured’s Fraud 
In terms of establishing and quantifying its liability to the assured it is necessary only for 
the reinsured to have acted honestly and professionally in determining that there was a 
serious possibility that the loss fell within the original insurance coverage. Subsequently, 
if the assured’s claim is shown to have been fraudulent, that should not in principle affect 
the reinsured’s rights against the reinsurer under the follow the settlements clause because 
matters have to be judged at the date of the settlement. So long as the reinsured acted in 
bona fide and businesslike manner in settling the claim, even if subsequently it was 
demonstrated that the assured acted fraudulently, this should not cause the reinsured to 
lose its rights.  
 
The issue came before the Court of Appeal in Scor where the reinsurer received 
anonymous letters alleging that the fire was set deliberately by the assured, and the 
reinsurers therefore warned the reinsured to reject the claim otherwise it would not follow 
any settlements. After the reinsured’s refusal to indemnify the assured for the loss caused 
by the fire, the assured brought an action against the reinsured in Liberia and the Court 
decided that the claim was not fraudulent. The assured’s fraud was not the issue in the 
proceedings before the English courts but the Court of Appeal nevertheless expressed their 
opinion on cases where the assured’s fraud could be established and held that so long as 
reinsureds have settled the claim acting honestly and in a proper and businesslike manner 
the reinsurer is not entitled to reject to follow the settlement even if it is later proved that 
the claim of the assured was fraudulent
314. The Court of Appeal suggested that reinsurers 
may have recourse to their rights of subrogation
315 arising upon payment of the claim 
under the policy of reinsurance, in order to seek to rescind the settlement with the assured 
and to recover the money paid by the insurers under that settlement
316.  
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6.2.4  Proving Liability by the Reinsured in Stop Loss Policies 
It has not been settled yet whether or not stop loss policies are reinsurance but cases have 
shown the need to discuss the operation of the follow the settlements clause in stop loss 
contracts.  
 
In this kind of agreement the reinsurers accept liability for aggregate ultimate net losses in 
excess of a fixed monetary amount per annum, subject to an upper limit
317. In other words 
the reinsurer protects the reinsured against the risk of a series of losses occurring during 
one year arising from any one event in excess of the reinsured’s retention up to an agreed 
limit
318. They are normally written on the basis that all losses above a given figure will be 
picked up by reinsurers. Hence stop loss reinsurance is not intended to provide protection 
against individual claims
319. The reinsurer will be liable after the loss ratio for the year 
reaches an agreed percentage of the premiums until its limit of liability is reached
320.  
 
Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd 
321 was a case where the policy was in stop loss 
form and referred itself as “this reinsurance contract”. Eagle Star, the reinsurer to close
322, 
agreed to pay all claims and other outgoings in respect of the run-off of the syndicates’ 
1965 underwriting year of account including all previous years of account reinsured by 
that year. The contract provided that settlements to be made monthly on receipt of debit 
notes to be rendered by the syndicate to Eagle Star. For a long time the agreement was 
operated without difficulty until a huge increase in claims, mostly arising from personal 
injury claims as a result of asbestosis, had been made on the syndicates in respect of 1965 
and prior years. The issue was whether Eagle Star was under an obligation to reimburse 
the syndicates in respect of claims and other relevant payments regardless of the 
claimants’ proof of liability to the assured.  
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The contract provided that claims negotiations should be handled by the reinsured, that 
settlements should be made monthly on receipt of debit notes from the reinsured, that the 
reinsured should provide Eagle Star with brief details of any new losses or increased 
losses which come to their attention and that Eagle Star should be entitled to inspect the 
records of the reinsured at any reasonable time. Hobhouse LJ found that this contract did 
not require the claimants to prove liability as would be the case in a true reinsurance or 
liability insurance contract
323. His alternative solution for Eagle Star was that they could 
deny liability either by relying on good faith defence or by exercising their contractual 
right to be kept informed.  
 
Furthermore Hobhouse LJ said that because of the “pay as may be paid clause” in some 
reinsurance contracts, establishing liability was required but in this case there was no such 
clause and liability did not need to be proved.  
 
It is in fact not clear why the Court found it unnecessary to prove liability and whether it 
was because of the absence of a “pay as may be paid” clause,  as was said by Hobhouse LJ 
in distinguishing this case from Versicherung
324 and Fireman
325, or whether because stop-
loss was not reinsurance. However, it is suggested that his reasoning is incorrect either 
way. Stop-loss policies cover all losses incurred by the reinsured and are a variation of 
excess of loss non-proportional cover. Stop loss does look more like an agreement to pay 
debts once they reach a certain level, rather than reinsurance, but it is accepted as 
reinsurance by the market
326 and by the regulator
327. As a matter of reinsurance law, there 
is no inconsistency between the idea of reinsurance and nil retention by the reinsured
328. 
Moreover reinsurance operates in the same way as liability insurance and, regardless of 
any discussion of the nature of reinsurance, it is established that in the absence of a follow 
the settlements provision the reinsured must prove liability.  
 
6.3  When Reinsurers’ Liability Arises 
Two different contractual relationships are affected when the risk insured against by a 
direct policy has occurred. In facultative reinsurance contracts the assured’s loss forms the 
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reinsured’s claim against the reinsured. Under this mechanism the reinsured cannot claim 
until its liability to the assured has been established and quantified
329. However this may 
give rise to disputes as to, for example, the relevant exchange rate for the claim against the 
reinsurers and also the applicable limitation period.  
 
The exchange rate was the issue in Versicherungs und Transport A/G Daugava v 
Henderson where an English underwriter reinsured a Latvian insurance company against 
liability under a fire insurance policy on buildings in Riga. A fire occurred and as a result 
of legal proceeding commenced by the assured judgment was given against the reinsured 
by the Latvian courts, assessed in the local currency, Lats. The amount was paid to the 
assured within a month. The issue was, with regard to the reinsurer’s liability, whether the 
sum was to be converted into Sterling at the exchange rate on the day of the fire, or at the 
date of the settlement of the insurer’s liability
330. At first instance Roche J emphasised the 
follow the settlements clause and stated that the exchange must be calculated as to the 
exchange rate at the judgment date, January 1932 because the reinsurer was not under any 
liability at all until there was a settlement to follow, and that did not occur until January 
1932
331. In the Court of Appeal Scrutton LJ reached the same conclusion but for different 
reasons. He found it unnecessary to decide if Roche J’s reason was correct and expressed 
the opinion that the reinsurer could not be liable to pay an amount until it had been fixed 
between the insurer and the assured
332. He also added that if the rate of exchange has been 
fixed at a date before the insurer’s liability to pay is quantified and satisfied, the insurer 
may recover more than it is actually entitled to, which would be contrary to all principles 
of insurance indemnity
333. 
In terms of the limitation period in liability insurance, that period starts running from the 
date when the assured’s liability to the third party is established and quantified by virtue 
                                                 
329 Home Insurance Company of New York v Victoria – Montreal Fire Insurance Company [1907] AC 59. 
330 The fire occurred on 11
th April 1930 and the insurance payment was made in January 1932. 
331 (1934) 48 Ll LR 54, 60. 
332 (1934) 49 Ll LR 252, 253. The parties can expressly agree when the reinsurer’s liability arises. In Feasey 
v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 637 the reinsurance agreement was drafted on 
the basis that the reinsurer’s liability to make payment arose when the insured contingency happened rather 
than on which the reinsured’s own liability was established. However, Feasey turned on a contract 
specifically drafted to achieve that end.  
333 (1934) 49 Ll LR 252, 253. In Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co v Western Australian Insurance Co Bateson 
J stated that “…a contract of reinsurance is a contract to indemnify against a liability and a payment. There 
must be both liability and payment, and the precise liability must be covered in each case.” After Henderson 
this dictum arguably cannot stand: Butler and Merkin, para C-0003.   83
of judgment, arbitration award or settlement
334. The same principle applies to 
reinsurance
335. That amount will form the measure of the reinsured’s indemnity
336 and 
this indeed lends further support for the proposition that reinsurance is a form of liability 
insurance. 
 
6.4  The Necessity of Payment to Trigger the Reinsurer’s Liability 
The mechanism that was mentioned in the previous paragraphs in reinsurance contracts 
may lead to an argument that payment by the reinsured to the assured must be a 
precondition to make claim against the reinsurer
337. This argument may seem to be strong 
especially where the contract contains “to pay as may be paid thereon” clause. 
 
The issue first came before the court in Re Eddystone Marine Insurance Company, Ex p. 
Western Insurance Company
338 where both the reinsurer and the reinsured were in 
liquidation and the marine reinsurance policy was expressed to be “…subject to the same 
terms and conditions as the original policy, and to pay as may be paid thereon”. Stirling J 
expressed the view that the words “to pay as may be paid thereon” did not have a strict 
grammatical connection with those words which immediately preceded it. The effect of 
the clause was nevertheless to impose an obligation as to payment on the reinsurers and 
this obligation should not depend upon to make payment by the reinsured, which would in 
any event be impossible if the reinsured was insolvent
339. Stirling J also added that in 
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order to construe the clause as rendering payment by the reinsured as a condition 
precedent the clause should clearly so state.
340  
 
The matter has more recently come before the courts in the construction of ultimate net 
loss clauses in excess of loss treaties. Those clauses typically provide that the reinsurers’ 
liability is triggered when the reinsured “shall actually have paid” the assured. For 
example in Home and Overseas Insurance Co Ltd v Mentor Insurance Co (UK) Ltd
341 the 
reinsurance policy was drafted as “…only to pay the Excess of an ultimate net loss to the 
reinsured…” and the policy defined ultimate net loss as “the sum actually paid by the 
reinsured in settlement of losses…”. The reinsured went into voluntary liquidation and 
made claims against the reinsurer. The latter denied liability and applied for summary 
judgment declaring that “the amount paid being given by the reinsured”, “only to pay…” 
and “…the sum actually paid by the reinsured in settlement…” required the actual 
payment by the reinsured in order to make a claim against them. Referring to Stirling J’s 
comments in Re Eddystone and also Re Law Guarantee Trust & Accident Society Ltd Hirst 
J expressed that it would be “unjust” and “discordant” with commercial good sense if the 
reinsurer should be discharged from liability just because the reinsured went into 
liquidation and not be able to make any payment to the assured especially in a situation 
where the reinsurer would unquestionably have been liable had the reinsured remained 
solvent
342. 
 
Moreover the word “paid” in the definition of ultimate net loss clause has been construed 
as “liable to pay” where the reinsured went into liquidation, holding otherwise being 
contrary to common sense in that it would unduly prolong the reinsured’s liquidation
343.  
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In Charter Reinsurance Company Limited v Fagan
344 the House of Lords drew particular 
attention to the nature of excess of loss reinsurance, and held that within this context the 
phrase “actually paid” should not be given its ordinary meaning. Their Lordships preferred 
to read the word “actually” as “in the event when finally ascertained”, and “paid” as 
“exposed to liability as a result of the loss insured under clause 1”. Lord Hoffman 
emphasised that words may have different meanings in different contexts and in order to 
explain that in this policy the words “shall have actually paid” should not be construed in 
their literal meaning, gave an example of a typical conversation between a husband and 
wife. He took the word “pay” as an example and said that “A wife comes home with a 
new dress and her husband says “What did you pay for it?” She would not understand his 
question in its natural meaning if she answered “Nothing, because the shop gave me 30 
days’ credit”
345. Lord Hoffman said that there was an ambiguity of meaning of “pay” here 
because his question was about the amount of money that has changed hands whereas her 
answer was about the liability that was incurred but had not at the time been discharged. 
Consequently the House of Lords held that the phrase was not designed to introduce a 
temporal pre-condition to recovery in the form of disbursement or other satisfaction of the 
precise net commitment between the assured and the reinsured, but was there “for the 
purpose of measurement”
346.  
 
Obliging the reinsured to have made payment where it is insolvent would clearly be 
tantamount to releasing the reinsurer from liability just because the reinsured faced 
financial difficulties. This unjust result was correctly pointed out by Courts and the rule 
has been settled. The issue in fact does not create real problems where the reinsured is 
capable of paying the assured’s claim, but is more significant where the reinsured has 
gone into liquidation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
344 [1997] AC 313. 
345 [1997] AC 313, 391. 
346 However, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of America 23 NE 2d 839, 1939 
that the phrase “the sum actually paid in cash” in an “ultimate net loss” clause was held to mean that actual 
payment in cash of a loss by the reinsured for which it is liable was a condition precedent to the duty of the 
reinsurer to pay (see Appendix).   86
6.5   Follow the Leader v Follow the Settlements 
If there are a number of subscribing underwriters on a risk, a major claim can be settled in 
one of three ways. 
 (1)    Each underwriter makes his own decision, some may pay and some may not
347. 
(2)    All of the underwriters may agree to follow the leader, so if he decides to settle then 
unless he has acted in bad faith all the others will act accordingly
348.  
(3)    The underwriters may try to agree what to do. In that case they will form a steering 
committee which will represent all of them, and that committee will make a decision on 
payment which will be binding on all the underwriters
349.  
The question may arise whether the Scor provisos are also applicable to case (2), where 
the policy contains a follow the leader clause. The issue came before Mance J in Roar 
Marine Ltd v Bimeh Iran Insurance Co (The Daylam) where the insurance policy provided 
“It is agreed with or without previous notice to follow leading British underwriters in 
regard to. . .settlements in respect of claims. . .” The insurers submitted that a proviso was 
implied into the “follow the leader” clause that the settlement must have been concluded 
in a proper and businesslike way by the leader. 
 
Mance J recognised the difference between insurance and reinsurance. In the reinsurance 
context, the insurer handles and is responsible for settlement of original incoming claims 
on which he then seeks to rely against his own reinsurer; whereas in the insurance context, 
there is mutuality of interest between insurers. Following insurers agree with the insured 
to be bound by settlements handled and made by their leading co-insurer. The insured 
does not control the way in which the leading underwriters handle or settle the claim; for 
better or for worse following insurers trust and follow their leader. Following underwriters 
accept both the advantages and any risks of the leading underwriters’ handling of 
settlements and of other matters affecting them. The leading underwriter clause was, in 
Roar Marine, limited by the presence of two express exceptions to the following market’s 
duty to follow settlements, namely ex- gratia and without prejudice settlements. Mance J 
                                                 
347 See Wasa v Lexington [2008] 1 CLC 340. 
348 Roar Marine Ltd v Bimeh Iran Insurance Co (The Daylam) [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 423. 
349 Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Spratt [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116 decides that if a steering committee is 
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found no basis for further qualifying the operation of the “follow the leader” clause as 
between the following market and the insured in the manner suggested by the defendants. 
The qualification would in reality undermine its purpose and operation.  
It is uncertain whether the leader acts as an agent for the following market in this 
situation
350. If there is said to be an agency relationship between lead and followers, the 
usual agency rules will apply. That means that the lead will owe a duty of care to the 
followers, giving rise to the possibilities of litigation and that the following market are 
participants in the lead’s professional indemnity insurance so that the claim becomes a 
circular one. It may be thought that agency principles are therefore not appropriate
351. 
6.6  Re-opening a Settlement 
The word “settlement” indicates a concluded binding agreement between the assured and 
the original insurer, and it does not mean something that can be reconsidered at a later 
stage by the parties
352. Therefore a settlement that is provisional
353 or subject to being 
reopened cannot be defined as “settlement” for the purposes of a follow the settlements 
clause
354.  
 
In practice most settlements are expressed to be “full and final” and cover “all claims 
whether known and unknown”, hence subsequent changes in the law render them immune 
from being reopened
355. For example, if it is discovered after the settlement that the 
assured has suffered some consequential loss he will not thereby be entitled to overturn the 
                                                 
350 A similar issue arises in relation to leading underwriter clauses not concerned with settlements. 
351 But see Reinsurance Law and Practice, para 15.4.1 where it is argued that a leading underwriter will 
almost invariably take an active role in claims handling, and may find himself in a de facto agency position 
when he takes responsibility for claims handling.   
352 Faraday Capital v Copenhagen Reinsurance [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 23, 30. 
353 Provisional payments that subject to future changes are not absolute and can be challenged later on. 
However in Boden v Hussey [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 423 the retrocessionaire was held liable for a claim 
settled on the basis of provisional liability subject to adjustment in the event that the reinsured’s liability was 
either reduced or not proved. In this case an aircraft was lost in an explosion whose cause was not 
established, so it was unclear whether the loss fell within the scope of the original aviation policy. The 
reinsurance contract required the reinsurer to make provisional payment, and the reinsurer sought an 
indemnity from its retrocessionaire under an agreement which indemnified the reinsurer for “losses which 
may be sustained howsoever” and stated “follow the reinsurer’s settlements”. The Court of Appeal construed 
the word “losses” as covering payments made both under an established liability and also provisional 
payments. However, the decision was based on one particular form of retrocession wording and does not 
establish a general principle: Butler and Merkin, para C-0004.   
354 Rix J in Hill v Mercantile, approved by the House of Lords, commented stated that there must be a 
proven settlement and not some other form of acceptance of liability [1996] 3 All ER 865. 
355 The validity and amount of the payment can be challenged if the insurer simply asks the insured to sign a 
receipt without requiring the insured to sign an acceptance declaring that the settlement is full and final: 
Butler and Merkin, para C-0161.     88
settlement
356. In the same way, if after having reached a settlement it appears that the 
amount of the insured loss is greater or lesser than the settled amount, this should not lead 
the settlement re-opened
357. However it should be borne in mind that there may be some 
circumstances that the parties could not have contemplated at the time of the settlement. 
For instance in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali and Khan
358 House 
of Lords decided by a majority to re-open a settlement between a bank and dismissed 
employees by reason of the fact that at the date of the settlement the law had not 
recognised damages for the manner of dismissal, a head of loss subsequently recognised 
by the courts, thereby rendering the settlement one tainted by error of law.  
  
This decision will be of some disappointment to those who rely upon the certainty of 
settlements and commutations, although it should be taken into account that Bank of 
Credit v Ali is an employment case and of a different nature from insurance cases where 
the assured’s heads of loss are generally ascertainable from the outset
359. Therefore it 
cannot be treated as an authority on the re-opening of reinsurance settlements. But in any 
event it is sensible to draft the settlement as covering all claims “known and unknown” to 
take steps to protect it against possible re-opening
360, and this is indeed the market 
practice.  
 
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that at common law settlements can be overturned 
if the parties can prove that they made a fundamental mistake which renders the contract 
void
361. Therefore the validity of an insurance settlement can be challenged if the contract 
that the settlement was based on did not exist in the first place. For example if a reinsurer 
proves a fundamental mistake in assessing the loss that made them believe that the loss 
fell within the reinsurance cover whereas it did not,
362 such mistake may be interpreted as 
                                                 
356 Kitchen Design & Advice Ltd v Lea Valley Water Co [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 221; Fontana v Skandia Life 
Assurance Ltd 2000 WL 1841575. 
357 Kyle Bay Ltd v Lloyd’sUnderwriters [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 460. 
358 [2002] 1 AC 251.  
359 Butler/Merkin, para C-0153. 
360 Butler/Merkin, para C-0153. 
361 Bell v Lever Brothers [1932] AC 161. However this common law principle should be considered together 
with the principle that a contract is void (not voidable) when the subject matter of the contract is not in 
existence, therefore mistake in quality is not enough to render it void: Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris 
Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 689; O’Kane v Jones (The Martin P) [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
174; Brennan v Bolt Burdon [2005] QB 303; Statoil ASA v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP (The Harriette 
N) [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 685. 
362 See Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v Price [1934] AC 455 where the insurers made payment 
on the basis of a mistaken belief that the loss arose from perils insured against. The Privy Council found the 
mistake “vital” and reopened the settlement.   89
rendering the settlement void because there was in truth no intention to contract
363. It is 
also worth noting that in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council
364 the House of 
Lords abolished the distinction between mistake of law and fact and ruled that the two 
types of mistake should be analysed in the same way. As a result if the insurer makes 
payment and subsequently declared his right to avoid the policy or to rely upon the breach 
of warranty that payment may be prima facie void.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
363 Bell v Lever Brothers. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE SCOPE OF THE FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS CLAUSE 
 
7.1  The Reinsured’s Costs in Defending the Assured’s Claim  
The reinsured is under the duty to take all proper and businesslike steps to ascertain that 
there is a serious possibility that the loss fell within the contract of insurance. However if 
there are arguable defences available against the assured, the reinsured might have to incur 
expense in defending the assured’s claim. If the reinsured’s defence is successful, this 
would necessarily be to the reinsurer’s benefit and therefore one may argue that the 
reinsurer should share the relevant costs with the reinsured. This may be on the basis of 
relying on a sue and labour clause or alternatively, especially in proportional reinsurance 
contracts, the suggestion that the reinsurer and the reinsured are in a partnership 
relationship and they should share the costs of defending the assureds claim as well as 
sharing the risk and the premium
365.   
 
7.1.1  Sue and Labour Clauses 
In the past there have been cases in which the reinsured has based its claim to recover 
costs on sue and labour clauses. In Scottish Metropolitan Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Groom
366 
the reinsurance policy did not contain follow the settlements or to pay as may be paid 
thereon clause but provided that “… in case of any loss or misfortune it shall be lawful to 
the assured…to sue, labour and travel for, in and about the defence, safeguard, and 
recovery of the said goods and merchandises and ship, &c., or any part thereof, without 
prejudice to this insurance”. The insurer incurred considerable expenses in successfully 
defending an action by the assured on the ground that the vessel had been deliberately cast 
away and that the loss was not covered by the policy for that reason. By relying on the sue 
and labour clause, the reinsured then claimed the cost of defending the assured’s action. 
Alternatively it contended that a term should be implied into reinsurance which required 
the reinsurer to contribute the expenses incurred by the reinsured in defending the 
assured’s claim. However the Court of Appeal rejected the reinsured’s arguments. The 
Court looked closely at the wording of the sue and labour clause and held that it was 
                                                 
365 Baker v Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 327. 
366 (1924) 20 Ll LR 44; cf British Dominions General Insurance Co Ltd v Duder [1915] 2 KB 394. Scottish 
Metropolitan was applied by Roche J in Versicherungs und Transport A/G Daugava v Henderson (1934) 48 
Ll LR 54, 60. It should be noted that the reinsurer in this case agreed to follow the settlements of the 
reinsured but Roche J did not express any view as to the effect of the follow the settlements clause on 
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inapposite to cover such claims as it did not contain any provision for payment of costs. 
As for the implied term argument it was suggested that the term was to be implied from 
the conduct and action of the defendant or possibly from a practice at Lloyd’s. 
Nevertheless no sufficient evidence was produced to establish any practice by which the 
defendant would be bound by implied contract to pay these costs. It can be inferred from 
the Court of Appeal’s comments on the sue and labour clause that the reinsurer may be 
held liable for the costs but all will depend on the wording of the clause.  
 
7.1.2  Partnership and Implied Term Argument 
The partnership argument was the issue in Baker v Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance 
Co Ltd. where the reinsurance policy contained the “Full Reinsurance Clause”, and the 
reinsured emphasised the relationship between the reinsured and the reinsurer and asserted 
that the reinsurance is an extension of the underlying insurance so that the parties should 
share the costs as well as the benefits of the contract. The reinsurer was profiting from the 
defence of these coverage actions and accordingly should contribute to the cost because 
the proportional nature of reinsurance requires sharing proportionately all aspects of the 
contract including defence costs. 
 
The Court of Appeal
367 distinguished a partnership relationship from reinsurance, pointing 
out that, in the former, costs and expenses incurred by one partner in the course of the 
partnership business are incurred for and on behalf of the partnership. Nevertheless in the 
reinsurance context the legal costs and expenses incurred by the syndicate in investigating 
claims were incurred by it as principal and on its own account in the course of its own 
business. Consequently the syndicate had no right to recover any part of such costs from 
the reinsurer unless the reinsurance contract expressly so provided
368.  
 
                                                 
367 [1996] LRLR 353. 
368 For an express term in a reinsurance policy that entitling the reinsured to claim for costs see Eagle Star 
Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 537: “In the event of a loss arising to which the 
underwriters hereon may be liable to contribute, no legal costs shall be incurred on their behalf without their 
consent being first obtained and if they so consent they shall contribute to the said costs in the proportion 
that their share of the loss as finally settled bears to the total sum payable. If, however, a settlement of the 
loss be practicable prior to taking the case into court whether by compromise or otherwise for a sum not 
exceeding the limits stated in the Schedule hereto, no legal costs shall be payable by the underwriters 
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In the House of Lords
369 the reinsured continued to rely on its assertions that a term to 
such effect must be implied in order to give the contract business efficacy, or because it 
was trade practice in the London insurance market
370.  
 
The House of Lords rejected the reinsured’s implied term argument, entirely agreeing with 
the Court of Appeal. As to market practice, the House of Lords pointed out that there 
would have to be evidence of a universal and acknowledged practice of the market for 
reinsurers to pay such costs and no such evidence had been produced. The case was 
remitted to the High Court to see if such evidence existed, but the reinsured did not press 
its case. There has been no subsequent attempt to argue that there is a market custom to 
the effect that costs are recoverable on this basis.  
 
As a result of these authorities, it is now settled that unless the policy expressly imposes 
an obligation on the reinsurer, the reinsured is not entitled to claim the costs that it 
incurred in investigating the loss or defending the assured’s claim and the follow the 
settlements clause does not include to follow the reinsured’s such expenses because unless 
the parties agree otherwise the expenses of dealing with a loss are no part of the loss 
itself
371.   
 
7.1.3  The Relationship with Claims Provisions 
Problems arise where the policy contains the full reinsurance clause together with claims 
provisions
372. If the reinsurers declare under a claims co-operation clause that they will not 
consent to the settlement and force the reinsured to reject the claim, or if they refuse to 
take over the conduct of the claim under a claims control clause, it may be arguable that a 
term should be implied into the contract that the cost of defending the claim would be on 
reinsurers, at least to the extent of their proportion of the risk.   
 
This issue was discussed in Scor where the reinsurance policy contained a follow the 
settlements and a claims co-operation clause. In this case the insured warehouse was 
                                                 
369 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 327. 
370 See Wasa v Lexington [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 604, where Simon J rejected a claim for defence costs by 
relying on Baker v Black Sea and holding that the reinsurance contract contained no express provision for 
such coverage and that the reinsured had not attempted to prove a universal practice in the London market in 
1977. The point was not appealed.  
371 Roche J, Versicherungs und Transport A/G Daugava v Henderson (1934) 48 Ll LR 54. Costs were not in 
issue on appeal. 
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damaged by fire and the reinsurer received some anonymous letters alleging that the fire 
was set by the assured deliberately. Subsequently the reinsurers notified the reinsured that 
they would not pay if the reinsured chose to pay the assured’s claim because they 
suspected that the claim was fraudulent. Therefore the reinsured had to deny liability to 
the original assured even though it did not posses any evidence of fraud. The assured 
brought an action against the reinsured and the Liberian court found the reinsured liable 
and it was also obliged to pay $58,000 for costs of the proceeding. When the reinsured 
claimed defence costs from the reinsurer, at first instance, Leggatt J
373 found necessary for 
business efficacy to imply a term to the effect that where the reinsurer by using his 
authority refuses to make payment and forces the reinsured to deny the claim the reinsurer 
should indemnify the reinsured for such expenses even if the costs is beyond the 
reinsurer’s policy limit
374. In the Court of Appeal Stephenson LJ emphasised that a 
contract of reinsurance is a contract of indemnity and the indemnity must cover any 
payments made by the reinsured which are the reasonably foreseeable result and their 
Lordships regarded the expenses that the reinsured incurred as a result of the reinsurers’ 
refusal to approve the settlement of the claim as reasonably foreseeable if not direct and 
inevitable
375.  
 
However Robert Goff LJ (Fox LJ concurring) disagreed
376. Their Lordships said that 
Leggatt J had not defined the implication which he was prepared to accept
377. Robert Goff 
LJ was of the view that in order to make the reinsurers liable for such costs, a request in 
law by the reinsurers, express or implied, to incur the relevant expense or liability, or so to 
act as to expose themselves to it, must be made. If this condition is met, then an obligation 
upon the reinsurers to indemnify the reinsureds would arise by virtue of the request, and 
not as an implied term of the policy. Their Lordships agreed that the attitude of the 
reinsurers put the reinsureds in a very considerable difficulty; however Goff LJ held that 
by so doing the reinsurers left to the reinsureds to decide what course of action the latter 
                                                 
373 [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 541. 
374 This is different from Scottish Metropolitan Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Groom (1924) 20 Ll LR 44 because in 
Groom the reinsured voluntarily incurred the expenses. 
375 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312, 324. 
376 O’Neill and Woloniecki prefer the majority view. 
377 In fact he did, by saying that if the reinsurer compelled the reinsured to deny the claim, then the latter 
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should take following upon the failure or refusal by them to give their approval to the 
settlement and this did not amount to a request to defend the claim of the assured
378. 
 
It seems that there is only one case where the Court of Appeal has expressed willingness 
to award defence costs, but this case turns on its facts. In British Dominions General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Duder
379 the assured’s claim was for the constructive total loss of the 
vessel. The reinsurer argued that it was not a constructive total loss and refused indemnity. 
The reinsured compromised the claim for 66% of the loss and in the subsequent action 
brought by the reinsured against the reinsurer it was established that the vessel was a 
constructive total loss. The reinsured then made a claim against the reinsurer 100% of the 
loss by contending that the reinsurer should not have benefited from their rejection.  
 
The Court of Appeal put emphasis on the nature of reinsurance, and because reinsurance is 
a contract of indemnity it was concluded that the reinsured could not recover more than it 
paid
380. Moreover the Court stressed that the reinsured could not make a profit out of the 
reinsurance. With regard to defence costs Buckley LJ commented that the indemnity was 
not necessarily confined to 66%: the costs, for instance, of obtaining the compromise at 
66% should be added to the 66%. However in this case the Court did not give a firm ruling 
on the costs because the reinsured did not make it clear what sort of expenses had been 
incurred and, if they were, for what reason.  
 
It is thus accepted that the only option for the reinsured to be entitled to claim defence 
costs against the reinsurer is agreeing on this at the outset with the reinsurer
381. Otherwise 
the reinsured’s claim for costs will fail irrespective of the other terms of the reinsurance
382.  
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379 [1915] 2 KB 394. 
380 The Court also discussed the applicability of Uzielli v Boston Marine Insurance (1884) 15 OBD 11, 
doubts were expressed as to what Uzielli actually decided: the case was not regarded as authority for the 
proposition that the reinsured can recover more than it paid. 
381 It is suggested that a clause such as “The ceding company have the sole right to settle claims either by 
way of compromise, ‘ex gratia’ payments, or otherwise, and all settlements are binding on the reinsurers. 
The reinsurers should be liable for their share of any costs incurred in resisting or defending any claim” 
would be an example of an express clause as for costs. See Carter, 135. 
382 In fact the reinsurance of a liability policy will normally cover the reinsured’s obligations to indemnify 
the assured both for any liability to the third party and for any defence costs incurred by the assured insofar 
as they relate to an insured peril although such recovery may be conditional on the reinsured seeking the 
consent of the reinsurers for the defence of the claim against the assured. For instance in British General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Mountain (1919) 1 Ll LR 605 the reinsured issued a liability policy in the sum of £1000. 
The reinsured took out a reinsurance policy for £750, with an excess of £250. The direct policy imposed 
liability on the reinsured for the assured’s defence costs. The reinsurers were also liable to indemnify the   95
 
The rule seems reasonable because if there is any defence available to the reinsured it has 
to be asserted, failing which it cannot be said that the reinsured has acted in bona fide and 
businesslike manner, and if the assured sued the reinsured as a result of rejection of its 
claim, the reinsured has to defend itself. If the reinsured chose not to plead the defence 
then it would not be able to establish its liabilty. It seems that where there is no claims 
provision, defence costs have no relevance to the assured’s loss so that the reinsurer 
should not be required to share those costs with the reinsured. Even where the policy 
contains claims provisions, it is equally arguable that the reinsured should bear the 
expenses itself, despite the fact that such expenses will have to be incurred before the 
reinsured is able to make a claim against the reinsurers.  
 
It is not clear from British Dominions v Duder whether the Court of Appeal would have 
been willing to hold the reinsurer liable for the costs had the reinsured paid 100% of the 
loss plus costs. In Scor the sum paid plus expenses exceeded the amount reinsured. 
Therefore it is possible to say that Scor left open the possibility of the implication of a 
term to the effect that the reinsurer might be liable for the reinsured’s defence costs so 
long as it is up to the maximum of the reinsurer’s potential contractual liability where the 
reinsured’s claim itself does not reach the reinsurance policy maximum figure
383. 
 
7.2  Interest 
If a reinsured fails to settle the claim quickly and it is ultimately held liable to the assured 
it may have to pay a considerable amount of interest
384 and the matter to be discussed is 
whether the interest should be counted as part of the loss in respect of which the reinsurer 
undertakes to indemnify the reinsured. The answer was held to be positive in Excess 
Insurance Company Ltd. v Mathews
385 but this case should be read in the light of its 
particular circumstances. In this case even though the risk occurred during the currency of 
                                                                                                                                                   
reinsured for the assured’s defence costs, although if the claim against the assured was likely to exceed the 
reinsured’s £250 retention then the reinsurers were only liable for those defence costs if they had given 
consent for them to be incurred. A claim was made against the assured likely to exceed £250, but the 
reinsured did not seek the reinsurers’ consent to defend the claim. It followed, therefore, that the reinsurers 
were not liable to indemnify the reinsured for its liability for the assured’s defence costs. 
383 Butler and Merkin, para C-0128. 
384 Section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 authorises the English courts to award interest on the sum 
due, and s.17 of the Judgments Act 1838 provides that interest runs from the date of judgment to the date of 
actual payment. 
385 (1925) 23 Ll LR 71.   96
the original policy the insurers were legally prevented from paying such loss due to the 
First World War. After the War a protocol between Hungary and Britain made the insurers 
legally compellable to pay the loss but with interest at a specified rate of exchange at a 
date after the conclusion of the war
386. Therefore it was inevitable that the reinsured and 
the reinsurer were liable for the interest. However Branson J’s comments in this case can 
be interpreted as meaning that the follow the settlements clause should entitle the 
reinsured to claim interest from the reinsurer. The learned judge stated that subject to the 
point on the words “and to follow their settlements” the reinsurers could not be made 
liable to pay interest merely because the claimants chose to agree to do so or because the 
claimants became compellable to do so by any act or default of their own other than an 
express agreement in the original policy. However even though the learned judge put a 
reservation on the effect of the follow the settlements clause it was not the basis of the 
decision.    
 
It should also be remembered that the settlement process might be prolonged because the 
insurers might have refused to give consent to the reinsured’s settlement. Even in this 
situation it is unlikely that reinsurers are to be held liable for the surplus interest because 
the insurers took the risk under a claims co-operation clause that reinsurers may refuse 
consent. 
 
7.3  Extra-contractual Liability 
A reinsured may be obliged to make payment to the assured in excess of its contractual 
liability. The reinsured may be exposed to this situation because it failed to settle the claim 
promptly, thereby rendering itself liable for damages for its negligent act
387. This may 
arise because the reinsured is obliged to make payment within a certain time limit but did 
                                                 
386 In Excess v Mathews the claimant insured a mill against fire at Budapest and reinsured the risk at Lloyd’s. 
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to pay to the assured with 5% interest to run from the date of commencement of hostilities (or, if the sum of 
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not do so in breach of express terms of the contract, as in Scor, where the reinsured was 
obliged to settle the claim in 60 day-period. In Scor the claim for extra-contractual liability 
was rejected because it was in conflict with the claims co-operation clause. However it is 
yet to be decided whether the position is the same where there are no claims provisions in 
the reinsurance policy. Moreover in Scor the extra-contractual liability was in excess of 
the reinsurance policy’s limit and therefore it is not clear what the position would be if the 
aggregate sum remains within the reinsurance policy limit
388.  
 
In Scor the reinsured was also held liable by the Liberian Court to pay $600,000 for 
“general damages”. Neither Leggatt J nor the Court of Appeal distinguished the 
reinsured’s claim for general damages from its claim for costs. It has been suggested that 
the Court of Appeal’s comment on costs was also applicable to this class of damages
389. 
However, it may be said that an implied term which allows the reinsured to claim punitive 
damages awarded against it would potentially expose the reinsurer to open-ended liability.  
 
It should be added that in Scor the Court of Appeal focused on the effect of claims co-
operation clause and not the follow the settlements clause; therefore it is not certain what 
would be the position if the policy contains only the settlements clause without providing 
any claims provisions
390.  
 
Another possibility is that the reinsured might be obliged to pay exemplary damages 
representing penalty for settling the claim late. There is no direct authority on 
reinsurance
391 in English law but it is arguable that this would be a personal punishment of 
the reinsured and the award should be borne by the reinsured only
392. 
 
As the phrase itself suggests “extra-contractual liability” is not within the reinsurance 
contract coverage for the reason that it is outside the original policy because it is not a 
damage to or loss of the subject matter insured. Therefore, it is submitted that it would not 
be justifiable to hold the reinsurer liable for such amount unless the policy expressly 
                                                 
388 According to Uzielli v Boston Marine Insurance (1884) 15 OBD 11 it could be said that if it is within the 
policy limit the reinsurer may be held liable for such losses.   
389 Butler and Merkin, para C-0138. 
390 Butler and Merkin, para C-0138. 
391 See Lancashire County Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd [1997] QB 897 where it was held that 
public policy for a liability policy would cover both compensatory awards and exemplary damages.  
392 Butler and Merkin, para C-0144.   98
provides otherwise. Furthermore allowing otherwise would also be inconsistent with the 
nature of reinsurance as it would turn out to be a general liability insurance of the 
reinsured
393. 
 
7.4  Commutations 
As a means of simplifying accounting issues reinsurers and reinsureds may enter into 
commutation agreements that generally release the parties from accrued and future 
liabilities in relation to the payment of agreed sums
394. Since liability under the 
reinsurance agreements is replaced by a fresh contract the question here would be what 
would be the remedy for the breach of the commutation by one party; in other words 
whether the other party can insist on performance of the commutation agreement or could 
rely on the terms of the reinsurance contract.  
 
According to general contract law principles if one party is in repudiatory breach of 
contract the other party has a right to elect whether or not to insist on performing the 
contract or to treat it as wholly discharged. On the other hand commutation agreements, 
unless the contrary is provided, release the parties from their obligations arising from the 
underlying contract and any claim can be brought only for breach of the commutation 
agreement. However an express term can provide options for the parties. For instance in 
Korea Foreign Insurance Co v Omne Re Sa
395 the commutation agreement provided a 
condition precedent that “in the event the Omne Re makes default in payments of USD 
100,000.00 upon execution of this Agreement and/or any of the instalments within 5 to 10 
bank working days from [any] reason whatsoever, this Commutation and Release 
Agreement shall be wholly null and void, and KFIC shall be entitled to reserve its full 
rights without prejudice to its rights under the Reinsurance Agreements and the claims 
recoveries”. The agreement was also stated to be “full and final settlement of the 
outstanding claims under the reinsurance contracts”. The Court of Appeal was of the 
opinion that the clause was not to be construed as meaning that the commutation 
agreement was null and void in case of any default payments because such construction 
                                                 
393 Butler and Merkin, para C-0137. 
394 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 17-22; Evans LJ in Korea Foreign Insurance Co v Omne Re Sa 
[1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 509, 514 particularly in relation to old accounts or when one party is in run-off. 
MacGillivray on Insurance Law, para 33-72; O’Neill/Woloniecki, para 5-54. For an example of a 
commutation agreement, see A Guide to Reinsurance Law, 303-306. The sum in question is calculated by 
taking into account the claims history, what claims are likely to be made in the future and the likely cost of 
those claims and what payments are likely to be made in respect of existing claims. 
395 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 509.   99
would be contrary to business commonsense and to the commercial purpose of the 
contract: that approach would enable the reinsurer to render the agreement null and void at 
any time simply by not making payment during the performance of the agreement. 
Therefore the effect of the clause was held to be that a default during the interim period 
gave the reinsured a right to elect whether or not to affirm the compromise agreement and 
to insist upon performance of its terms or to disregard the agreement and the underlying 
reinsurance contracts
396.      
  
Another question may be whether or not a commutation agreement is a settlement within 
the meaning of the follow the settlements clause. A similar issue came before the High 
Court of Singapore in Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v Home and Overseas Insurance Co 
Ltd
397 where OUI entered into ten reinsurance contracts with the reinsured then made 
claim against its retrocessionaire. The reinsurance agreement provided “all loss 
settlements made by the reinsured, including compromise settlements, shall be 
unconditionally binding upon reinsurers”. The judge held that the follow the settlements 
clause did not make the commutation recoverable from the retrocessionaire. A 
commutation agreement was not a settlement within the meaning of the follow the 
settlements clause: it is a separate agreement over and above a reinsurance contract.  
 
This decision seems justifiable as the learned Judge correctly stated that a commutation 
agreement includes the settlement of losses but the reasons for settlement are quite 
different to a normal settlement because the reinsurer has another priority besides merely 
settling the individual losses. The agreement will cover various claims and counterclaims 
that have been accrued and also future liabilities. Therefore in its nature commutations are 
usually entered into within the context of treaty rather than facultative reinsurance, but 
even if it is made in the latter context, so long as the loss that the reinsurer reinsured has 
not been ascertained, it may be the case that the reinsurer will not be obliged to follow the 
commutation agreement
398.   
 
 
 
                                                 
396 The words “void ab initio”, were disregarded by the Court of Appeal because the phrase had not been 
used accurately. 
397 [2002] 4 SLR 104. 
398 Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bovis Lend Lease Ltd [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 494.   100
 
CHAPTER 8 OTHER FORMS OF FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS CLAUSE  
 
8.1  Variations 
The follow the settlements clause is not always worded in its usual form and some 
variations are often seen. In such cases the question is whether or not the variations release 
the reinsured from the obligation of acting in bona fide and businesslike manner in settling 
the assured’s claim. 
 
8.1.1  “Without Question” to Follow the Settlement  
This was the issue in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance plc.
399 
where the reinsurer agreed to follow without question the settlement of the reinsured 
except ex-gratia and/or without prejudice settlement
400. The Court of Appeal held that the 
phrase “without question” clarified rather than qualified or limited the obligations under 
the follow the settlements clause. By that phrase the reinsurers had entrusted their interests 
to the reinsureds: the obligation to act in a businesslike manner assumed an even greater 
significance than it might otherwise possess
401. The Court of Appeal however accepted the 
possibility that the reinsurer could be deprived of the protection that the Scor proviso 
offers, but they pointed out that in order to do that far clearer and more explicit words than 
“without question” would be required
402. 
 
8.1.2  Liable or not liable 
The same question came before Webster J in Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange 
Assurance
403 with regard to the phrase “liable or not liable” in the clause “…to follow … 
in so far as applicable including loss settlements, liable or not liable”. In fact Webster J 
found unnecessary to decide the point, because there was no evidence to suggest that the 
reinsureds had no belief that they were not arguably liable to the original insured. 
                                                 
399 [2004] 2 CLC 122. 
400 The clause provided: “As original: Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, this Reinsurance is 
declared and agreed to be subject to the same terms, clauses and conditions, special or otherwise, as the 
original policy or policies and is to pay as may be paid thereon and to follow without question the 
settlements of the Reassured except exgratia and/or without prejudice settlements.” 
401 Per Tuckey LJ, [2004] 2 CLC 122, 127-128. 
402 [2004] 2 CLC 122, 128. However it should be noted that the validity of a clause imposing an obligation 
to the reinsured to follow the reinsured’s settlement who paid irrespective of liability would be open to doubt 
as Mathew J in Chippendale v Holt (1895) Com Cas 197 held that such a clause would amount to wagering 
by the reinsurer.   
403 [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 607.   101
Nevertheless he expressed his view that although “liable or not liable” distinguished the 
clause from a typical follow the settlements clause, those words made no material 
difference.  
 
8.1.3  Excluded “Without Prejudice” Settlements 
In Faraday Capital Ltd v Copenhagen Reinsurance Co Ltd
404 Aikens J discussed the types 
of settlement falling within the ambit of a follow the settlements clause which excludes 
“Without Prejudice Settlements”
405. The judge stated the general rule as that the reinsurers 
are entitled to insist that the reinsured must prove actual liability under the original policy 
if the original insurer is not prepared to admit liability, and the judge found that the 
addition of the proviso concerning without prejudice settlements was an encouragement to 
the reinsured to give proper and businesslike consideration to its liability to the original 
assured and to act honestly in settling the claim. In this case the settlement was expressly 
stated to be a compromise between the parties and that it “…shall not be construed as an 
admission of coverage under the Subject Insurance Policies”. Moreover the settlement 
agreement will not be treated as “…a waiver, modification, or retraction of the positions of 
the Parties with respect to the interpretation and application of the Subject Insurance 
Policies that are the subject of the Action”. Aikens J found that without admission of 
liability
406, was clearly a “Without Prejudice Settlement”
407 so that the reinsured was 
unable to recover even though it might otherwise be able to prove its loss.  
 
8.2  Qualified Follow the Settlements Clauses 
8.2.1  “Within the Terms of Original Insurance” 
In Hill v Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co Plc
408 the reinsurer agreed to be bound by 
the reinsured’s settlement “providing such settlements are within the terms and conditions 
of the original policies and within the terms and conditions of this reinsurance.”  
                                                 
404 [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 23. 
405 “This Reinsurance is subject to all terms, clauses and conditions as original except as provided for herein, 
and to follow in all respects the settlements or other payments of whatsoever nature excluding Without 
Prejudice and Ex-Gratia Settlements made by the Original Underwriters arising out of and in connection 
with the Original Insurance.” 
406 See also Assicurazioni Generali v CGU where Gavin Kealey QC described without prejudice settlements 
as “…those where the basis on which they were made was that there was no admission of the existence of 
any liability under the terms and conditions of the original policy to indemnify.” [2003] 2 CLC 852, para 63. 
407 [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 23, 31. However this should be distinguished from settlements where the 
reinsured admitted or compromised the liability but the claim as recognised was arguably covered. In this 
case, the reinsurer would be obliged to pay if the reinsured acted in a bona fide and businesslike fashion 
even if it was established after trial that the reinsured was not actually liable.   
408 [1996] 3 All ER 865.   102
 
The additional words in the clause were regarded by Lord Mustill as qualifying its effect. 
According to their Lordships the purpose of the words was to ensure that the reinsurer’s 
original assessment and rating of the risks assumed were not falsified by a settlement 
which appeared bona fide and businesslike. Contrary to the reinsured’s argument that the 
literal reading of the clause would emasculate its “follow settlements” aspect, their 
Lordships found that there was ample room for the clause to operate in every situation 
except where the settlement would bind the reinsurer to a different definition of cover and 
furthermore the reinsurers should not be bound by settlements which were not intended to 
be covered
409.  
 
A similar qualification was in question in Commercial Union Assurance Co. Plc. v NRG 
Victory Reinsurance Ltd
410 where the reinsurance policies provided “All loss settlements 
by the Re-assured including compromise settlements ….shall be binding upon the 
Reinsurers, providing such settlements are within the terms and conditions of the original 
policies and/or contracts…and within the terms and conditions of this Reinsurance”. This 
case was concerned with pollution following the Exxon Valdez accident. The assured 
applied for summary judgment against the reinsured in the Texas Courts under a policy 
governed by English law, but then the reinsured settled the claim before trial. The reason 
was a local lawyer’s advice that the reinsured would be unlikely to succeed. According to 
the lawyer, Mr Reasoner, the case involved a complex construction of terms. But the judge 
was not experienced and the Texas jury was likely to take a pro-assured approach. Relying 
on Mr Reasoner’s view, the reinsured settled the claim but the reinsurer denied payment 
on the ground that the reinsured had a clear defence in that the policy covered only 
“debris” and not oil pollution. Clarke J decided in favour of the reinsured whereas the 
Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. Both Clarke J and the Court of Appeal agreed that 
the reinsured must prove his liability in the same manner as the original assured had to. 
However while Clarke J was convinced that the reinsured had shown that he would have 
been liable to the assured if the issue had gone to trial, the Court of Appeal disagreed. 
Potter LJ found that Clarke J fell into error in his approach to the question of whether or 
not the liability of the claimants to the assured was proved. He said that in the absence of a 
                                                 
409 This interpretation was classified as a case “where there has been a significant shift away from the 
‘generic’ approach to the construction of reinsurance contracts”: Butler, “Different contract, different 
terms”, Reinsurance, September 1996, 62. 
410 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600.   103
binding foreign judgment, it was the judge’s duty to form his own view whether an 
arguable defence had been shown by the reinsurer that the reinsured were not liable to the 
assured according to the applicable law and rules of construction
411. Potter LJ stated that 
the settlement was no doubt reasonable and businesslike, but he pointed out that the follow 
the settlements clause in this case was worded in a similar way to that of Hill v Mercantile 
and under such a qualified clause establishing that the settlement was businesslike in 
commercial sense was not enough to make the reinsurer liable
412. Potter LJ was of the 
view that any court should be reluctant to make predictions as to a decision in another 
court. Moreover, Mr Reasoner’s prediction was not based on the principles of law and was 
no more than a prediction of human behaviour based on the jury’s consideration of 
different matters in another trial. Furthermore it should not be ignored that it was the 
reinsured’s decision to settle the claim which prevented the jury having the opportunity to 
consider the case
413.   
 
8.2.2  “…as far as applicable hereto” 
In Aegis Electrical and Gas International Services Co Ltd v Continental Casualty Co
414 
the original insurance and the reinsurance policies provided different “accident” 
definitions. The Judge held that the two clauses should be read together, with the effect 
that the reinsurance definition modified that of the original policy and to that extent the 
two contracts were not back-to-back. The reinsurance policy also contained “To follow the 
terms, clauses, conditions, exceptions and settlements of the original policy wording as far 
as applicable hereto”. Andrew Smith J pointed out that it was not clear whether the phrase 
“…as far as applicable hereto” referred to terms or to settlements but either way it 
reflected that the reinsurance cover was not fully back-to-back with the direct cover and its 
effect was to restrict the effect of the follow the settlements obligation to settlements to 
which the reinsurance cover was applicable.  
 
 
                                                 
411 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600, 611. 
412 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600, 612. 
413 The reinsurers who had –unlike NRG - settled the claim, brought an action against the retrocessionaire in 
King v Brandywine Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 655. The retrocession agreement 
contained the same follow the settlement clause as in Commercial Union v NRG, therefore the retrocedants 
were required to prove that the loss was both covered by the primary policies and within the terms of the 
retrocessions. The Court of Appeal held that there was no liability under the direct policy or the reinsurance 
so that the retrocessionaires were not required to provide an indemnity.  
414 [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 17.   104
 
CHAPTER 9 CLAIMS PROVISIONS  
 
9.1  Claims Co-operations and Claims Control Clauses 
In the absence of an express provision in a reinsurance contract, the reinsured is not under 
any duty to notify the claim to the reinsurer or to seek the reinsurer’s consent to settle the 
claim, and the reinsurer has no right to interfere with the manner in which the reinsured 
handles it
415. However claims provisions provide such opportunity to reinsurers. There are 
two types of claims provisions found in facultative contracts. Claims co-operation clauses 
give reinsurers the right to be involved in the investigation and settlement of the loss
416. 
The reinsured retains the responsibility for the settlement but its authority will be subject 
to compliance with any obligations imposed by the contract. Such obligations could be 
advising the reinsurer within a certain time limit about any circumstances that may give 
rise to a claim or co-operation with reinsurers in investigating and assessing the claim or 
contesting the reinsurers consent before reaching a settlement with the assured
417.  
 
Claims control clauses provide even more authority to the reinsurer, in that the reinsured is 
obliged to pass to reinsurers the control of any negotiations with the direct assured
418. The 
reinsured may be required to inform the reinsurer of all developments that may affect the 
cost of claims
419. Such clauses become particularly important where the reinsurance 
contract is in fronting form
420. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
415Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Plc. [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 607;  O’Neill and 
Woloniecki, para 5-105; Butler and Merkin, para C-0053. 
416 Edelman, para 5.07; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, para 17-24. 
417 See Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Co Ltd (No.2&3) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 667. Claims co-
operation clauses usually specify a time limit to comply with the clause however if the clause does not 
provide any specified time limit the insured (and reinsured) should comply with the clause within a 
reasonable time. What is reasonable depends on the facts of each case. See Hadenfayre Ltd v British 
National Insurance Society Ltd [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 393, 402; per Lloyd J. See Bankers Ins v South [2004] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 1; Lowry and Rawlings, 251-252; Shinedean Ltd v Alldown Demolition Ltd [2006] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 846. 
418 See the clause in Scor.  
419 Carter, 358. 
420 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, para 17-24.   105
9.2  The Nature of Claims Provisions 
It is necessary to determine the nature of claims provisions because the remedy for the 
breach of these clauses will depend on their classification. 
 
In ordinary contract law terms are classified as conditions, warranties or innominate. The 
effect of breach of warranty will be that the innocent party can claim his damages whereas 
breach of condition gives right to repudiate the contract in addition to claiming 
damages
421. The third category is innominate terms, the remedy for breach depends on the 
seriousness of the consequences of that breach; the innocent party can claim his damages 
but can also treat the contract as repudiated if the breach is so serious that goes to the root 
of the contract
422. In an insurance and reinsurance context these terms are construed 
differently. Breach of warranty discharges the insurer/reinsurer from liability as at the date 
of the breach. Conditions may be classified either mere conditions, similar to innominate 
terms in contract law breach of them entitles the innocent party to claim damages or 
repudiate the contract as a whole if the breach goes to the root of the contract
423 or 
condition precedent, breach of which gives right the insurer/reinsurer to reject the claim. 
In this respect it is important to distinguish warranties from conditions precedent. Where 
the assured is in breach of condition precedent, it does not amount to breach of contract 
which gives rise to liabity in damages, but the breach prevents the assured from making a 
claim regardless of whether or not the insurer/reinsurer is prejudiced by the breach
424. The 
breach cannot affect the assured’s/reinsured’s right to pursue a separate claim the 
conditions relating to which have been complied with: as a result, for example if a 
condition precedent which requires a claim to be made within a specified period is 
breached, that claim is lost but other claims are unaffected
425. Consequently it appears that 
breach of condition precedent will cause the assured/reinsured to lose their claim but the 
policy and the risk itself will remain unaffected
426, whereas in case a breach of warranty, 
the risk terminates as of the date of breach and there can be no future liability under the 
                                                 
421 Chitty on Contracts, 12-019. 
422 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1962] 2 QB 26. 
423 Edelman, para 6-52. 
424 Shinedean Ltd v Alldown Demolition  Ltd. [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 846. 
425 Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, para B-0086. 
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policy. In other words the breach of a condition precedent affects the claim, whereas a 
breach of warranty affects the risk as a whole
427.   
 
The key distinction is nevertheless between innominate terms and conditions precedent. In 
determining the nature of clause the terminology that is used by the parties is not 
conclusive but depends on the wording of the policy and the nature of the condition in 
question. For instance in Scor the reinsurance slip contained a claims co-operation clause 
which provided: “It is a condition precedent to liability under this insurance that all claims 
be notified immediately to the Underwriters subscribing to this policy and the Reassured 
hereby undertake in arriving at the settlement of any claim, that they will co-operate with 
the Reassured Underwriters and that no settlement shall be made without the approval of 
the Underwriters subscribing to this Policy.” Leggatt J divided the clause into two and 
held that only the first part which related to notification of loss was a condition 
precedent
428. The Court interpreted the rest of the clause as constituting a two-fold 
undertaking by the reassured in arriving at the settlement of the claim: first, that they will 
co-operate with the reinsurers, and secondly, that they will not make any settlement 
without the reinsurers’ approval. In the Court of Appeal the reinsurer was held to be liable 
despite the breach of the claims co-operation clause, because the reinsured had proved its 
loss. However in Scor the reinsured had proved its loss by a judgment against it. The case 
does not deal with the situation in which the reinsured has entered into a settlement falling 
within the scope of the follow the settlements clause. It is unclear whether the Court of 
Appeal’s comment that the reinsured has to prove its loss means that a reinsured in breach 
of the claims cooperation clause is automatically denied the right to rely upon a bona fide 
                                                 
427 Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, para B-141. It should be noted that the concept of 
repudiation of claim was discussed in terms of breach of claims notification clauses in an insurance context. 
In Alfred McAlpine Plc v BAI (Run-Off) Ltd [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437 it was held that breach of claims 
notification clause entitles the insurer to reject the claim if the breach is serious but not sufficiently serious to 
repudiate the policy. This interpretation was adopted in a number of subsequent decisions: K/S Merc-
Scandia XXXXII v Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 802 and 
Glencore International AG v Ryan (The Beursgracht) (No.1), [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 335; Bankers 
Insurance Co Ltd v South [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 1. However in Friends Provident Life & Pensions Ltd v 
Sirius International Insurance Corp [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517 the majority of the Court of Appeal rejected 
the principle of repudiation of a claim and held that English law did not recognise the concept of partial 
repudiation. If there was a serious breach of contract then the entire policy was repudiated: if the breach was 
minor, then the only remedy was damages. Accordingly, given that claims conditions are to be construed as 
innominate terms only, and given that it is all but inconceivable that breach of a claims condition could ever 
amount to a repudiation of the policy as a whole, unless the term is drafted as condition precedent at the 
outset, the only remedy available to insurers is to claim damages. See also Ronson International Ltd v. 
Patrick [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 194; Limit (No 2) v Axa Versericherung AG [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 330. 
428 No breach of notification clause was alleged in Scor.   107
and businesslike settlement or whether the Court of Appeal was simply referring to the 
fact before it. This point is discussed below.  
 
The clause in Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Co Ltd (No.2&3) was worded differently 
from that of Scor. The parties agreed: 
  
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the reinsurance agreement and/or policy wording 
to the contrary, it is a condition precedent to any liability under this policy that  
a)  The reinsured shall, upon knowledge of any circumstances which may give rise to 
a claim against them, advise the reinsurers immediately, and in any event not later 
than 30 days. 
b)  The reinsured shall co-operate with reinsurers and/or their appointed 
representatives subscribing to this policy in the investigation and assessment of 
any loss and/or circumstances giving rise to a loss.  
c)  No settlement and/or compromise shall be made and liability admitted without the 
prior approval of reinsurers. All other terms and criticisms of this policy remain 
unchanged
429.    
 
Comparing this clause to the claims co-operation clause in Scor, Mance LJ found that this 
was more stringent and the draftsmen had separated out the three parts of the clause and 
had determined to make each into a condition precedent
430. Therefore while in Scor the 
breach of claims co-operation clause which was not a condition precedent left it open to 
the reinsured to prove actual liability against the assured, in Gan the clause was classified 
as condition precedent, breach having the effect that the reinsured could not recover even 
by proving that he was in fact and in law liable to the assured
431. 
  
The interpretation of a claims co-operation clause was again the issue in Eagle Star 
Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell
432 where the clause in fact was not expressly stated to be a 
“condition precedent”. In this case the reinsured agreed  
 
                                                 
429 It was held that the reinsured would be in breach of the claims co-operation clause by settling,   
compromising the claim or admitting liability; in other words, any breach in these regards would entitle the 
reinsurer to reject the claim. 
430 [2001]1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, 687. 
431 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, 688. 
432 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 537. The policy also contained a typical full reinsurance clause.   108
a)  To notify all claims or occurrences likely to involve the underwriters within seven 
days from the time that such claims or occurrences become known to them.  
b)  The underwriters hereon shall control the negotiations and settlements of any 
claims under this policy. In this event the underwriters hereon will not be liable to 
pay any claim not controlled as set out above. 
 
Omission however by the company to notify any claim or occurrence which at the outset 
did not appear to be serious but which at a later date threatened to involve the company 
shall not prejudice their right of recovery hereunder”
433. 
 
The reinsured argued that sub-paragraph (b) conferred an option on reinsurers whereby 
they could, if they wished, opt to control the negotiation and settlement of claims. That 
option was triggered by Eagle Star giving notice of claims under sub-paragraph (a) which 
requires the reinsured to notify all claims or occurrences likely to involve the underwriters 
within seven days from the time that such claims or occurrences become known to them 
but the reinsurers did not so opt, so sub-paragraph (b) had no application.  
 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the reinsured and read the word “shall” as not 
imposing any obligation on the reinsurer to control negotiations with the original assured 
but conferred upon them the right to do so. In other words the clause was construed to be 
an allocation not an option, namely the reinsurer was entitled to be informed when 
negotiations began so that the reinsurer could decide at that point how the negotiations 
should be conducted. 
 
As to the nature of the clause the Court of Appeal found that using the words “condition 
precedent” was not essential and that other clear words could be used to express the 
consequences of breach
434. According to their Lordships the words “reinsurers will not be 
liable to pay any claim not controlled by them” were clear enough to create the equivalent 
remedy to a breach of a condition precedent. Additionally, the words “will not be liable to 
pay any claim” were described as strong words
435, if not the language of condition 
                                                 
433 The Court of Appeal commented that this clause was in the nature of a claims control clause. However 
nothing turned on that classification.  
434 In its original form of the Claims Co-operation Clause in the Lloyd’s and Companies Market Policies was 
expressed as a condition precedent to the liability of reinsurers. 
435 Emphasis added.    109
precedent, at any rate the language of exclusion
436. Furthermore, in the second sentence 
“in this event” was dealt with the situation where there were negotiations in respect of a 
claim. Therefore the clause was held to mean that “whenever negotiations or settlement 
have taken place which have not been controlled by the reinsurers, reinsurers will not be 
liable to pay the relevant claim” unless some reason is shown for excusing the agreed fact 
that the reinsurers did not control the negotiations or settlement of the assured’s claim
437. 
As a result their Lordships were convinced that the clause was to be construed as 
condition precedent which deprived the reinsured of the right to make claim against the 
reinsurer even if it could establish that it was in fact and in law liable against the assured. 
It was so held because the reinsurers will still have a defence that they were never given 
that opportunity to control negotiations or the settlement and thus they cannot be liable
438.  
As may be seen, the use of the words “condition precedent” is not essential to classify the 
nature of the claims provision. Equally, a clause may not be regarded as a condition 
precedent even if it says that it is. An example of this can be found in Dornoch Ltd v 
Royal and Sun Alliance plc
439 where breach of claims co-operation clause was  held not to 
deprive the reinsured from making a claim against the reinsurer even though the clause 
expressly provided the words “condition precedent”. Nevertheless, in Anonymous Greek 
Co of General Insurances “The Ethniki” v AIG Europe (UK) & Ors.
440 the clause was 
stated to be a condition precedent and it was held that the breach of the clause deprived the 
reinsured of claiming indemnification from the reinsurer but the reason was not based on 
the “condition precedent” wording but the effect of the breach namely depriving the 
reinsurer of reducing or extinguishing the claim by making proper investigations in time. 
                                                 
436 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 537, 548. 
437 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 537, 549. 
438 In Eagle Star this was not an issue but Longmore LJ nevertheless expressed his opinion. See also Gan 
Insurance v Tai Ping (No 2&3) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, 688. 
439 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 544. Under the reinsurance policy the reinsured was required to give notice of any 
loss or losses which may give rise to claim under the policy within 72 hours upon knowledge of them. 
Longmore LJ stated that breach of conditions precedent operated as an exemption to the reinsurers’ liability 
but in this case the the clause was not sufficiently clearly expressed as a condition precedent so as to exempt 
the reinsurers from liability in case of breach. 
440 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 343. In this case the clause provided “…it is a condition precedent to any liability 
under this policy that: (A) the Reassured shall, upon any knowledge of loss or losses which may give rise to 
a claim under this policy, advise the Underwriters thereof by cable within 72 hours; (B) the Reassured shall 
furnish the Underwriters with all information available respecting such loss or losses, and the Underwriters 
shall have the right to appoint adjusters, assessors and/or surveyors and to control all negotiations, 
adjustments and settlements in connection with such loss or losses.”   110
Finally it should be noted that the burden of proof that the reinsured is in breach of claims 
provisions is borne by the reinsurer
441. 
 
9.3  Follow the Settlements v Claims Provisions 
The interpretation of the “follow the settlements” clause indicates that the reinsurer trusts 
the honesty and professionalism of the reinsured. On the other hand reinsurers might want 
to control the negotiations or the process of dealing with the assured’s claim by the insurer 
and therefore the reinsurance policy may contain claims provisions as well as a “follow 
the settlements” clause. Claims provisions impose restrictions on the reinsured’s rights 
recognised by the common law
442. Therefore it is necessary to clarify how to resolve the 
inconsistency that may arise in a policy which contains both clauses. 
 
Leggatt J in Scor found that there was no reason to construe the claims provisions as 
weakening the effect of the follow the settlements clause. So long as the settlement is bona 
fide and businesslike and the loss falls within the reinsurance cover the reinsurer is obliged 
to follow the reinsured’s settlement. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found that 
undertaking by the insurers not to make a settlement without the approval of reinsurers 
circumscribed the power of insurers to make settlements binding upon reinsurers to the 
effect that reinsurers would only be bound to follow a settlement when it had received 
their approval
443. The Court of Appeal admitted that such construction would lead the 
claims co-operation clause emasculating the follow settlements clause
444; nevertheless 
their Lordships were convinced that this was what the parties to a policy in this form had 
agreed. 
 
Moreover, in Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell a typed “no settlement without 
consent”
445 clause was found to cut away the printed “follow the settlements” clause in so 
far as the two clauses were inconsistent.   
 
                                                 
441 Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (No.3) [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 612. 
442 Per Robert Goff LJ Scor [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312, 331. Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co 
Ltd (No.3). 
443 Naturally, reinsurers may, if they wish, waive that requirement. 
444 See also Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd, per Longmore J, [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
291, 307. 
445 “No settlement of a loss by agreement shall be effected by the company for a sum in excess of the limits 
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However, it may be thought that there is in fact no necessary connection between a follow 
the settlements and a claims clause, so the mere fact that the reinsured is in breach of 
claims clause which is not expressed to be a condition precedent should not deprive the 
reinsured of its right to insist that its settlement is followed
446. While it is inevitable that, 
where the claims provisions are conditions precedent breach of which entitle the reinsurer 
to reject the claim, the reinsured will not have any right to rely on the follow the 
settlements clause, but where the clause is not a condition precedent it is open to doubt 
why the reinsured should not have the rights conferred by the follow the settlements 
clause
447. It should also be remembered that Friends Provident accepted that a clause 
which is not a condition precedent is of no significance as regards the claim. Therefore so 
long as the reinsured acted bona fide and businesslike manner in settling the claim, not 
seeking the reinsurer’s consent should not deprive the reinsured of its right to rely on the 
follow the settlements clause where the claims provision is not a condition precedent.   
 
9.4  Waiver to Rely upon Breach of Claims Provisions Which Are Conditions 
Precedent 
The issue was authoritatively discussed in Kosmar Villa Holidays Plc v Trustees of 
Syndicate 1243
448 in the insurance context. In this case the Court of Appeal found that in 
an insurance contract breach of a claims notification clause which was a condition 
precedent discharged the insurers from liability automatically. Their Lordships rejected 
the argument that upon breach of the clause insurers had the right to elect either to accept 
or reject the claim, so that any representation made by them indicating a willingness to 
pay amounted to an irrevocable election. However the Court also stated the possibility 
that, if having been automatically discharged from liability, insurers represented 
unequivocally to the assured, by words or conduct, that they did not intend to rely upon 
the breach, and the assured relied on that representation to its detriment, insurers could 
be estopped from relying on the breach of the claims condition. 
                                                 
446 Butler and Merkin, para C-0584. O’Neill/Woloniecki, para 5-26 state that Leggatt J’s view in Scor is 
more supportable because there is no logical inconsistency between the “follow the settlements” and “claims 
co-operation” clauses. 
447 Butler and Merkin, para C-0584. 
448 [2008] 1 CLC 307.   112
The  Kosmar case was applied by Chirstopher Clarke J in Lexington Insurance Co v 
Multinacional de Seguros SA
449 where the reinsurance contract taken out in respect of a 
liability policy contained a claims settlements clause in the following terms: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in the reinsurance agreement and/or the policy 
wording to the contrary, it is a condition precedent to any liability under this policy 
that: 
(a)           Upon the reinsured being advised of any circumstances which 
may give rise to a claim against this policy, the reinsured will advise 
reinsurers of such notification as soon as is reasonably practicable; 
(b)           The reinsured shall furnish the reinsurers with all information in 
respect of such circumstances and shall co-operate with the reinsurers in 
the adjustment and settlement of the claim. 
The reinsured failed to co-operate with the reinsurer in investigating the claim. Following 
that, the reinsurer sent a letter to the reinsured declaring that because of the breach of 
claims co-operation clause the reinsurers were treating themselves as discharged from 
liability. After this letter further negotiation took place between the assured and the 
reinsured, the effect of which was a waiver by the reinsured of the assured’s failure to rely 
upon a time-bar defence open to it in respect of the third party claim. Christopher Clarke J 
held that the reinsured was in breach of the claims condition clause by this action. At the 
trial the reinsured argued that, by virtue of the first letter in which liability had been 
denied, the reinsurers had waived their right to rely upon any future failure by the 
reinsured to co-operate. Applying the decision in Kosmar, Christopher Clarke J held that 
where the reinsured was automatically discharged from liability for breach of condition 
precedent, waiver of the right to rely on the breach by election was not a possibility 
because there was nothing to elect to waive.  
Consequently the only form of waiver open to the reinsured was waiver by estoppel. In 
other words the reinsured had to prove both that there was an unequivocal representation 
by the reinsurers that they accepted liability and that the reinsured relied on such 
representation to its detriment.  
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9.5  Limits on the Reinsurers’ Discretion under Claims Clauses 
As it was stated above claims co-operation clauses may require the reinsured to seek the 
reinsurer’s consent before entering into any settlements with the assured. It might be 
thought that in such circumstances there should be an implied term that reinsurers could 
not withhold approval of a settlement unless there were reasonable grounds for that
450. In 
Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd
451, at first instance Longmore J found 
it necessary to imply that obligation, to give business efficacy to the contract for the 
reason that arbitrarily refusing approval of a settlement would defeat the purpose of the 
reinsurance contract, which was to indemnify the reinsured in respect of his actual liability 
to his assured
452.  
 
However in the Court of Appeal Mance LJ expressed his concerns as to the difficulties of 
identifying criteria by which to determine whether a reinsurer acted on reasonable grounds 
in withholding approval
453. Mance LJ stated that if it had been the case that the reinsured 
agreed that the reinsurer should have absolute conduct and control of all or any 
proceedings against the assured
454, it would make sense to imply a reasonableness 
requirement. However the clause in Gan did not give the reinsurer the power to act on 
behalf of or to bind the reinsured
455. As a general qualification Mance LJ declared that the 
reinsurer should act in good faith in withholding approval by taking into consideration that 
the facts giving rise to the particular claim and not with reference to extraneous 
considerations that not connected with the merits of the claim
456. It should also be noted 
that such good faith is not an extension of the duty of utmost good faith which is special to 
insurance law, but arises from the nature and purpose of the relevant contractual 
                                                 
450 Reasonableness is required in the insurance context; see E Hulton & Co v Mountain (1921) 8 Ll LR Rep 
249; Poole Harbour Yacht Club Marina Ltd v Excess Marine Insurance Ltd [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 580.  
451 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 291. 
452 The judge did not find it useful to answer the question of implication of a term obliging the reinsurer to 
respond to the reinsured’s request for approval of a settlement with reasonable promptness. Longmore J 
found that an unanswered request would be tantamount to a refusal and it was therefore, difficult to foresee 
circumstances when it actually mattered that a reinsurer did not respond with reasonable promptness: [2001] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 291, 308. 
453 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, 691. 
454 As in Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 KB 194. 
455 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, 693. 
456 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, 697. For example, if a reinsurer withholds approval to harm an insurer as a 
competitor in respect of other business. Cf Structural Polymer Systems Ltd v Brown [1999] CLC 268 where 
it was held that where the criteria for liability had been met it was irrelevant that the settlement had been 
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provisions. The case thus draws a distinction between reasonableness (which was rejected) 
and rationality (which was accepted)
457. 
 
The matter becomes more significant where the claims co-operation clause is a condition 
precedent breach of which provides defence for reinsurers even if reinsureds establish 
their liability to assureds. In Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell in order to get 
around the problem Rix LJ suggested the reinsurer’s rejection could amount a waiver, so 
that in appropriate circumstances a refusal to participate by reinsurers could be construed 
as a willingness to follow the reinsured’s settlements. According to their Lordships waiver 
could be an issue where the reinsurers chose not to intervene the negotiations. However 
this suggestion should be read with care because it will be appreciated that waiver may not 
readily be made out by a simple refusal to join the negotiations. Moreover Rix LJ’s second 
suggestion will be open to doubt where the clause gives the right to the reinsurers to 
intervene at any time.  
 
It should be emphasised that Mance LJ’s test in Gan is not a reasonableness test but an 
implied term whereby reinsurers could not exercise their discretion under a claims 
provision in bad faith, capriciously or arbitrarily but should use its discretion in a rational 
fashion by disregarding considerations other than those relating to the claim itself. 
Moreover in Eagle Star v Cresswell Rix LJ took the matter slightly further, and indicated 
that the duty to act in this way was “as a matter of law in the very essence of the 
reinsurers” mutual obligation
458 of good faith as it was suggested by Longmore LJ in The 
Mercandian Continent. As a result it became apparent that the reinsurers’ discretion in 
handling claims is not unlimited whatever the wording of the policy may be
459.  
 
9.6  The Time of Notification of Loss 
In reinsurance policies where the reinsured insured the liability of the assured both 
insurance and reinsurance policies are likely to contain a claims control clause which 
usually provides “Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, it is a 
condition precedent to any liability under this policy that the reinsured shall upon 
knowledge of any loss or losses which may give rise to claim under this policy, advise the 
                                                 
457 See also Anders & Kern Ltd v CGU Insurance plc [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 460 where the distinction was 
noted but not developed.  
458 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 537, 550. 
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underwriters thereof within … hours”. Whereas such clauses make commercial sense in 
property insurance policies, problems may arise where policy is one on liability, because 
the concept of a “loss” is not appropriate to that form of cover
460. Facultative reinsurance 
operates similarly to liability insurance and in this context in order to construe such 
clauses it is necessary to determine the meaning of the word “loss” and the sort of 
knowledge that the reinsured is required to posses in order to trigger the running of time 
under the clause.  
      
These were the issues in Dornoch v Royal and Sun Alliance and AIG Europe (Ireland) Ltd 
v Faraday Capital Ltd.
461 The facts were slightly different in the two cases, as reflected in 
their outcomes.  
 
In Dornoch Coca Cola and its directors and officers were insured against legal liability. 
Coca Cola were alleged to have made false statements about their affairs and caused 
investors to buy their shares at artificially inflated prices. Two different class actions were 
filed against Coca Cola and named directors in the US, seeking damages for loss sustained 
by the complainants as a result of the alleged false statements. The reinsurers were not 
informed of the claims until after the parties had settled them, and the question was 
whether the loss within the meaning of claims notification clause was the loss that of the 
claimants who bought shares at artificially inflated prices or the loss of Coca Cola in being 
required to compensate the claimants for their loss. The Court decided that adopting the 
former view was correct. Before the decision had been made as to the actions it was not 
known by anyone that the American claimants had suffered the loss which they claimed 
or, indeed, any loss because the question whether the claimants had suffered any loss was 
still in dispute. Therefore the Court was of the opinion that the loss should have been 
proved in order to describe it as an “actual loss” which might give rise to an insurance 
claim
462.  
 
It is noteworthy that Longmore LJ distinguished the position where the claim had been 
that, as a result of something done by the directors of Coca Cola the value of the stock had 
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fallen; particularly if the stock had been rendered valueless. Then it might have been clear 
that there had been a loss and once the reinsured were notified of a claim for that loss, it 
could be said that they then had knowledge of a loss which might give rise to a claim 
under the reinsurance policy
463. Shortly afterwards, Longmore LJ heard AIG Europe 
(Ireland) Ltd v Faraday Capital Ltd and found that the situation in AIG fitted the 
reservation in Dornoch. In this case the insurance policy covered the liabilities of 
Smartforce and its directors. It was alleged by shareholders that as a result of financial 
statements, made in this case in the company accounts, the value of the company’s shares 
was artificially inflated beyond their true worth. On 19 Nov 2002, before the stock market 
opened for business in New York, Smartforce announced that they intended to re-write the 
previous three years’ accounts. On the same day the company’s shares lost a third of their 
value. Shareholders brought actions against Smartforce and its directors. The company’s 
liability insurance policy required notification of a claim within 30 days and that 
notification was duly given to the company’s liability insurers but they did not pass the 
notice on to their reinsurers. The US action was settled and the reinsured gave notice to 
reinsurers within 30 days of that settlement but one of the reinsurers, Faraday, relied on 
the wording of the Claims Co-operation clause in the reinsurance policy which provided : 
“…it is a condition precedent to any liability under this policy that a) The reinsured shall 
upon knowledge of any loss or losses which may give rise to a claim, advise the reinsurers 
thereof as soon as is reasonably practicable and in any event within 30 days…”.  
 
The decision was for the reinsurers. There was no event - apart from such artificial 
inflation - in Dornoch which could trigger any loss; the fall in that occurred in the share 
value could have arisen as a result of normal market fluctuation or market perceptions of 
the normal kind whereas in AIG there was a positive event happened on 19
th November 
2002 that covered a substantial drop in the share price after the announcement on that day 
of the intention to restate the company’s account. Consequently AIG knew about the claim 
when Smartforce notified them in late December 2002; therefore AIG should have notified 
reinsurers within 30 days of that date.  
 
As may be seen, there is no certain rule as to the loss which triggers the notification period 
starts running because it changes according to the facts of every case and it depends on the 
interpretation of the particular circumstances in question.  
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9.7  Implied Term: Inspection of Records 
Inspection clauses are in fact more typical of reinsurance treaties than of facultative 
contracts, although the latter may also contain clauses requiring the reinsured to keep 
records to demonstrate that negotiations were carried out in bona fide and businesslike 
manner
464. The effect of breach of such clauses is no different from that of other claims 
provisions, namely the English courts will not allow the reinsurer to repudiate the claim 
itself unless the clause was drafted as a condition precedent
465.  
 
Nevertheless reinsurance contracts do not always contain inspection of records clauses and 
the question that has arisen is whether a term providing a right to inspection should be 
implied into the contracts. Such an implication has been found appropriate in facultative 
obligatory treaties. In Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance 
Co Ltd
466 Hobhouse J expressed the view that the necessity to imply a duty to investigate 
claims properly arose from the undertaking by the reinsurer to “follow the settlements” of 
the reinsured
467. Consequently, the duty should apply to all reinsurance contracts that 
contain a settlement clause
468. 
  
However it should be taken into consideration that Hobhouse J’s implication was based on 
the facultative/obligatory nature of the contract in question. It is especially noteworthy that 
in these types of contract no restrictions are imposed on the reinsured as to its right to 
choose whether or not to cede the risk insured. On the other hand the reinsurer does not 
have any equivalent right and is obliged to accept all risks that has been ceded by the 
reinsured. For these reasons, in this type of reinsurance, the judge found it appropriate to 
imply the duty on the reinsured “to conduct the business involved in the cession prudently, 
reasonably carefully and in accordance with the ordinary practice of the market.” However 
                                                 
464 Exercising the right to inspect is subject to a reasonableness requirement: Welch v Royal Exchange 
Assurance [1939] 1 KB 294; Napier v UNUM Ltd [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 550. It should not be exercised in 
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Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, para 17-15. 
466 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 599. According to the learned judge the reinsured is obliged to, inter alia, “keep 
full, proper and accurate accounts showing at all times the amounts due and payable by the plaintiffs to the 
defendants and by the defendants to the plaintiffs under the contract”. The case was applied in Economic v 
Le Assicurazioni d'Italia unreported: see Bonner v Cox  [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 385. 
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such an implication may not be appropriate in non-proportional reinsurance. Having 
recognised the nature of the contract in Phoenix, the Court of Appeal in Bonner v Cox
469 
expressed that Hobhouse J could not possibly have intended to say that the implied terms 
applied to all forms of reinsurance
470, although the implied term under consideration in 
Bonner was not an inspection clause but rather a term whereby the reinsured undertook to 
write business with reasonable care.  
 
In Bonner v Cox the Court of Appeal did not make clear whether they overruled Hobhouse 
J’s decision with regard to proportional contracts. However looking into detail of the two 
decisions it seems that implied term theory is not supportable. For instance in Phoenix it 
was held that the relevant obligations must be regarded as continuing ones, just as is the 
obligation of the utmost good faith whereas, in Bonner v Cox, the Court of Appeal 
emphasised that the duty of utmost good faith was only pre-contractual. Moreover, 
according to Hobhouse J the relevant terms have to be implied so as to require the 
reinsured to conduct his business in a proper and business-like fashion and the reinsurer 
may also be able to find out what his rights are. On the other hand the Court of Appeal in 
Bonner v Cox were of the opinion that the reinsurers could protect themselves by way of 
using other defences rather than implying terms into the contract. The reinsurers are 
entitled to agree on the policy terms at the outset that could provide enough protection for 
them. The Court of Appeal found it inappropriate to make reinsured responsible for the 
reinsurers’ failure to take such steps. More importantly Hobhouse J ruled that the implied 
terms were to be innominate and therefore the remedy for breach of them must depend on 
the nature and gravity of the relevant breach. Nevertheless in Bonner v Cox the Court of 
Appeal put emphasis on the difficulties in determining whether damages would always 
cancel out the claim entirely or whether the defence of contributory negligence would be 
taken into account.   
 
It should be noted that even if implied terms are found justifiable, they will not be 
classified as conditions precedent
471 and the breach of record-keeping and inspection 
obligations will not deprive the reinsured of a claim against the reinsurers and the 
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reinsured can still rely on the follow the settlements clause. However it could avail the 
reinsurers to claim for damages if they prove that they suffered loss as a result of the 
breach
472. Nevertheless such remedy should be considered with the effect of the 
reinsurers’ right to rely on a defence regarding the inspection clauses and the clause itself 
would remove the prospect of separate loss for the breach of such clauses
473.    
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PART C SETTLEMENT CLAUSES IN THE US REINSURANCE MARKET 
 
CHAPTER 10  INTRODUCTION TO REINSURANCE AND FOLLOW THE 
FORM CLAUSES  
 
Settlement clauses are also widely used in the US reinsurance market. It is adopted that in 
the absence of a follow the settlements clause the reinsured would have to deal with the 
proof of the loss and the amount of it twice, at the insurance and reinsurance level. 
Therefore it is found necessary to use settlement clauses to prevent unnecessary 
procedures and delays for reinsured’s claims
474. In the following chapters the nature and 
scope of the settlement clauses and their relationship with claims co-operation and 
notification clauses will be examined. It should be noted that most reinsurance disputes in 
the US are resolved by arbitration
475. Consequently there are relatively few judicial 
decisions, and state courts tend to refer to decisions from other state jurisdictions as well 
as their own therefore, it is necessary to look at law overall in the US without making any 
limitations to any State’s law
476. 
 
10.1  Nature of Reinsurance 
Unlike the position in England, in the US there is little controversy as to the nature of 
reinsurance, which is defined as “simply insurance for insurance companies”
477 where the 
insurable interest is the potential liability of the insurer under the original policy
478. In 
other words, insurance companies purchase reinsurance to insure their liabilities under 
direct policies
479. In Central Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Prudential Reinsurance Co.
480 
reinsurance was defined as a contract whereby one insurer for a consideration contracts 
with another to indemnify it against a loss by reason of a risk which the latter has assumed 
under a separate and distinct contract as the insurer of a third party. 
 
                                                 
474 See Chaffetz and Moss, “Follow the Fortunes and Allocation: An Update”, (2009) 16 Journal of 
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475 Employer Reinsurance Corp. v. Laurier Indem. Co. 2007 WL 1831775 (MD Fla). 
476 Houston Cas.Co. v Lexington Ins. Co., 2006 US Dist, LEXIS 45027. 
477 Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Constitution Reinsurance Corp. 2004 WL 2387313 (ED Mich); 
Continental Cas. Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., Ltd. 77 F 3d 16, 1996. 
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It is submitted that reinsurance is not co-insurance, where separate insurers share the same 
insured risk, nor is it a substitution of one insurer for another
481. Nor it is a partnership 
between the reinsured and the reinsurer or a separate joint venture between them
482. 
 
10.1.1  Privity of Contract  
It is generally accepted that there is no privity between assureds and reinsurers, and 
reinsurers are under no obligation to pay the assured even if the reinsured becomes 
insolvent
483.  
 
The reason for the rule is said to be inherent in the nature of the reinsurance contract, 
because reinsurance is the ceding by one insurance company to another of all or a 
proportion of its risks for a stipulated proportion of the premium, in which “the liability of 
the reinsurer is solely to the reinsured, the ceding company, and in which contract the 
ceding company retains all contact with the original insured, and handles all matters 
prior to and subsequent to loss”. This principle was stated in Reid v. Ruffin
484 where the 
assured, Ruffin, negligently caused serious injury to Reid. The reinsured did not settle the 
claim despite an offer from Reid’s counsel, and at the trial the jury awarded Reid a sum 
considerably higher than the amount put forward prior to the trial. The reinsured 
subsequently became insolvent; Reid argued that he was entitled to recover directly from 
the reinsurers for their own bad faith in refusing to sanction the reinsured to settle, and 
effectively asked the Court to abandon the privity requirement and to impose a duty of 
good faith on the reinsurers towards the original insured. The court noted that an insured is 
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not notified of the reinsurance, has no contact with the reinsuring company, and is 
generally not a party to the contract. Because the reinsurer has not assumed a contractual 
duty to represent the original insured, he has no obligation to which the duty of good faith 
can attach. The reinsurer’s only obligations are toward the reinsured and arise under 
contract. Therefore the assured was held to have no enforceable rights against the 
reinsurers.  
 
Despite accepting the rule in Reid v Ruffin, in Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker
485 it 
was pointed out that whether or not a reinsurer has a duty to the primary insured depends 
on the degree of the reinsurer’s control over the decisions concerning settlement with the 
third party claimant. Accordingly, where the reinsurer, under the reinsurance contract or 
otherwise, takes charge of and manages the defence of suits against the original insured, 
the reinsurer may be held to be “privy” to the action. Here, Homestead reinsured Mutual 
100 percent and Homestead carried out the insurance investigation, reimbursed Mutual for 
claims and had absolute control of the final claim adjustment. This was, therefore, a 
fronting operation. Accordingly, Homestead was treated as though it had the obligations 
of a primary insurer to the assured. The court distinguished Reid v. Ruffin where the 
primary insurer had retained most of the risk, reinsuring only twenty five percent, and 
controlled the settlement negotiations.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the policy wording may be interpreted as permitting the 
assured to bring suit against the reinsurer. In Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp.
486 it was held that 
the excess-of-policy-coverage clause added to the original reinsurance agreement made 
the reinsurer the liability insurer of the insurer, allowing the assured to make a direct claim 
against the reinsurer for the reinsured’s alleged tort of bad faith. 
 
It should also be noted that the principle that the assured has no rights against the reinsurer 
does not relieve the reinsurer from liability when the reinsured has become insolvent. In 
Consolidated Real Estate & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cashow
487 it was held that the original 
assured has no kind of claim against the reinsurer; the reinsured remains solely liable on 
the original insurance, and alone has any claim against the reinsurer. Hence, if the original 
insurer becomes insolvent and the assured is paid only a small dividend from his 
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remaining assets, the reinsurer is still liable to pay the whole amount of the reinsurance to 
the person administering the insolvency of the original insurer without deducting the 
dividend, and the assured has no claim in respect of the money so paid. Similarly, in 
Cashau v Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co
488 it was emphasised that the financial condition of 
the reinsured is not to be taken into account in the computation of the amount to be paid 
on the policy of reinsurance. The condition in the reinsurance policy that “in case of loss 
the company shall pay pro rata at and in the same time and manner as the reinsured” 
cannot mean that in case of the insolvency of the reinsured the reinsurer can only be 
obliged to pay the pro rata the dividends of the assets of the reinsured upon the claim of 
the assured. The condition means that the reinsurer shall pay at and in the same time and 
manner as the reinsured company shall pay or be bound to pay according to its policy,
489 
and the reinsurer shall have all the advantages of the time and manner of payment 
specified in the policy of the reinsured - otherwise the reinsurer’s policy would not be the 
contract of indemnity intended, and endless litigation might ensue.   
 
10.1.2  Insurable Interest 
The direct assured has no interest in the contract of reinsurance
490. Equally, the reinsured 
has no property right in respect of the subject matter insured. The reinsured renders itself 
liable for the loss that assured may suffer and it acquires an insurable interest to the extent 
of that liability but it was only for the risk reinsured
491.  
 
Reinsurance and insurance contracts are independent of each other. However in order to 
provide concurrency between the policies and also to simplify the procedure for reinsureds 
in making claim from reinsurers it is also the case in the US reinsurance markets that, 
respectively, follow the form and follow the fortunes clauses are in use.  
  
10.2  Follow the form clauses  
The “follow the form” clause is used in order to express the match between the 
reinsurance and insurance coverage. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co.
492 
considered a standard wording of that clause: “This Policy is subject to the same 
                                                 
488 5 F Cas 270 CC Wis 1873.  
489 This is sometimes referred to as a “simultaneous settlements” clause. 
490 Strong v. Phoenix 62 Mo 289, 1876; Carlson Holdings v. NAFCO. 205 F Supp 2d 1069 DMinn .  
491 Jackson v. St. Paul Fire 1 NE 539, NY 1885. 
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warranties, terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided herein) as are contained in 
or as may be added to the Underlying Coverage prior to the happening of an accident or 
occurrence, whichever is applicable, for which claim is made hereunder”. The purpose of 
using the “follow the form” clause is to limit expressly the reinsurance to the terms and 
conditions of the underlying policy and to provide that the reinsurance will cover only the 
kinds of liability insured by the original policy
493. It should be noted that there is no 
standard Full Reinsurance Clause in this market and it is not always the case that a follow 
the form clause is used together with a follow the settlements or follow the fortunes 
clause
494.  
   
10.2.1  Follow the form – concurrency between the reinsurance and the original 
insurance 
It was pointed out that concurrency between the policy of reinsurance and the reinsured 
policy is provided through a follow the form clause. It is presumed in such a policy that, 
unless an exclusion is spelled out, the reinsurance contract will be construed as offering 
the same terms, conditions and scope of coverage as exist in the underlying policy
495. In 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. ACE American Reinsurance Co.
496 the parties disagreed as to 
whether the three-year contracts provided coverage up to a single aggregate limit for the 
three-year period or for three annual aggregate limits. The reinsurance policy contained a 
follow the form clause which stated that the terms and conditions of liability of the 
Certificates shall “follow” those of the Policies, “except as otherwise specifically 
provided.” The Second Circuit noted that the reinsurance agreement did not provide 
anything contrary to the underlying insurance and that both the original insurance and 
reinsurance provided “each occ.-agg” to describe the relevant coverage period. Therefore 
the concurrency between the two contracts remained in place, the reinsurance policy 
should be interpreted the same way as the original policy and the only reasonable 
interpretation of the phrase “each occ.-agg.” in the three-year certificates was that each 
three-year certificate provided coverage for three annual aggregate limits.  
 
Concurrency between the reinsurance and the underlying insurance has also been defined 
in terms that, through a follow the form clause, the reinsurance policy looks back to the 
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original insurance policy. In Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance America 
Corp.
497 the primary layer insurance provided coverage to Grace under five successive 
one-year policies for personal injury and property damage up to $1 million per occurrence. 
Commercial Union’s excess liability policies provided coverage in the amount of $5 
million for each “occurrence”. The Commercial Union policies included “follow-the-
form” clauses stating that “the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy will not be 
construed any more restrictive [sic] than the terms, conditions and limitations of 
Underlying Insurance.” Swiss Re issued three multi-year facultative reinsurance policies 
to Commercial Union, thereby agreeing to share a specified portion of Commercial 
Union’s liability to Grace. Swiss Re agreed to take fifty percent of the first $1 million, so 
that its cover for any one occurrence giving rise to a claim exceeding $1 million was 
$500,000. The reinsurance policy also contained a follow-the-form clause which provided 
that “-except as “otherwise specifically provided” in the certificate, Swiss Re’s liability 
would “follow” or “be subject” to the “terms and conditions” of Commercial Union’s 
policies”. Thus, according to the First Circuit, through “follow-the-form clauses”, Swiss 
Re’s policies looked back to Commercial Union’s, and the latter’s policies looked back to 
the original policies with Grace. 
 
Commercial Union settled Grace’s pollution claims based on an “annualisation approach”, 
on the unarticulated premise that $5 million per-occurrence limit in its multi-year umbrella 
policies applied separately to each policy year. Swiss Re contested the allocation and 
argued that the leakage at any one site during the three-year period covered by its 
certificate comprised a single “occurrence.” If the leakage during the three-year period 
comprised one occurrence, then Commercial Union’s liability to Grace for a three-year 
leak would be capped at $5 million and Swiss Re’s liability to Commercial Union would 
be $500,000 (fifty percent of the first $1 million).  
  
The court held that Swiss Re’s argument would have been stronger if the reinsurance 
contract had not contained a follow the form clause. The First Circuit stated that, as 
established by Aetna, concurrency between the policy of reinsurance and the reinsured 
policy is presumed where a reinsurance policy contains a follow the form clause. Under 
Swiss Re’s “follow-the-settlements” clause it was bound to accept this pro-annualisation 
reading of the Commercial Union policy for purposes of establishing Commercial Union’s 
                                                 
497 413 F 3d 121 CA1 (Mass), 2005.   126
liability to Grace. According to the First Circuit, Swiss Re’s “follow-the-form” clause was 
deemed to extend this reading into the parallel language in Swiss Re’s own certificates 
subject only to any clear limitation to the contrary in the Swiss Re documents which 
defined single occurrence as including a “continuous or repeated exposure to conditions” 
and did not include additional language “within a single year. 
 
It must be noted that providing a concurrent coverage does not strictly depend on the 
follow the form clause. In Philadelphia Ins. Co. v. Washington Ins. Co.
498 the issue was 
whether the reinsurance and original policies were co-extensive in the absence of a follow 
the form clause. In this case it was argued that the reinsurance and the original insurance 
policies were not back to back for the reason that one was a time policy and the other was 
for a specific voyage. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected this argument and held 
that both policies were issued on the same day; while the insurer was bound for any 
voyage the vessel might make or commence within five months from the date indicated, 
the reinsurers were bound only for a voyage that was capable of being finished short of the 
five months. Therefore the court found that the reinsurers’ risk was lesser, and was 
included within that of the reinsured. The court also emphasised that if the insurance be 
against perils of the sea, the reinsurance must be against perils of the sea; but whilst it may 
not be against more, it may be against fewer, perils of the sea than the original insurance.  
 
10.2.2  Incorporation of Terms  
10.2.2.1  Incorporation of arbitration clauses 
It was stated that a “follow the form” clause in a policy of reinsurance incorporates by 
reference all the terms and conditions of the reinsured policy, except to the extent that the 
reinsurance contract by its own terms specifically defines the scope of coverage 
differently
499. Unlike English law, in the US, incorporation of terms has not caused 
controversy. Nor, there is much dispute as regards the terms that can be incorporated or 
not such as incorporation of ancillary terms or incorporation of terms that determine the 
scope of coverage. There are, however, a few authorities in which incorporation of some 
dispute resolution provisions has been questioned. In Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. 
Reaseguradora Nacional De Venezuela
500 incorporation of an arbitration clause from the 
reinsurance into the retrocession agreement was at stake. In this case the retrocession 
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agreement was “Subject to Facultative Reinsurance Agreement”. The Facultative 
Reinsurance Agreement (FRA) contained an arbitration clause that “Any question or 
dispute arising between the contracting parties concerning the interpretation of this 
Reinsurance Agreement, which cannot be otherwise arranged shall be settled by 
arbitration in London, England.” 
 
The district court held that a trial was necessary to determine whether the Policy identified 
the FRA with sufficient specificity to incorporate it by reference into the Policy. However, 
the Second Circuit found that the Policy specifically and directly identified the FRA by 
name. The use of capitalised letters in the phrase “Subject to Facultative Reinsurance 
Agreement” indicated to any reasonable person that a specific document was being 
referenced. If the retrocessionarie’s broker was unfamiliar with the FRA, it should either 
have asked the reinsured or objected to the provision before signing the Policy. Having 
failed to do so, the retrocessionaire’s broker, as a very sophisticated party, was deemed as 
a matter of law to have understood and agreed to all aspects of the Policy. The Second 
Circuit further noted that under New York law, in the absence of fraud or other wrongful 
conduct, a party who signed a written contract was conclusively presumed to know its 
contents and to assent to them, and he was therefore bound by its terms and conditions. 
The Second Circuit also considered the wording of the arbitration clause, which provided 
for arbitration of disputes between “the contracting parties”, which, according to the 
Court, did not restrict the clause referring to the immediate parties to that contract by 
name. In other words, the clause was worded broadly enough to allow its effective 
incorporation by reference into other contracts.  
 
Another point worth noting as regards the wording of the clause is that US reinsurers 
contend that because the FRA’s arbitration clause refers to disputes “concerning the 
interpretation of this Reinsurance Agreement,” the clause applies only to disputes 
concerning the FRA, even where the clause has been incorporated into another agreement. 
The Second Circuit noted that a standard clause such as “All disputes arising out of this 
agreement shall be arbitrated” could not be incorporated because “this agreement” would 
be held to refer only to the original agreement containing the clause; however the FRA 
clause was held to incorporate the arbitration clause because if the retrocessionaire’s   128
argument was to be accepted, it would be almost impossible to incorporate any arbitration 
clause into a second agreement
501.   
 
10.2.2.2  Incorporation of choice of law clauses 
This was the issue not in the reinsurance context but in an excess of loss reinsurance 
dispute. In AT&T v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co
502 the Superior court of Delaware accepted 
the argument for incorporation of a choice of law clause in the fourth-level excess policy 
into the fifth-level excess of loss policy by virtue of the follow the form clause which 
was worded, follow form to “the policy of the Primary Insurer, together with all the ... 
terms ... contained in ... any Underlying Excess Policy(ies).”) The fourth-level policy 
was one of the “Underlying Excess Policy(ies).”) The court also noted that the parties to 
the dispute were sophisticated parties who understood the meaning and effect of 
including the New York choice of law provision in the fourth-level excess policy and the 
ramifications it would have on the excess policies that “follow form.” While the fourth-
level excess policy provided that New York law shall govern the contract, the primary 
policy was silent. Thus, the policies did not contain any inconsistent provisions which 
would otherwise preclude the incorporation.  
 
10.2.2.3  Incorporation of a time bar clause    
In Faneuil Hall Ins. Co. v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co.
503 the clause “this policy 
is subject to the same risks, conditions, mode of settlement, and in case of loss, payable at 
the same time, and in same manner, as the policies reinsured” was held not to incorporate 
the various terms in the reinsured policies as to risks, conditions, mode of settlement, time 
and manner of payment in case of loss. As a result of that the time bar clause was held not 
to be incorporated into the reinsurance policy.  
 
10.3  Follow the form – endorsement or modification of the original policy  
After the reinsurance policy has been taken out and the reinsurer has agreed to follow the 
form of the original policy, if the reinsured extends the original policy cover, a question 
will arise as to whether or not the reinsurer is also automatically bound by the 
endorsement because of the “following form” clause. An early opinion on this issue stated 
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that the follow the form clause did not authorise the reinsured to charge the reinsurers by 
the assumption of a new risk of a different character, or to materially enlarge the existing 
one
504.  
 
The position has not changed; in a more recent case, decided under New York law, it was 
held that extended period of endorsement provision in business interruption policy issued 
by reinsured was not “term” or “condition” of policy, but rather was separate and distinct 
endorsement to policy, and thus was not within “following form” clauses of reinsurance 
contracts providing that reinsurers’ liability would follow terms and conditions of 
underlying policy. The issue came to the Southern District of New York Court in United 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co.
505 where the insurer, Arkwright, issued to 
Warnaco a first-party property damage and business interruption insurance policy 
covering Warnaco’s property throughout the US and Mexico. Arkwright’s standard policy 
form provided basic business interruption coverage. The extended period of endorsement 
(EPI) lengthened the period of interruption in the Warnaco Policy for an additional 270 
consecutive days beyond the time afforded by the basic business interruption coverage. An 
earthquake occurred on 17 January 1994 which damaged Warnaco’s property. The 
business interruption loss sustained by Warnaco was $12,644,243 between the date of the 
earthquake and the time that the property was ready to be reoccupied (July 1994). The loss 
was sustained under the EPI endorsement was $5,726,998 which represented the amount 
of business interruption loss sustained by Warnaco in the 270 days subsequent to July 
1994, ending in April 1994
506 and resulted primarily from the difficulty in re-categorising 
stock and the consequent inability to fill orders and a resultant loss of market share. The 
reinsurer argued that the Endorsement contained in the Arkwright policy of insurance 
issued to Warnaco was not reinsured by the reinsurers and that the reinsurers were not 
liable under their Certificates of Facultative Reinsurance. Balis, a reinsurance 
intermediary, placed facultative reinsurance for the Warnaco Policy with Western Re and 
Axa Re. Both reinsurance certificates provided a “following form” clause to the effect that 
the liability of the reinsurer shall follow the terms and conditions of the reinsured’s policy 
furnished to the reinsurer at the effective date of the reinsurance certificate, unless 
otherwise specifically provided herein by indorsement made a party of this certificate. By 
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taking into consideration that facultative certificates do not necessarily constitute the 
entire agreement among the parties to a reinsurance transaction, the District Court looked 
to the communications exchanged between the parties to determine the nature of the actual 
agreement between them. The court saw that from 1989 through to 1993 none of the 
documents exchanged between the parties, the submissions, requests, binders, facultative 
notes and certificates contained any reference to EPI. The court pointed out that the 
reinsurers agreed to reinsure the peril of earthquake and consequential business 
interruption, and they followed all of the Warnaco Policy’s terms and conditions with 
respect to the business interruption coverage pursuant to the “following form” clauses. 
However, EPI was not a term or condition of the business interruption coverage contained 
within the Warnaco Policy, but rather a separate and distinct endorsement to that.  
 
In this respect it was also questioned whether the Wellington Agreement
507 altered the 
reinsurance policies and whether the follow the settlements doctrine binds reinsurers by an 
agreement which was entered into after reinsurance was issued. In North River v. 
CIGNA
508 the Court held that “follow the fortunes” doctrine does not require the reinsurer 
to cover risks undertaken after the certificate of reinsurance is issued, and the reinsurer is 
not liable for coverage occasioned only because of the Wellington Agreement. The 
Wellington Agreement represented an innovative effort by asbestos producers and their 
insurers to solve the asbestos litigation crisis. The Agreement established a non-profit 
claims handling centre that coordinated claim payments on behalf of producers. It also 
contained provisions that aimed to avoid coverage disputes between producers and their 
insurers and established arbitration procedures to adjudicate claims the participants could 
not settle. Wellington did not rewrite existing policies between producers and their 
insurers. Rather, the Agreement aimed to avoid coverage disputes by applying insurance 
arrangements “in a consistent manner.” 
 
10.4  Overriding effect of the follow the form clauses  
It is sometimes seen that reinsurers may be exposed to liability beyond the cover that they 
in fact agreed. In Imperial Fire Ins. Co. of London v. Home Ins. Co. of New Orleans
509 
Royal and Imperial reinsured Home under a treaty which allowed Home to accept future 
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risks which would then be declared to the treaty. Home warranted to retain $25,000 and 
the subject matter was “cotton subject to coinsurance clause”. A coinsurance clause is one 
which provides that if the assured is not insured for the full value of the subject matter 
then the assured and insurers share the loss proportionately
510.  
 
Some of the policies issued by Home did not contain the coinsurance clause, so that Home 
was liable for greater sums than would otherwise have been the case, and that affected the 
reinsurers. The reinsurance policy was written “subject to the same risks, conditions, and 
valuations, indorsements, etc., that are or may be assumed or accepted by the original 
insurer.” The majority held that the reinsuring clause overrode the obligation of Home to 
insure only on a coinsurance basis, in that the reinsurers had agreed to follow the liability 
of Home and failure to disclose that some policies did not contain the coinsurance clause 
was not a material fact.    
  
The majority view was that reinsurance was a contract of liability insurance, and that the 
liability was unaffected by a failure by the reinsured to insert a coinsurance clause. But it 
may be thought obvious that the object of the coinsurance clause was to reduce the 
reinsured’s liability. As the dissenting judge said the majority decision permitted the 
reinsured to recover from the reinsurer sums for which the reinsured never asked, for 
which it never paid, and upon risks never insured by the reinsurer, and which the reinsured 
agreed that the reinsurer should not insure. 
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CHAPTER 11  REINSURER’S LIABILITY TO INDEMNIFY REINSURED  
 
11.1  No “Follow the Fortunes” clause  
In the absence of a follow the fortunes/settlements clause it is a settled rule that the 
reinsured must prove its liability in the same way that the assured has to prove its loss to 
the reinsured, and the reinsurer is entitled to rely upon any defence that might be available 
to the reinsured in a suit upon the original policy
511. Where a reinsured’s liability is 
established by a judgment, it is accepted that reinsurers are bound by such a decision so 
long as this risk is also within the reinsurance policy cover
512. The courts are normally 
reluctant to recognise or enforce a judgment against a person who was not party to the 
dispute but a judgment in an action between an assured and reinsured is regarded as an 
exception to the rule that a judgment does not affect a non-party, given the interest of 
reinsurers in the outcome
513.  
 
The reinsured may choose to settle the claim with their assured without litigating the 
latter’s claim. In one of the earliest reinsurance cases in the US, Hastie v De Peyster,
514 it 
was emphasised that reinsurance policies normally contain an express clause where the 
reinsured is entitled to make a claim by only proving the payment of the loss, and in this 
case in admitting or contesting the claim the reinsured’s only obligation is to act in good 
faith
515. The court regarded this as a special contract between the reinsured and the 
reinsurer and held that in the absence of an agreement as to follow the settlements of the 
reinsured, the reinsured is obliged to prove the existence and extent of the loss in the same 
manner as if he was the original insured. When he has done that, the reinsured is entitled 
to make its claim against the reinsurer
516. That view is retained by the modern reinsurance 
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authorities
517: in National American Ins. Co. of California v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London
518 the Ninth Circuit accepted this “accurately portrays the common law 
rule in California”
519.  
 
11.2  Settlement Clauses 
As a general principle reinsurers are not obliged to make any payments to reinsureds 
where there was no basis for liability to the assured, namely, where the reinsured has made 
a payment which it in fact was not bound as a matter of law to make. However, the parties 
may specify in the reinsurance contract that a settlement or other adjustment of loss 
between the assured and the reinsured is to be binding on the reinsurers. By so doing the 
reinsurer’s obligation to indemnify the reinsured becomes dependent on the reinsurance 
policy terms, and not on the question of whether the insured suffered a loss as a matter of 
law under the original policy
520.   
 
11.2.1  Distinguishing “Follow the Fortunes” from “Follow the Settlements”  
Settlement clauses in the US are called “follow the fortunes” or “follow the settlements” 
provisions, a typical formulation of which will read, “All claims involving this 
reinsurance, when settled by the company, shall be binding on the reinsurer.”
521 There is 
no common view as to whether or not the follow the fortunes clause serves any different 
function than the follow the settlements clause. It is not clear whether or not follow the 
fortunes is narrower than follow the settlements. Some cases suggest that it is wider than 
                                                                                                                                                   
a voyage from Malaga to NY the vessel was captured and taken to Santa Domingo. The assured sought to 
abandon the vessel to the insurers on the ground that there had been constructive total loss, but the insurers 
refused to accept the abandonment. However, it was agreed between the assured and the insurers that when 
the vessel reached NY the assured was entitled to sell the vessel and dispose of her on the most favourable 
possible terms, and that he would still be entitled to make his claim for constructive total loss against the 
underwriters and if he succeeded he could claim the policy moneys but deduct from the policy moneys the 
amount he received from the sale. All of this happened. The assured sold the vessel, and then successfully 
made a claim against the insurers. They were found to be liable for $832.35 under the policy and that sum – 
minus the amount received by the assured for the sale of the vessel – was paid to the assured. The reinsurers 
were held to be liable for: (a) the sums paid by the insurers; (b) the assured’s legal costs of $108.53; and (c) 
the insurers’ legal costs of $30.56. 
517 Michigan Tp Participating Plan v. Federal Ins. Co., 233 Mich App 422, 1999 (applying Michigan law). 
See also Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool, England, v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Edinburgh, Scotland 182 Cal 219, 
1920 (dictum); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pacific Sur. Co., 69 Cal App 730, 734, (1924) (also dictum). 
518 93 F 3d 529 CA 9 (Cal), 1996. 
519 However the court noted that they did not accept the reinsurers’ contention that this rule precludes 
evidence of custom and usage to the contrary to the effect that a settlement clause may be implied into 
reinsurance contracts if custom and usage permits to do so. The Ninth Circuit noted that where, as here, the 
law derives from the common law but not statute, the rule that custom or usage cannot overcome a rule of 
law applies with less force. See below, implication of follow the fortunes clause.    
520 Michigan Tp v. Federal. 
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follow the settlements
522 while others indicate that follow the fortunes is narrower
523. The 
difference between these two clauses is stated to be that follow the fortunes is implied into 
every reinsurance contract whereas, follow the settlements is not and while the former 
more properly relates to the obligation of a reinsurer to follow developments affecting the 
reinsured’s business that are outside its control, follow the settlements refers to the claims 
handling function of the reinsured, namely, that the clause prevents a reinsurer from 
second guessing bona fide claim settlements that are made in good faith
524. Follow the 
fortunes has also been defined as requiring reinsurers to accept a reinsured’s good faith 
decision that a particular loss is covered by the terms of the underlying policy, while the 
“follow the settlements” doctrine requires reinsurers to abide by a reinsured’s good faith 
decision to settle, rather than litigate, claims on that policy
525.  
 
It has been stated that, during the early history of reinsurance, underwriters agreed to 
contribute to profits or losses of traders as they conducted their business around the 
world
526. This seems to be the source of the follow the “fortunes” clause, given that  such 
an agreement requires the reinsurer to contribute to the reinsured’s bad or good 
fortunes
527. In today’s reinsurance, if the clause is to be distinguished from the follow the 
settlements clause, it may be said that the word “fortunes” is more suited to treaties than to 
facultative reinsurance. In treaties, reinsurers allow the reinsured to exercise a large 
measure of their own discretion and therefore “fortunes”, in the sense of “course of good 
or bad luck… in some undertaking” can be seen to refer to the obligation of reinsurers to 
that of the reinsured
528. The insurer may be required to make claims payments, subject to 
the terms and limitations of the reinsurance agreement, in connection with a policy 
although he is not obliged to do so in objective terms (eg in cases of fraudulent action on 
the part of the insured which cannot be proved). The “follow-the-fortunes” clause is 
therefore designed to protect the reinsured against circumstances beyond its control
529. On 
                                                 
522 North River Ins. Co. v. Ace American Reinsurance Co. 361 F 3d 134 CA 2 (NY), 2004.  
523 Holland v Employers Reins. Corp., 2007 US Dist Lexis 68069 (WD Okla). 
524 The Law of Reinsurance Claims 1997 Supplement of Blatt, Hammesfahr & Eaton (supplement by Robert 
W Hammesfahr, Scott W Wright), 64. 
525Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co. 9 F Supp 2d 49 D Mass., 1998 aff’d 217 F 3d 33 
CA 1 (Mass), 2000. 
526 Langen ,JF, “Special Clauses and Endorsements”, Reinsurance Contract Wording, 3
rd Ed, Ed by 
R.W.Strain, 1998, 582. 
527 Langen, 582. 
528 Staring, para 18:1. 
529 Gerathewohl, K, Reinsurance Principles and Practice, Vol I, 1980, 711, 712; Holmes, E M/Sutin, A S 
Original Edition by Appleman, J A, Holmes’ Appleman On Insurance 2D (as modified by the Cumulative 
Supplement, 2007), Vol. 14, Law of Reinsurance, LexisNexis Publishing 2000 § 106.2.    135
the other hand, follow the settlements pertains to the obligations of the reinsured for 
particular amounts voluntarily paid out in settlement of specific claims on behalf of the 
underlying insured
530. Despite the conflicting analysis, it is clear from modern precedent 
that the word “fortune” in fact is used not to follow the reinsured’s fortune where there 
was no settlement clause but rather it is now interchangeably used with the follow the 
settlements clause
531.  
 
11.2.2  Functions of Settlement Clauses  
The condition that the reinsured is obliged to prove a loss under the reinsurance agreement 
in the same way as the assured must prove a loss under the direct policy was held to be 
unnecessary where the reinsurance policy contained a clause that the reinsurance was 
“…subject to the same risks, valuations, conditions and mode of settlement as are or may 
be adopted or assumed by said company”
532.   
 
The follow the settlements doctrine requires payment where the reinsured’s good faith 
settlement is at least arguably within the scope of the insurance coverage that was 
reinsured even if technically not covered by it
533. In other words, where a reinsurer agrees 
to follow the fortunes of the reinsured, the question is not whether the underlying claim 
was covered by the reinsured’s policy, but whether there is any reasonable basis to 
conclude there was such coverage
534. Therefore, reinsurers are not entitled to second guess 
the reinsured’s good faith judgments as for settling the claim with the assured, or the 
reinsured’s good faith decision to waive defences to which it may be entitled
535. In 
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International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters and Underwriting Syndicates 
at Lloyd’s of London
536 this standard was said to be purposefully low for the reason that if 
reinsurers are entitled to interfere with the reinsured’s decision-making process, the 
foundation of the reinsured-reinsurer relationship would be damaged because a reinsured 
faced with de novo review of its claims determinations would ultimately feel the need to 
litigate every coverage issue rather than settling the claim. In this case, Owens-Corning 
purchased several layers of liability insurance. The first layer, an umbrella policy, 
provided coverage in each of the four years of cover in the amount of $25 million for each 
“occurrence.” The sum recoverable was subject to a $1 million deductible for “each and 
every occurrence.” Having been exposed to massive number of asbestos claims, the 
assured made a claim against its insurer by taking the position that the asbestos claims 
against it arose from one occurrence – its decision to manufacture and sell products 
containing asbestos. ISLIC, the reinsured, accepted this analysis and the assured paid 
ISLIC on the basis that there was only one $1 million “per occurrence” deductible in each 
of the four annual policy periods. In the subsequent dispute between the reinsurer and 
ISLIC, the court rejected the reinsurers’ assertion that each asbestos claim by each 
individual claimant had to be treated as a separate occurrence, subject to a separate $1 
million deductible. According to the court, by reason of the follow the fortunes doctrine
537 
the reinsurer is obliged to follow the reinsured’s settlements where it acted in good faith in 
settling the claim. After having examined the state of the law concerning the number of 
occurrences, the court found that the focus had to be on “the underlying circumstances 
which resulted in the claim for damages” rather than on the number of persons injured or 
the items damaged; therefore the assured’s and, in turn the reinsured’s settlement was 
reasonable under Ohio law. The court recognised that the application of multiple 
deductibles would create virtually no coverage, and any interpretation of the term 
“occurrence” as a per claim term would render the umbrella policies meaningless. The 
court found that Owens-Corning’s position was influenced by this fact, and it was not 
unreasonable for ISLIC to accept that the term referred to a single “occurrence.” 
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Encouraging settlements has also been stated to be a matter of public policy. In Insurance 
Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. Associated Intern. Ins. Co.
538 the settlement agreement 
between the insurers, ICP, and the assured, Fibreboard, called for the payment of “future 
unidentified claims”. The reinsurers asserted that they were liable only for payments 
which were “actually expended to injured claimants by way of settlement or judgment.” 
The Ninth Circuit stated that the settlement agreement required ICP to pay asbestos claims 
“as and if such claims arise.” Pursuant to the reinsurance contract, Associated’s liability 
“shall follow that of [ICP] and shall be subject in all respects to all the terms and 
conditions of the [ICP-Fibreboard] policy....” Under the ICP-Fibreboard policy, ICP was 
required “to indemnify [Fibreboard] for all sums which [Fibreboard] shall be obligated to 
pay by reason of the liability....” Therefore, since the asbestos claims represented a 
liability against Fibreboard which it was obliged to pay, ICP had to indemnify Fibreboard 
and, pursuant to the reinsurance contract, Associated was required to indemnify ICP. The 
Ninth Circuit found that accepting the reinsurers’ argument would be contrary to the 
policy in question and would frustrate the public policy of encouraging settlement. 
 
As previously commented, in the US reinsurance disputes are mostly arbitrated. It was 
suggested that even though courts have recognised limits on the scope of the “follow the 
fortunes” doctrines, the reinsurance industry largely measures mutual relationships as if a 
particular contract included a broad follow the settlements clause
539. It should be noted 
that it is the case that most arbitration panels pay attention to provisions in reinsurance 
contracts directing them to consider reinsurance agreements as “honorable 
engagements”
540. 
 
11.3  Exception to the follow the fortunes clauses 
11.3.1  Fraud or bad faith 
It is undisputed that the reinsurers may not object to the reinsured’s settlement of a claim 
unless the settlement was fraudulent, collusive or made in bad faith
 541. 
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The burden of showing bad faith is on the reinsurers
542, and it is not easily discharged: the 
reinsurer must show that the reinsured had been guilty of deliberate deception, gross 
negligence or recklessness, or that the settlement was not even arguably within the scope 
of the reinsurance coverage
543. To equate bad faith with simple negligence would lead 
virtually every decision by the reinsured to be second-guessed and litigated under a simple 
negligence standard which would eventually vitiate all of the policy reasons that gave rise 
to the follow the fortunes doctrine
544. Accordingly, the question is not whether the 
reinsured was ultimately correct or incorrect, but whether it acted in good faith at the 
time
545.   
 
In Granite State Ins. Co. v. ACE American Reinsurance Co.
546ACE American Reinsurance 
Company agreed to reinsure excess umbrella liability policies issued by the subsidiaries of 
American International Group (collectively known AIG). ACE reinsured only one of the 
policies that AIG insured which issued by Granite State (GS) in 1979. Castle & Cooke 
(C&C), the assured, was exposed to thousands of claims by field workers who claimed 
injuries as a result of being exposed to the pesticide dibromochloropropane (DBCP). After 
having consulted with its counsel AIG argued that the GS policy did not provide coverage 
for C&C’s claim. C&C then entered into a future cost agreement (FCA) with certain AIG 
companies as to which policies would provide defence and indemnity on the C&C claims 
on an ongoing basis. AIG realised that it paid more than the available limits with respect 
to defence expense and indemnity on one of its National Union (NU) policies issued to 
C&C which was not reinsured by ACE. Then AIG and C&C added an addendum to the 
FCA that AIG had exhausted the applicable limits of its NU policy and, “to the extent and 
any sums remain unpaid, they shall become the responsibility of Granite State.” AIG made 
claim against the reinsurer by alleging that C&C faced with 26,000 lawsuits in many states 
and foreign countries and once the NU policy was exhausted, the FCA was amended by 
endorsement to replace the policy with the GS policy. However, AIG did not clarify how 
it moved around its losses in order to charge ACE to the GS policy.  
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The Appellate Court took into consideration that the GS excluded DBCP claims, the FCA 
did not mention GS in the parties that was stated in the list and AIG allocated the loss fell 
within the GS policy after discovering that it made payments under the NU policy. Noting 
that where there is concurrency of coverage between the original insurance and 
reinsurance policy, the follow the fortunes doctrine imposes a contractual obligation upon 
reinsurer to indemnify the reinsured for payments it makes pursuant to a loss settlement 
under its own policy, the reinsurer was held not to oblige to follow settlements that made 
in bad faith or with the knowledge that the payment was outside the original policy. The 
court concluded that AIG’s claim fell within the exception of bad faith and ex gratia 
payments to follow the fortunes doctrine.  
 
Another example of a finding that the reinsured had acted in bad faith is City of Renton v. 
Lexington Ins. Co. ( USA )
547 where the reinsured paid a claim without further notice to, or 
consultation with, the reinsurers, knowing that the reinsurers had already declined to cover 
the claim under the “inherent vice” exclusion. 
 
11.3.2  Reinsurance Policy Defences  
11.3.2.1  Claim clearly outside the scope of original insurance 
A reinsurer is not obliged to indemnify the reinsured where the latter’s claim is clearly 
beyond the scope of the original policy
548. In Independence Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat. Life 
Ins. Co.
549 a life insurance policy lapsed before the assured died by reason of unpaid 
monthly instalment of premiums. Nevertheless the reinsured paid under the policy and 
claimed to be indemnified by the reinsurers. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that 
a contract of reinsurance did not either enlarge the rights of the insured under the original 
policy or renew rights already lost. If the reinsured was not liable under the terms of the 
original contract of insurance issued by it to the assured then, by the same token, the 
reinsurers could not be liable. The Court also stated that, by a follow the fortunes clause, 
the reinsurer submitted itself to any settlement or adjustment of liability on the original 
policy which the reinsured might adopt or assume in good faith, but such authorisation did 
not mean the reinsured could impose liability on the reinsurer by settlement or adjustment 
of a claim for which no liability existed as a matter of law.  
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Similarly, in Insurance Co. of North America v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.
550 the goods which 
were insured while in transit from US gulf ports to the United Kingdom were destroyed by 
hurricane while undergoing bagging operations at Gulfport. The reinsurance policy 
provided “...to pay as may be paid by the Reassured, liable or not liable”. The reinsured 
paid the assured and, relying on especially the phrase “liable or not liable” in the 
reinsurance contact, contended that the reinsurer was liable whenever the reinsured 
decided, unilaterally, to pay its assured. The Court rejected this argument and held that the 
reinsured’s construction would be an unwarranted and indeed tortured construction of that 
clause, in that it held a reinsurer bound, for example, to pay if the primary insurer paid 
monies to its insured on a claim completely without the scope of the policy and not in 
good faith. Referring to an English case Western Assurance Co. of Toronto v. Poole
551 the 
court stated that the “follow the fortunes” clause was certainly a broad one, and that it was 
clear that the reinsurer was liable only for “a loss of the kind reinsured”. To determine 
what type of loss was reinsured, the court turned to the original insurance contract. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the reinsurance policy, the reinsured issued two binders to 
the assured, for an additional premium, providing coverage for inland transport “from Int. 
U.S. to Gulfport, Miss., and while at risk there at State Authority Warehouse, Gulfport, 
Miss. during bagging operations and thence until laden on board overseas vessel.” The 
court found that issuance of the two binders indicated the reinsured’s intention that the 
original insurance contract was not intended to cover the losses occurring during bagging. 
The stoppage and bagging of the cargo at Gulfport was an interruption in the transit of the 
goods and created a shore risk not insured and the reinsurers never consented to reinsure a 
loss not covered in the original insurance policy.  
 
11.3.2.2  Claim Beyond the Reinsurance Policy Cover  
While a “follow the fortunes” clause limits a reinsurer’s defences, it does not make a 
reinsurer liable for risks beyond those agreed in the reinsurance certificate
552. In other 
words, the clause does not create reinsurance cover where none otherwise existed
553.  
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In Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. North American Reinsurance Corp.
554 an excess layer 
reinsured paid the assured’s claim under an umbrella policy even though the claim was 
within the deductible to be borne by the assured. Dealing with the claim against the 
reinsurer the Court of Appeals of Michigan stated that the extent of the liability of the 
reinsurer was determined by the language of the reinsurance contract, and the reinsurer 
could not be held liable beyond the terms of its contract merely because the original 
insurer had made payment. If no liability had attached to the insurer under the original 
contract, there could be no recovery against the reinsurer, for nothing existed upon which 
to base an indemnity. Holding the reinsurer liable in this case would effectively have 
required the court to rewrite the policy. The reinsured contended that although it 
contributed to a settlement that was less than the assured’s retention, it agreed to do so in 
order to avoid exposure to a potentially larger jury verdict and excessive litigation costs. 
However the Court stated that interpreting the contract in this way would expose the 
reinsurers to greater risk than contracted for, and it rejected the reinsured’s public policy 
argument. 
 
Reinsurers plainly do not have to pay any amount beyond the limits of liability stated in 
the reinsurance policy
555. In Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
556 the 
reinsured settled a claim with the assured, covering also the assured’s defence expenses 
even though the aggregate payment was in excess of the cap stated in the policies. The 
reinsurance agreement provided “All claims involving this reinsurance, when settled by 
the Company, shall be binding on the Reinsurer, which shall be bound to pay its 
proportion of such settlements, and in addition thereto, in the ratio that the Reinsurer’s 
loss payment bears to the Company’s gross loss payment, its proportion of expenses ... 
incurred by the Company in the investigation and settlement of claims or suits....” 
 
The reinsured claimed the settled amount from the reinsurer by contending that the follow 
the fortunes clause obliged the reinsurer to follow its settlement. The Second Circuit 
declined to read the “follow the fortunes” clause as negating the phrase “the reinsurer does 
hereby reinsure Aetna ... subject to the ... amount of liability set forth herein.” This was so 
because such an interpretation would strip the limitation clause and other conditions of all 
meaning; the reinsurer would be obliged to reimburse the insurer for any and all funds 
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paid. The court stated that the follow the fortunes clause “coexist[s] with, rather than 
supplant[s], the liability cap”. The phrase “in addition thereto,” was also challenged by 
Aetna but the court stated that the function of the phrase in the clause was merely to 
differentiate the obligations for losses and for expenses; it was not designed to exempt 
defence costs from the overall monetary limitation in the certificate
557. Rather, the court 
held that defence costs were “subject to” the express cap on liability in each certificate. 
Accordingly, this monetary limitation was a cap on all payments under the certificate. It 
did not indicate that either component was not within the overall limitation
558. 
 
The same approach was followed by the Michigan District Court in Travelers Cas. and 
Sur. Co. v. Constitution Reinsurance Corp.
559 Travelers’ policy provided coverage to Dow 
for the period 1975 to 1978. CRC reinsured Travelers under three reinsurance certificates 
for the same time period for “$1,000,000 each occurrence and in the aggregate where 
applicab[l]e part of $4,000,000 part of $8,000,000 part of $15,000,000 which in turn is 
excess of $24,000,000.” The reinsured settled the assured’s claim and then argued that the 
$1 million per occurrence limits in the three reinsurance certificates should be annualised, 
so that the reinsured could obtain reinsurance coverage up to $3 million for each 
certificate. The District court noted that the “Reinsurance Accepted” for the 75-78 
reinsurance certificate was $1 million for “each occurrence and in the aggregate where 
applicab[l]e part of” $8 million. There was nothing in the express language of the 
certificates stating that the $1 million limited apply “annually” or “each year” or “for each 
annual period.” Rather, they unambiguously granted coverage up to $1 million (not $3 
million) for each occurrence during the period of reinsurance coverage. Interpreting “each 
occurrence” to mean “each occurrence, each year” would require reading in a contract 
term that was not there. The court also refused to read the follow the form clause as 
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disregarding the reinsurer’s liability limit under the reinsurance policy
560. The policy 
issued to Dow provided coverage for $4.5 million part of $15 million, but reinsurance was 
only provided for $1 million part of $4.5 million. If Travelers were allowed to recover its 
full liability to Dow simply because it held some amount of reinsurance, the negotiated 
coverage limits of the reinsurance certificates would be rendered meaningless.  
 
In Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Yosemite Ins. Co.
561 it can be seen that the rule as for the 
reinsurance policy defences is strictly interpreted. Yosemite issued liability insurance 
policy to Yellow Cab Co of California (Yellow Cab) against the liability imposed upon it 
by law arising out of the operation of its taxi cabs, subject to a self-insured retention or 
deductible of $25,000. Calvert reinsured Yosemite for fifty per cent of each loss in excess 
of $25,000 up to a limit of 300,000. The problem here arose when Yellow Cab went into 
bankruptcy and Yosemite became liable under its policy to pay claims within Yellow 
Cab’s self-insured retention of $25,000. Yosemite thereupon made a demand that its 
reinsurers, Calvert, paid claims of less than $25,000 which had been made against 
Yosemite. 
 
The first provision of the reinsurance contract provided: “...liability of [Calvert] specified 
in Item 4 shall follow that of the Company, except as otherwise specifically provided 
herein, and shall be subject in all respects to all the terms and conditions of [Yosemite’s] 
policy”. Under item 4 of the reinsurance contract Calvert reinsured Yosemite for the first 
$50,000 of its exposure over the Yellow Cab retention for each person injured; $150,000 
for all bodily injuries in any one accident; and $25,000 for property damage in any one 
accident. The court found that item 4 was not ambiguous and the first provision had to be 
construed to mean that the reinsurer’s liability followed that of the reinsured within the 
limits specified in Item 4. To construe the clause otherwise would effectively have 
eliminated the provision in Item 4 that the reinsurer’s liability began after the self-insured 
retention had been exhausted.   
 
It was also ruled that, unless reinsurers expressly agreed otherwise, they were not liable 
for the increase of the original insurance limit which was agreed after the reinsurance 
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policy had incepted. In Penn Re, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
562 the court noted that the 
follow-the-fortunes doctrine did not support  the proposition that Aetna could unilaterally 
increase the reinsurers’ liability by agreeing with the assured to do so. 
 
11.4  Scope of the Follow the Settlements Clauses 
11.4.1  Claiming the defence costs of the assured’s claim 
11.4.1.1  No follow the settlements clause 
In a very early reinsurance case, it was held that upon notification of the assured’s claim, 
if the reinsurer declined to indemnify the reinsured, thereby forcing the reinsured to incur 
costs to defend the assured’s claim, it was perfectly reasonable to hold the reinsurer liable 
for the defence costs incurred by the reinsured, on the basis that the reinsurers could have 
prevented the reinsured from incurring those costs by affirming the claim
563. This 
reasoning was applied in New York State Marine Ins. Co. v Protection Ins. Co.
564 where it 
was emphasised that, upon notification of the assured’s claim, if the reinsurer did not use 
the opportunity to contest that claim or to authorise the reinsured to compromise or settle 
the claim, the reinsurer was deemed to have consented to the defence of the claim and 
thereby impliedly to have agreed to indemnify the reinsured against the costs and expenses 
necessarily and reasonably incurred in defending the suit
565.  
 
It is also stated in New York v Protection that the reinsured’s ability to claim “a full 
indemnity for the entire loss sustained by him, and also for the costs and expenses, which 
he has reasonably and necessarily incurred, in order to protect himself” is subject to the 
requirements that:   
 
-  the assured’s action is just and reasonable 
-  the conduct of the insurer is bona fide  
-  the insurer exercised a sound discretion 
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Extrinsic evidence as to these requirements was accepted in TIG Premier Ins. Co. v. 
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
566 where the reinsurance policy provided “Reinsurance 
Accepted: 150,000 each occurrence/NIL aggregate, being 20% P/O $750,000 each 
occurrence/NIL aggregate, excess item 5.” The reinsured offered evidence that in 1994 the 
reinsurer paid the reinsured for a claim under a nearly identical reinsurance policy and, 
reimbursed the reinsured for legal expenses in addition to the dollar amount set forth in the 
“Reinsurance accepted” box. The reinsured also offered the reinsurer’s own internal 
documents concerning the  policy before the court, in which a claims analysis conducted 
for the reinsurer stated that [e]xpenses are in addition to limits ... [t]he policy limits under 
such policies are not eroded by defense expenses”.  Two experts, who worked in the 
reinsurance industry in the 1970’s, the period when this policy was entered into, also 
stated that it was “standard practice within the industry” for reinsurers to pay their pro-rata 
share of the primary insurer’s payments of the underlying insured’s liability damages and 
also the same percentage of the primary insured’s reimbursement of the underlying 
insured’s defence costs. The court found that the evidence was more than sufficient to 
prove that the “Reinsurance Accepted” meant that “the reinsurer’s coverage included not 
only 20% of the reinsured’s obligations to Dow on the $750,000 reinsured liability risk but 
also 20% of the related defence costs incurred or covered by the reinsured under its 
primary policy.” The court noted that a New York court might not interpret the clause this 
way but a California court would recognise this interpretation of the clause in the light of 
extrinsic evidence.    
 
In the US, reinsurance policies usually contain a clause regarding the reinsurer’s liability 
for expenses incurred by the reinsured. For example in Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. 
American Reinsurance Co.
567 the court found that the clause “all expenses incurred in the 
investigation and settlement of claims or suits” covered expenses incurred in declaratory 
judgment actions where the reinsured contested the assured’s claim
568. 
 
 
                                                 
566 35 F Supp 2d 348 SDNY, 1999 (applying California law). 
567 256 F Supp 2d 923 WD Wis, 2003. 
568 For a comment on the case see Kendall W.Harrison, “Recent Developments Concerning A Reinsurer’s 
Obligation To Pay Its Reinsured’s Declaratory Judgment Expenses”, Mealey’s Litigation Report, Vol.14, #5, 
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11.4.1.2  Follow the settlements clause 
It may be argued that where a reinsured has paid for the assured’s defence costs in an 
amount which, together with the amount of the assured’s liability, exceeds the original 
policy limits, the reinsurers are liable to indemnify the reinsured for the defence costs even 
though they are in excess of the reinsurers’ own limit of liability. The assertion is based on 
the argument that such liability arises because the scope of reinsurance cover is identical 
to the cover provided by the original policy. In Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. 
Co.
569 Aetna put forward this contention even though the ultimate net loss clause in 
Aetna’s outwards excess policies expressly excluded
570 liability for the costs of defending 
claims against the assured. The policy provided a standard follow the form clause. The 
court also recognised that the follow the fortunes doctrine was to be implied into all 
reinsurance contracts including the present contract. It was held that concurrency of 
coverage between the original policy and the policy of reinsurance was provided by the 
follow the form clause and, according to the follow the settlements doctrine the reinsurer 
was under a contractual obligation to indemnify the reinsured for payments it made 
pursuant to a loss settlement under its own policy, provided that such settlement was not 
fraudulent, collusive or otherwise made in bad faith, and provided further that the 
settlement was not ex gratia. The reinsurer was held to be not liable for the defence costs 
incurred by the assured because such costs were outside the original insurance cover and 
therefore not covered by the reinsurance policy
571.    
 
In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp.
572 the first clause of the 
reinsurance policy stated “[Phil Re] [d]oes hereby reinsure Aetna … subject to the terms, 
conditions and amount of liability set forth herein, as follows.” The amount of Phil Re’s 
liability was stated to be $7.5 million. The reinsurance policy provided a follow the form 
clause and a follow the fortunes clause whereby the reinsurer’s loss payment was to bear 
to the reinsured’s gross loss payment its proportion of expenses, other than reinsured 
                                                 
569 882 F Supp 1328, SDNY, 1995. 
570 In Aetna v Home the court provided for definitions that “A policy that includes no duty to defend the 
insured and no provision for the payment of defense costs by the insurer is referred to as ‘cost-exclusive’ ”; 
the insured must bear the costs for investigating and defending against such claims. “A policy that provides 
for a duty to defend subject to an overall limit of liability is ‘cost-inclusive’ ”; the maximum liability of the 
insurer to its insured is capped by the limit of liability expressed in the policy. “Where the policy places in 
the insurer a duty to defend the insured but does not by its terms include those costs within the limit of 
liability such a policy may be termed ‘cost-supplemental’ ”. 
571 Home provided reinsurance cover from 1970 through 1976 and the reinsurer was held to be liable for 
claims under 1970 policy year only because in 1970 policy year, unlike other years that were covered, 
defence costs were unambiguously included within insurance company’s definition of ultimate net loss.  
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salaries and office expenses, incurred by the reinsured in the investigation and settlement 
of claims or suits. Applying Bellefonte
573 the District court judge held that the reinsurer’s 
entire obligation was quantitatively limited by the dollar amount the reinsurers agreed to 
reinsure. Once the reinsurers had paid up to the certificate limits, they had no additional 
liability to Aetna for defence expenses or settlement contributions. Any other construction 
of the reinsurance certificates would negate the first clause stated above
574.     
 
Regardless of whether the policies are cost-inclusive or not, it is accepted that a 
reinsured’s declaratory judgment expenses are not a “risk” that is reinsured by the 
reinsurer. In British Intern. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A.
575 the reinsurance 
policy provided: “...subject to the same risks, valuations, conditions, endorsements (except 
changes of location), assignments and adjustments as are or may be assumed, made or 
adopted by the reinsured, and loss, if any, hereunder is payable pro rata with the reinsured 
and at the same time and place...”. BIIC, the reinsured, argued that the then-prevailing 
custom in the industry required the reinsurer to pay a pro rata share of the reinsured’s 
expenses in resisting coverage; and that such payment was compelled by the reinsurance 
doctrine requiring the reinsurer to follow the fortunes of the reinsured. The Second Circuit 
rejected this argument for the reason that the follow the fortunes doctrine simply required 
payment where the reinsured’s good-faith payment to its insured was at least arguably 
within the scope of the insurance coverage that was reinsured. According to the court 
BIIC’s contention required proof that its own declaratory judgment expenses in litigating 
against its policyholders were potentially within the coverage of the underlying policies. 
However the court was of the view that this could not be done because the policyholders 
obtained no benefit from the mounting of coverage litigation against their own claims; 
such an initiative could be conceived as any part of the policyholders’ coverage; on the 
whole, any policyholder would prefer the insurer to forgo the contest. The reinsurers did 
                                                 
573 903 F 2d 910 CA2 (NY), 1990. 
574 One day after the court granted the summary judgment for the reinsurer, the Third Circuit decided North 
River v. CIGNA and Aetna applied for reconsideration of the Pennsylvania District Court decision in favour 
of the reinsurer for the reason that North River v CIGNA effected a change in the law mandating a denial of 
Phil Re’s motion. Aetna argued that it was held in North River that whether the underlying insurance 
policies are cost-inclusive or cost-supplemental is the dispositive factor in interpreting a follow the fortunes 
clause. The District Court stated that in Bellefonte the reinsurance policy was cost-inclusive. The court stated 
that the issue in North River was whether the certificates covered costs at all, ie whether they were cost-
exclusive, not whether they were cost-inclusive or cost-supplemental. North River did not reach the issue 
decided here and in Bellefonte, it did not affect a change in the law warranting denial of Phil Re’s summary 
judgment motion. Aetna’s motion for reconsideration was denied.   
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not by their contract agree to cover the claims-handling expenses that an insurance 
company incurs in the conduct of its own operations.  
 
The Second Circuit also noted that the trade usage must establish either that the party 
alleged to be bound was aware of the custom, or that the custom’s existence was “so 
notorious” that it should have been aware of it. Moreover the trade usage must have been 
“so well settled, so uniformly acted upon, and so long continued as to raise a fair 
presumption that it was known to both contracting parties and that they contracted in 
reference thereto.” Thus, the reinsured must prove that the reinsurer either actually knew 
of the alleged custom, or that the practice of reinsurers’ paying declaratory judgment 
expenses was so notorious in the industry that the reinsurer must have been aware of it
576.  
 
In Penn Re v. Aetna
577 the court refused to apply the follow the fortunes doctrine to claims 
for the assured’s defence costs that the reinsured had agreed to pay. However, in this case 
the reinsurer was held to be obliged to pay such a claim because of the wording of the 
settlement clause. Despite the reinsurer’s objection Aetna settled the claim with its 
assured, Robins, agreeing to pay an amount substantially in excess of its original policy 
limits. The reinsurance policy provided that “All claims involving this reinsurance, when 
settled by the Company, shall be binding on the Reinsurer, which shall be bound to pay its 
proportion of such settlements, ... the Reinsurer’s limit of liability bears to the Company’s 
gross limit of liability with respect to business accepted on a pro rata basis and, with the 
prior consent of the Reinsurer to trial court proceedings, its proportion of court costs and 
interest on any judgment or award.” This clause, according to the court, provided that as to 
all claims involving the reinsurance policies, when settled by Aetna, the settlement thereof 
was binding on the reinsurers and they were thereby bound to pay their proportion of such 
settlements. It addressed the reinsurers’ obligation for “costs” incurred in settling claims 
brought by a third person alleging to have been injured by an assureds’ product covered by 
the reinsurance certificate. The court held that this provision was not limited to Aetna’s 
liability for the risks which the underlying insurance policies covered, but requires that, in 
addition, Aetna was liable for its proportion of the expenses incurred by Penn Re. The 
court also noted that in settling with Robins, Aetna amended the limits of its excess 
policies upwards and the follow the fortunes doctrine could not make the reinsurers liable 
                                                 
576 According to the Second Circuit, the practice of one company would not be sufficient to establish a trade 
usage. 
577 Not Reported in F Supp, WL 909519 EDNC, 1987.   149
for the newly increased limits unless the reinsurers had agreed to be so bound. The 
reinsurers were held to be liable for the settlements including defence costs because of the 
abovementioned clause, not because the follow the fortunes doctrine. 
 
Remarkably, in North River v. CIGNA the absence of an express exclusion of defence 
costs in the reinsurance contract was held to be based on a holding that the reinsurers were 
liable for such costs. In this case under procedures established by the Wellington 
Agreement an arbitrator ruled that North River Insurance Company was obliged to pay 
defence costs, in excess of policy limits, to its insured. The reinsurer agreed to be bound 
by all settlements by North River and also accepted liability for its proportion of expenses 
incurred by North River in the investigation and settlement of claims or suits and, with its 
prior consent to trial court proceedings, its proportion of court costs and interest on any 
judgment or award. The reinsurers, however, argued that they were not liable for the 
defence costs because they were not covered by the original policy. In the original 
insurance policy while paragraph 13 excluded all “Costs”, paragraph 15 provided that 
costs incurred by Owens-Corning “with the written consent of [North River]” would be 
apportioned. The Second Circuit adopted the arbitrator’s interpretation that these apparent 
inconsistencies provided a limited exclusion for costs that excluded expenses incurred 
unreasonably. The Second Circuit also noted that reading the consent clause as meaning 
that North River could only be liable for defence costs associated with litigation or a 
settlement to which it had given its formal consent would be inconsistent with paragraph 
11 of the policy, which provided that North River’s obligation to pay costs was not attach 
until the underlying limits had been paid. According to the Court, compliance with both 
paragraphs was in practice not feasible. Consequently it was held that the coverage of 
defence costs was within the terms of the North River-Owens-Corning insurance policies 
and the reinsurer was bound to follow the settlements in the absence of proof of fraud or 
bad faith of the reinsured. The Second Circuit also noted that the reinsurer could have 
avoided liability for defence costs if it had expressly excluded such coverage in the 
reinsurance certificates it issued to North River. On the contrary, the North River 
reinsurance certificates expressly referred to the reinsurer’s obligation to reimburse for 
“court costs and interest on any judgment or award” arising out of consented-to litigation.  
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11.4.2  Extra Contractual Obligations  
Extra Contractual Obligations (ECO) are defined in the US as “damages awarded by a 
court against an insurer or reinsurer that are outside the provisions of the insurance 
policy, due to the insurer’s bad faith, fraud, or gross negligence in the handling of a 
claim”
578.  
It has come before the courts that whether or not the follow the fortunes clause applies to 
punitive damages awarded against an assured or a reinsured. The opinions are not 
unanimous and depending on the facts or the case and the policy wording. In principle 
unless the parties expressly agree
579, the clause does not apply punitive damages because 
the clause applies to the claims at least arguably within the original policy cover whereas 
ECO, by definition, arises outside the reinsurance policy
580.  
  
This view was applied in American v. North American
581 where the jury had awarded 
punitive damages against the assured for deliberate corporate misbehaviour. The reinsured 
nevertheless settled the claim most of which covered such an excluded loss from the 
original insurance and reinsurance policy. The court rejected the reinsured’s argument that 
follow the fortunes clause required the reinsurers to indemnify the reinsured for punitive 
damages.  
  
However, as will be seen below, the cases suggest that agreeing to follow the fortunes of 
the reinsured may include to follow the fortunes as for extra contractual obligations 
depending on the policy wording and also the particular facts of the case
582. For instance 
in Inland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co.
583 the reinsurers were held to be liable for the 
reinsured’s share of extra contractual obligations in the absence of any express clause. 
Inland issued a vehicle liability policy under which Inland agreed to indemnify the assured 
against liability for personal injuries arising out of the operation of the insured’s vehicles 
to the extent of $15,000 for injuries arising to one person in any one accident. Pursuant to 
the reinsurance treaty, Inland retained $5,000 of this coverage and transferred to Peerless 
                                                 
578 Glossary of Insurance and Risk Management Terms, 11
th, IRMI Book Collection, 2007, 104. 
579 Hartford Fire Ins. Co v Lloyd’s Syndicate 1997 US Dist LEXIS 10858 (DConn 1997) it was accepted 
that the clause “those liabilities . . . which arise from the handling of any claim [including] but not limited to 
. . . alleged or actual negligence, fraud or bad faith. . . .” included ECO. 
580 Curiale v. DR Ins. Co. 593 NYS 2d 157 NY Sup, 1992. Schoenberg (conference paper); Staring, §18:7. 
581 697 F 2d 79 CA 2 (NY), 1982. 
582 Hollenbach, M, “Surplus Share”, Reinsurance Contract Wording, 3
rd Ed, Ed by R W Strain, 1998, 201.  
583 152 F Supp 506, aff’d, 251 F 2d 696 CA4 1958.    151
the excess, forwarding to Peerless the appropriate proportion of the premium paid by the 
assured.   
 
The assured was involved in an accident where a third party made a claim against him. 
The reinsured and reinsurer were notified the claim. During the litigation the claimant’s 
advocate offered a settlement of $20,000 but the advocate  representing the assured and 
appointed by the reinsured without objection by the reinsurer found the amount too high 
considering the claim, and was of the opinion that they should not settle for more than 
$7,500. The claimant rejected this offer, and after a trial the jury awarded $75,000, 
Inland paid the assured $15,000, and Peerless paid Inland $10,000. Then, the assured 
brought an action against Inland for its negligence and bad faith in failing to settle the 
third party litigation for $17,500. The parties reached a settlement where Inland paid the 
assured $27,500, and the assured paid the third party this $27,500 together with an 
additional $30,000 (the face amount of the policy together with $15,000 contributed by 
the assured), or a total of $57,500, for the release of the third party judgment of $75,000. 
Afterward the reinsured initially claimed the full $27,500 which later was reduced to 
two-thirds of that amount. Inland also claimed from Peerless its “proportionate share” of 
the expenses of investigating and defending the Arms-Yeatts (third party – assured) suit 
and the Yeatts-Inland (assured-reinsured) suit.  
 
The court put emphasis on the fact that Inland kept Peerless fully and adequately 
informed of the significant developments in the case of Arms v. Yeatts. Peerless 
expressed no objection to the nature or quality of the defence provided by Inland. The 
court
584 noted that under the original policy the obligation of Inland was to defend any 
suit against Yeatts, and it had the right to investigate, negotiate and settle any claim or 
suit, and as the liability of Peerless followed that of Inland in every case, upon actual 
payment of loss by Inland, the question was whether or not the payment by Inland of 
$27,500 and expenses in the Yeatts v. Inland suit, was a loss or expense of Inland under 
its policy insuring Yeatts. 
                                                 
584 There is no previous authority on the matter, so the court has to decide the question for itself without 
the benefit of earlier judicial guidance. Therefore the court stated that the question that whether Peerless is 
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The court also found that law firm defending the third party claim was selected by 
Inland, but Peerless never at any time objected, nor did seek to exercise its rights to be 
associated with the Company in the defence or control of any claim or suit or proceeding 
by appointment of its own counsel
585. 
 
Peerless therefore was held to know as much about the Arms case as did Inland and 
Peerless was freely and frankly consulted by Inland, and Peerless left the decision in 
Inland’s hands, that decision became the decision of Peerless as well as Inland; Peerless 
was accordingly bound along with Inland by that decision whether sound or unsound, 
favorable or unfavorable; and that because the liability of Peerless “shall follow that of” 
Inland, Peerless was liable for two-thirds of the cost to Inland of a concededly proper 
settlement of the Yeatts-Inland litigation. Notably, the court accepted in this case that 
claims cooperation created a joint enterprise: in other words, in defending the action 
against Yeatts, the companies were unquestionably engaged in a joint enterprise, the 
losses arising from which were be borne in accordance with their respective interests in 
the enterprise. 
 
It has been suggested that the interpretation of the contract language and defining the 
parties as joint venturers was wrong
586: the court ignored the fact that the reinsurer 
agreed to follow the reinsured’s liability under the original policy, not outside it. Once 
the reinsured’s liability under the original policy was exhausted, no further liability 
could to be imposed on the reinsurer. It has also been said that it was the reinsured who 
could make the ultimate decision despite the reinsurer’s involvement in investigating and 
defending the claim
587. The reinsurer did not have control of the handling of the 
underlying claim and should not be penalised by that
588. The author found that in 
Peerless the insurer were penalised by the court for having analysed both the original 
claim and the nature of the reinsurance relationship accurately
589. It should be noted that 
Peerless did not rule on what the position may be where the reinsurer is not fully 
                                                 
585 In fact, Peerless appointed its Assistant Secretary (an attorney) who extensively involved in the handling 
of the claim.  
586 Schoenberg, C H, “Follow The Fortunes And Extra Contractual Obligations (“ECOs”)”, Mealey’s 
Litigation Report: Reinsurance, July 8, 1992, Vol 3 #5 p.24. 
587 Schoenberg, 25. 
588 Schoenberg, 25. 
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appraised of all developments regarding the claim or was not consulted about the 
settlement procedure within the policy limits or where the reinsurer refused to settle the 
claim after the consultancy. 
  
Peerless has since been regarded as a case that is confined to its facts
590 and was 
distinguished in Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co.
591 where 
the extra-contractual liability of the reinsured concerned an excess of loss reinsurance 
which did not contain a follow the fortunes clause. In Employers, the Court emphasised 
that in Peerless the court took a limited view because of the follow the fortunes clause and 
the excess liability claim resulting from the particular dealings between the parties. The 
District court also rejected the joint enterprise argument and stated that the instant 
reinsurance contracts could not be construed as creating a joint adventurer relationship 
between the reinsured and the reinsurer.  
 
A commentator has suggested that ECO are to be distinguished from Excess of Loss 
Policy Limits (XPL) which relate to covered losses that are in excess of the policy 
limits
592. Similar to the view adopted in North River v CIGNA as for the defence costs 
above, it was contended that where a reinsurance agreement contains a follow the 
fortunes clause, so long as the reinsured acted in good faith in settling the claim, the 
strict ECO rules should not be applicable and the reinsurer should be bound by the 
settlement unless the reinsurance policy expressly provides to the contrary
593. The author 
justifies this approach by arguing that holding otherwise might cause claims decisions to 
be distorted, thereby ultimately increasing the losses claimed from reinsurers
594. It is not 
clear what the author means by saying “unless specifically agreed otherwise” but if he 
was referring to the situation in which XPL was not expressly excluded then the author 
is effectively saying that as long as the reinsured has acted in good faith in settling the 
claim, the reinsurer should follow its settlement irrespective of the maximum sum 
reinsured. In Bellefonte, which was decided two years before the article was published, it 
had been decided that the follow the fortunes clause could not be interpreted so as to 
                                                 
590 See Bellefonte.  
591 196 F Supp 553 DC Mo 1959. 
592 Maneval, A, “ “Follow The Fortunes” And Excess Of Policy Limit Obligations”, Mealey’s Litigation 
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disregard the reinsurance policy limits. There is no reason why the reinsurer should be 
obliged to pay more than the policy limit simply to prevent a reinsured distorting the 
claim
595. And in fact as the Second Circuit noted in Unigard
596 a reinsurance policy 
provides otherwise for the policy limits.    
 
11.5  Implying settlement clauses 
The rationale of the settlement clauses is accepted to be to meet the goal of maximising 
coverage, reducing relitigation by simplifying the reimbursement process and preventing a 
reinsurer from continually challenging the propriety of a reinsured’s settlement 
decisions
597. The latter consideration in particular has led the courts to consider implying 
the follow the fortunes clause into all reinsurance contracts where the wording itself is 
silent.  
 
It is accepted by some of the decisions that it is commonly understood that reinsurers must 
“follow the fortunes” of their insured; therefore, even if this is not expressed in the 
reinsurance agreement, the doctrine nevertheless is applicable
598. In National American v. 
Certain Underwriters
599 the Ninth Circuit stated that the necessity for reinsured to 
establish the loss in the same way as must the assured in order to recover upon the original 
policy, derives from the common law but not statute and under circumstances as such the 
rule that “custom or usage cannot overcome rule of law” applied with less force. The court 
commented that cases such as Royal v. Caledonian
600 suggest only that the reinsurer does 
not have to follow the settlement in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, but they 
do not preclude evidence of custom or usage to the contrary. The court held, however, that 
the existence of custom or usage is a factual question, so that trial was necessary on this 
issue.  
 
                                                 
595 That is true that in Penn Re v Aetna Not Reported in F Supp, WL 909519 EDNC, 1987 the reinsurer 
was held liable beyond the policy limit but the ratio of the case did not base on the follow the fortunes 
doctrine but a particular clause that the court relied on.  
596 4 F 3d 1049 CA2 (NY), 1993. 
597 Travelers v. Constitution; Carlson Holdings Inc. v. NAFCO Ins. Co. 205 F Supp 2d 1069 DMinn, 2001 
(applying Minnesota law). 
598 ISLIC; Aetna v. Home Ins. 882 F Supp 1328, SDNY, 1995; American v. Swiss. 
599 93 F 3d 529 CA9 (Cal), 1996. 
600 182 Cal 219, 1920.   155
A similar interpretation to that of North River v CIGNA can be seen in ReliaStar v. IOA
601 
in terms of implication of a settlement clause. In ReliaStar it was held that the contracts, 
which did not contain “anti-follow-the-fortunes” provisions, should not be interpreted as 
preventing the implication of the customary follow-the-fortunes clause into the 
retrocession. The reinsurance contract between Canada Life and ReliaStar referred to the 
ETFS Travel Health Medical Reinsurance Agreement, which required strict proof of 
coverage for the claim reinsured. The retrocession placement slips stated: “Conditions: 
See attached ETFS Travel Health Medical Reinsurance Agreement”. The Eighth Circuit 
rejected the retrocessionaire’s contention that the slip incorporated the terms of the 
reinsurance contract, including the clause requiring strict proof of liability, and held that 
the plain purpose of these slips was to identify the parties to the retrocession agreement, 
the period of coverage, and the coverage that the retrocessionaire was to provide, among 
other details, but not to incorporate a set of specific procedures agreed to between Canada 
Life and ReliaStar in a separate agreement to which neither of the retrocessionaires were a 
party. The loss settlement procedures of the underlying insurance policy did not form part 
of the operative terms of the retrocessional contracts at issue.   
 
It has been argued that decisions such as those in National American, ISLIC and Aetna 
come into play where the reinsurance contract does not require the reinsured to seek the 
reinsurer’s approval in settling the claim and the claim is not excluded by the terms of the 
reinsurance contract
602. However, the majority opinion of the courts suggests that the 
parties to a reinsurance contract are sophisticated enough to write their own policy 
wordings to protect their respective interests by negotiation of the terms of the reinsurance 
agreement
603. Imposing liability on the reinsurer for a settlement contribution absent such 
an agreement would be to write a new contract for the parties
604. In Employer Reins. Corp. 
v. Laurier Indemnity Co.
605 the reinsured argued that the contract’s silence as to follow the 
fortunes created an ambiguity; therefore the Court should allow custom to imply the 
clause into the reinsurance contract. Accepting that there were certainly benefits and 
numerous public policy considerations supporting enforcement of the “follow the 
fortunes” doctrine in the world of reinsurance, the Court nevertheless rejected the 
                                                 
601 303 F 3d 874 CA8 (Minn), 2002 (applying Minnesota law). 
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reinsured’s argument, for the reason that the parties were both sophisticated entities 
dealing at arm’s length, and familiar with drafting contracts who could agree on a follow 
the fortunes clause at the outset. The same view was adopted in American Motorists Ins. 
Co. v. American Reins. Co.
606 where, relying on Pacific Mutual, the reinsured argued that 
even though the reinsurance agreement did not provide express follow the settlements 
provision, the other language in the policy was sufficient to constitute an agreement to 
follow the settlements
607. However the judge found that the clause in Pacific Mutual that 
read “The ‘Pacific Mutual’ alone shall settle all claims and such settlements shall be 
binding on the ‘Reinsurance Company’ in proportion to its participation, whether the 
settlement be in full or in compromise” was itself an express “follow the settlements” 
provision. The judge also stated that the reinsured did not present any evidence of “custom 
and practice” as to the implication of the clause in the reinsurance industry. It was also 
stated that if the “follow the settlements” doctrine was so widely accepted as an inherent 
part of every reinsurance contract that the doctrine may be read into every certificate as a 
matter of law, there would be no need to include such clauses in reinsurance contracts to 
hold otherwise would be to write a new contract for the parties, which the court had no 
right to do
608. 
 
As for other issues regarding the doctrine, while a State court may refer to other 
jurisdictions, the implication of the doctrine was said to vary depending on which State’s 
laws apply to the contract dispute. In North River Ins. Co. v. Employers Reinsurance 
Corp.
609 where the issue was to be resolved under New Jersey law, the court noted that 
ISLIC and Aetna, the precedents that the reinsured relied on, did not require the 
application of New Jersey laws of contract interpretation.  
 
11.6  Post-settlement Allocations 
Allocation relates to whether and in what manner the reinsurance contract covers a claim 
by a reinsured
610. Allocation of loss is particularly important when long-tail toxic and 
environmental claims are in question. When reinsurance comes into play in such claims, 
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inevitably complications arise as to allocating the loss among reinsurance policies. 
Reinsureds may settle insured and uninsured claims in a global settlement agreement or 
there may be more than one reinsurer who has reinsured long-tail risks and which losses 
will fall upon which reinsurers makes the problem more complicated. 
 
It may be seen that in the US reinsureds sometimes use different loss allocation methods 
in settling the claim with the assured and making claim against their reinsurers. The 
standard that the courts look for is whether the allocation is grossly negligent, recklessly 
done or if the reinsured has acted fraudulently
611. If the answer is negative, the reinsurer is 
unlikely to be able to question the allocation.  
 
11.6.1  Inconsistency between pre-settlement and post-settlement allocations  
In order to serve the goals of the follow the settlements doctrine, which are to encourage 
maximum coverage and settlement and to prevent courts from undermining the foundation 
of the reinsured-reinsurer relationship, as long as the allocation meets the typical follow 
the settlements requirements reinsurers have been held to be obliged to follow the 
reinsured’s post-settlement allocation even though there was an inconsistency between the 
pre-settlement and post-settlement allocations. In North River v. ACE
612 the insurer’s 
policies covered portions of the second, third, fourth, and fifth excess layers of assured’s 
coverage. With the exception of $125,000 of coverage in the third excess layer of the 
1978-1980 policies, ACE reinsured only portions of the second excess layer policies. 
After its products liability coverage was exhausted, the assured settled the claim with the 
insurer, releasing the insurer from liability under all of its policies with the assured for not 
only asbestos-related claims but also for any future, non-asbestos-related claims. North 
River allocated 99% of the costs of the settlement to non-product asbestos claims among 
its reinsurers using the “rising bathtub”
613 approach, consistent with its view of the 
policies and the Wellington Agreement. ACE disputed the settlement allocation because 
North River’s pre-settlement analysis of possible litigation outcomes identified risk of loss 
                                                 
611 American v Northwestern 198 F 3d 1332 CA11 (Fla), 1999.  
612 361 F 3d 134 CA2 (NY), 2004. 
613 The Second Circuit defined the rising bathtub allocation method “is a phrase used to describe a provision 
of the Wellington Agreement that deals with how asbestos bodily injury losses would be allocated to 
insurers. That provision calls for asbestos payments to be allocated on the basis of horizontal exhaustion, 
which means losses are allocated to the lowest layer of coverage first and, like a bathtub, fill from the 
bottom layer up. Under that approach, a given layer of coverage is not implicated until the layer beneath it is 
completely exhausted”.    158
in higher layers but North River assigned its entire settlement to ACE’s layer of 
reinsurance (the second layer). 
 
There were number of reasons that the court found that the reinsurers were obliged to 
follow the reinsured’s settlements: In addition to stressing the need to achieve the goals of 
the follow the settlements doctrine, the Second Circuit was of the view that requiring post-
settlement allocation to match pre-settlement analyses would permit a reinsurer, and 
require the courts, to scrutinise the specific factual information regarding settlement 
negotiations. This would undermine the certainty that the general application of the 
doctrine to settlement decisions created. Furthermore, the court noted that applying the 
follow-the-settlements doctrine to post-settlement allocation decisions did not leave a 
reinsurer without protection. Reinsureds must make good-faith allocations, and reinsurers 
also could not be held accountable for any loss not covered by the reinsurance policy.  
 
In Travelers v Gerling Global
614, the reinsurer’s position was found to be even weaker 
than that of ACE outlined above. In this case the assured and the reinsured put forward 
conflicting theories as to the number of occurrences represented by thousands of asbestos 
claims arising from hundreds of sites over nearly thirty years of policies. At the arbitration 
stage the issue as to the number of occurrences was not resolved, and OCF and Travelers 
settled even though they “explicitly disclaimed any particular theory of coverage” and 
they never reached agreement as to whether the claims arose from a single occurrence or 
multiple occurrences. Travelers later allocated the settlements amount evenly among 
policy years (the “rising bathtub” methodology); because each year’s primary policy had a 
$1 million per occurrence limit, the primary policies were quickly exhausted. The 
remaining amount was then spread among the excess policies, including those issued by 
Gerling. Gerling’s contention was that the allocation should have been on the basis of 
separate occurrences at each site with the result that the loss would not have penetrated the 
excess
615.  
 
                                                 
614 419 F 3d 181 CA2 (Conn), 2005. 
615 Travellers insured OCF for bodily injury and property damage through a series of annual primary 
policies. For products coverage policies had a $1 million “aggregate” limit of liability, thus, if claims arising 
from multiple occurrences triggered products coverage, the most that Travellers had to pay under any single 
policy was $1 million. Once the aggregate limit was reached, the policy was exhausted, regardless of any 
additional occurrences. However if claims arising from multiple occurrences triggered non-products 
coverage, each occurrence was subject to a $1 million limit on liability there was no cap on total liability.     159
The court distinguished Gerling’s position from that of ACE’s against North River where 
the reinsured had clearly considered an alternative allocation position, as evidenced by its 
documents. The court therefore did not hesitate to apply the rule in North River v ACE that 
the follow the fortunes doctrine applies to the post-settlement allocation as long as the 
allocation met the typical follow the fortunes requirements, ie, is in good faith, reasonable, 
and the loss falling within the applicable policies
616.  
 
However the application of the follow the fortunes said rationale of maximising the 
coverage is not limitless. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. American Home Assur. Co.
617 the 
reinsured’s post-settlement allocation was contrary to the District Court judgment which 
ruled that there were seven occurrences at the site. The parties therefore settled the claims 
on the basis of multiple occurrences at each site but after the settlement, the lead counsel 
of the reinsured prepared an allocation which treated each site as one occurrence. The 
reinsurers audited the reinsured’s handling of the claims and litigation and discovered that 
no single occurrence at these sites would have exceeded the $1 million retention
618. Thus, 
the reinsurance obligations would not have been triggered, and the reinsurers sought 
negative declaratory relief. The court found that the reinsured applied the occurrence 
deductible at the assured’s level to minimise the amount of the reinsured’s exposure and 
loss, whereas at the reinsurance level, in the same loss setting, the occurrence deductible 
was used as sparingly as possible to maximise the reinsured’s recovery against the 
reinsurer; the court defined such an allocation as neither reasonable nor reflective of good 
faith but disingenuous. Moreover, the follow the fortunes doctrine was not intended to 
allow an insurer to use a different set of rules at each level. The court defined the 
reinsured’s allegation as a manifest manipulation in total disregard of its obligation to act 
in good faith. The court confirmed the rule that despite an inconsistency between pre/post 
settlement allocations the reinsurer is obliged to follow the settlements as long as the 
allocation meets the typical follow the settlements requirements but here the settlement 
was found unreasonable because the one-occurrence-per-site allocation of the Windsor 
                                                 
616 Travelers v Gerling Global was applied in National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. American 
Re-Ins. Co. 441 F Supp 2d 646 SDNY, 2006 to provide the certainty that the general application of the 
doctrine to settlement decisions creates. 
617 837 NYS 2d 138 NYAD 1 Dept, 2007. 
618 American Home issued commercial property insurance policies to United Technologies Corporation 
(UTC) where the deductible was $200,000 for “any one occurrence”. 22% of the $5 million excess of $1 
million layer was reinsured under the 1975 policy. When the 1975 certificate expired, 25% of the $5 million 
excess of $1 million was reinsured.   160
Locks site directly contradicted the District Court ruling as to the number of occurrences 
at that site.   
 
11.6.2  Distinguishing Settlement From Allocation 
 It may also be seen that the US courts have not  accepted any distinction between a 
reinsured’s settlement from its post-settlement allocation and have held that allocation is 
binding so long as the settlement has been made in good faith. In Commercial Union v 
Seven Provinces
619 the reinsured (CU) settled a multi-site environmental liability coverage 
action for a lump sum payment of $2.2 million, and the assured thereby released CU from 
all future liability for any environmental claims. CU allocated the settlement payment 
among all the sites at which it faced liability, each site being treated as a separate loss for 
reinsurance purpose so that there was a per-site reinsurance retention. The result of the 
allocation was that CU’s settlement payment on account of a semiconductor site was the 
only site-specific payment to exceed the retention under the reinsurance contracts. The 
reinsurance policy contained a “follow the settlements clause”; the reinsurers challenged 
the reinsured’s good faith in the “allocation” rather than in the “settlement”. The court 
found this to be “a distinction without a difference” because there it could see no 
difference between determining which of several policies covered which particular loss 
among many and the more general decision that the losses were covered by the policies. 
The court put emphasis on the complex nature of environmental claims, which necessarily 
involved a number of sites and a range of years over which the exposure could have 
occurred. Forcing a reinsured into litigation over its good faith judgment as to which 
policies covered which losses would make it impossible for the reinsured to come to any 
settlement of such complex claims. According to the court, when several reinsurers are 
involved, there would be a risk of successive litigation, in which each reinsurer offered an 
alternative allocation model designed to minimise its own liability. Challenging either a 
settlement or an allocation would have the same effects, those of undermining the 
settlement and of fostering litigation.  
 
This reasoning has been criticised as exaggerated,
620 for the reason that in fact only a few 
cases involving follow the settlement clauses give rise to allocation disputes, and the court 
                                                 
619 9 F Supp 2d 49 D Mass, 1998 aff’d 217 F 3d 33 CA 1 (Mass), 2000.  
620 Graydon S Staring “Following Settlements And Following Allocations”, Lexis Nexis Mealey’s Litigation 
Report: Reinsurance, Vol.15, #15 December 2, 2004, 27.    161
failed to explain why all the reinsurers affected should not be parties in the allocation 
dispute in order not to increase the number of reinsurance disputes.  
 
Nevertheless, the reinsured’s post-settlement allocation was distinguished from the 
settlement in Argonaut v. Travelers
621 where Witco and Travelers settled a claim for 
environmental pollution covering approximately 140 separate sites located throughout the 
US. The settlement released Travelers from all liability under the Primary and Excess 
Policies. In making the claim against the reinsurers, Travelers allocated the settlement 
amount on the basis that the environmental pollution claims constituted a “single 
occurrence.” Upon refusal by the reinsurer to accept that allocation, the court held that the 
damages which arose from environmental pollution at Witco’s approximately 140 sites 
throughout the US could not properly be aggregated into one occurrence because the 
damage arising at each site resulted from exposure to the particular conditions existing at 
that site, and not from some “general conditions” that were “substantially the same” at all 
of the different sites. Travelers’ goal in negotiating the Settlement Agreement was 
concededly to obtain a “global” settlement, which released it from liability in connection 
with environmental claims relating to all Witco sites. The court noted that here, the 
reinsurers were contesting Travelers’ allocation of the Witco settlement on a single rather 
than multiple-occurrence basis, and not challenging the settlement
622.  
 
The decision was not greeted with sympathy. It has been argued that the court 
substantially departed from the way in which the other courts analysed the application of 
follow the settlements to post-settlement allocations
623. Instead, the court should have 
looked only at the question whether the settlement was in good faith; the factual inquiry 
that the court did in-depth was described as “de novo” review of the reinsured’s decision 
in settling the assured’s claim which was in fact the follow the fortunes doctrine aimed to 
prevent
624. The commentator noted, however, that if the court had analysed if the 
                                                 
621 2005 WL 66778 (NY Sup), 2005 Unreported Disposition. 
622 In Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (96 NY 2d 583, 2001) the 
court recognised the same distinction and held that the American Bankers and ISLIC cases are inapposite 
because while these cases deal with challenges the reinsureds’ decision to settle claims, in this case the 
reinsurers are not contesting Travelers’ settlement but the challenge is to Travelers’ allocation of those 
settlements. 
623 Rubenstein, A M “ ‘Follow the Settlements’ And Allocation: A Review of Recent Developments” 
Mealey’s Litigation Report: Reinsurance, November 5, 2007, Vol 18 #13, 29. 
624 Rubenstein, 29.   162
allocation was made in good faith, rather than analysing the facts in depth, the same result 
would probably have followed
625. 
 
11.6.3  Allocation that alters the definition of insured peril 
In Travelers v. Certain Underwriters
626 Travelers settled two separate pollution coverage 
disputes with two different assureds
627. The activities of the two assureds at numerous 
sites in the US resulted in a series of separate claims against them, and in settling those 
claims under its excess policies Travelers treated the losses at each site as separate 
occurrences. However, in making a claim against the reinsurer, Travelers calculated the 
settled amount by treating the environmental contamination at the various sites as having a 
“common origin” or “traceable to the same act, omission, error and/or mistake” and 
combined all of the sites for each assured into one occurrence per assured. The treatment 
of each site as a separate “disaster and/or casualty” would not penetrate any of the 
retention levels imposed by the reinsurance treaties. The court held that, while a follow the 
fortunes clause in most reinsurance agreements left reinsurers little room to dispute the 
reinsured’s conduct of the case, such a clause did not alter the terms or override the 
language of reinsurance policies. To hold that the follow the fortunes clause supplanted 
the definition of “disaster and/or casualty” in the reinsurance treaties, and thereby allowed 
Travelers to recover under its single allocation theory, would effectively have negated that 
phrase
628. The practical result of that argument would have been that a reinsurance 
contract governed by New York law and which contained a “follow the fortunes” clause 
would bind a reinsurer to indemnify a reinsured whenever it paid a claim, regardless of the 
contractual language defining the insured peril or the loss.   
 
                                                 
625 Rubenstein, 30. 
626 96 NY2d 583, 2001. This case was said to have proved that old saying that “hard cases make bad law”. P 
Jay Wilker, “Travellers v Lloyd’s – Has New York’s Highest Court Made It Harder For Cedents To Settle 
With Their Insureds?”, Mealeys’s Litigation Report: Reinsurance, Vol.12, #13, November 1.2001, 26. 
627 Travellers settled several coverage disputes for environmental injury claims involving decades of 
commercial activities at numerous and industrial and waste disposal sites with its insureds DuPont (25 
separate environmental sites) and Koppers (160 separate sites). 
628 Travellers applied in Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. Ace American Reinsurance Co. 2005 WL 3663930 
Conn Super (the law of Connecticut and New York are the same with regard to the issues involved in this 
motion therefore the court did not decide which of these law particularly applicable to the contract) where 
the reinsurance treaty had an independent definition of occurrence and the court did not apply follow the 
fortunes doctrine to negate the reinsurance policy defence. The case was appealed but the follow the fortunes 
was not disputed on appeal: 284 Conn 744, 2007.   163
11.6.4  Annualisation  
In American v. Swiss
629 the original policies were multi-year but the reinsurance 
agreements were annual. After mediating on ten sites, the reinsured and the assured settled 
a claim with respect to additional twenty seven sites on which the reinsured had no 
information. There was no indication that the settlement agreement was based on 
“annualisation” but when making the claim against the reinsurer, the reinsured calculated 
the claim on an annualised basis. The reinsurer argued that they would be less liable if the 
allocation was done “site-by-site … once per-policy basis”. The reinsured contended that 
there were authorities to the effect that reinsurers were bound by the post-settlement 
allocation of the reinsured regardless of what the settlement embodied. However the First 
Circuit noted that it was not prepared to adopt such a rule. The District Court found no 
basis for the annualisation and moreover found that the reinsured acted in bad faith in 
settling the claim for the twenty-seven sites in respect of which the reinsured had no 
information, bad faith which relieved the reinsurer to follow the fortunes of the reinsured. 
However the First Circuit did not find that the reinsured acted in bad faith, vacated the 
judgment, remitted the decision for a follow the fortunes analysis and noted that reinsurers 
were free to challenge the reasonableness and good faith of reinsurer’s decision to settle. 
 
11.6.5  Comment  
It is in fact hard to distinguish an allocation from a settlement. It has been argued that the 
parties to a reinsurance agreement are sophisticated enough to look after their 
own business relationship; therefore adopting the rationale that the follow the fortunes 
doctrine aims “to nurture the relationship” between reinsureds and reinsurers, the notion 
that it is permissible “to maximise reinsureds’ coverage” is inappropriate
630. This view 
is plainly supportable. In practice an allocation cannot easily be separated from the 
underlying settlement, and if no objection can be taken to the settlement then it is difficult 
to object to the allocation. If the settlement is in good faith, then in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, the allocation is also to be assumed to have been made in good 
faith. Challenging the allocation would involve challenging the settlement itself, requiring 
a de novo review of the type which is intended to be precluded by follow the settlement 
clauses. The North River v ACE decision does not, therefore, seem supportable.  
                                                 
629 413 F 3d 129 CA1 (Mass), 2005. Either New York or Massachusetts law would be applicable to construe 
the reinsurance contracts. As the application of either Massachusetts or New York law yielded the same 
result, the court found unnecessary to make a formal choice of law decision. 
630 Grais D J, “Follow-The-Settlements And Its Rationale In American Law”, Mealey’s Litigation Report: 
Reinsurance, October 5, 2007, Vol 18, #11, 13.   164
 
In  Affiliated F.M. Ins. Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Co.
 631 the main issue was whether 
the loss was within the reinsurance policy cover. In Affiliated the reinsured claimed 
expenses in addition to the settled amount. If the allocation was in good faith, it could be 
argued that the reinsurers were obliged to indemnify the reinsured; in fact what the 
reinsured argued was that under the doctrine of follow the settlements, so long as it 
entered into the settlement in good faith, even if it was not permitted to claim defence 
costs, it could be reimbursed for payments made to extinguish future liability for defence 
costs. However, emphasising the fact that  the follow the settlements doctrine cannot 
impose liability on the reinsurer where none otherwise existed, and also the fact that the 
Reinsurance Certificate explicitly excluded defence costs from the definition of “loss”, the 
court held that the proper allocation remained a question of fact, thereby precluding 
summary judgment. 
 
It should be noted that where the settlement is silent as to allocation, and if the reinsurers 
reserve their rights for judicial determination when making payment, the reinsurers may 
be able to challenge the allocation. In Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Newcap Ins. Co., 
Ltd.
 632 the assured, Providence hospital, obtained both primary and excess insurance 
coverage; the claimant New Cap provided excess liability coverage to the hospital through 
an umbrella liability policy for its primary commercial liability insurance (CGL) and 
Hospital Professional Liability (HPL) coverage. The reinsurers, ERC, reinsured the New 
Cap policies one hundred percent. Following a claim by a patient, the hospital entered into 
a settlement for $7,600,000. Providence’s insurance companies entered into an Interim 
Funding Agreement to fund the settlement, under which ERC contributed $6,600,000; the 
insurance company providing Providence’s primary coverage contributed $1,000,000. The 
underlying dispute arose between ERC and New Cap because the settlement agreement 
was silent on the question of allocation, ie whether the CGL or the HPL provided 
coverage: this was significant given that the primary policies afforded different limits and 
if the claim fell in HPL policy the loss would fall within $10 million primary coverage 
limit
633. Consequently, the excess umbrella policy for which ERC provided reinsurance 
would not attach. The reinsured argued that the claim fell within CLG policy and that New 
                                                 
631 369 F Supp 2d 217 DRI, 2005. 
632 209 F Supp 2d 1184 DKan, 2002 (applying Kansas law). 
633 The primary policies afforded limits of $10 million for HPL coverage and either $1 million or $5 million 
for CGL coverage (there was a disagreement as to the applicable limits).   165
Cap was obliged to follow its settlement because it was a good faith and reasonable 
settlement and the doctrine extended to decisions of how to allocate a settlement between 
different policies. The reinsurers were held not to be obliged to follow the reinsured’s 
settlements, for the reason that the settlement was silent as to the policy within which the 
claim fell and the reinsurers had expressly reserved their rights to challenge the allocation.  
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CHAPTER 12  CLAIM PROCEDURE CLAUSES  
 
12.1  Late Notice 
12.1.1  When a notification duty arises - Reasonableness 
Clauses in reinsurance contracts requiring “prompt notice”, notice “as soon as practicable” 
or “immediate notice” of claims by reinsureds are generally construed to require notice 
within a reasonable time after the duty to give notice has arisen
634. The test to determine 
when the reinsured’s duty to provide such notice commences is an objective test of 
reasonableness
635. A mere speculation, rumour, or a remote contingency far removed from 
particular policy in question is not enough to trigger the objective reasonableness 
standard
636. However, by investigating potential claims with due diligence, when a 
prudent reinsured would believe that its policy may be involved, the notice obligation 
arises
637. Where a reinsurance policy requires notice when it “appears likely” that claim 
will or “may” involve the policy, this does not require a probability that the policy at issue 
will be involved but a “reasonable possibility” of such a happening based on objective 
assessment of information available will be required
638. For example in Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co v Gibbs
639 “losses which ‘may’ give rise to a claim” was held to require 
showing “a reasonable possibility” and not a reasonable likelihood. In this case Liberty 
issued a general liability policy to Boston Edison and Lloyd’s reinsured 80% of all 
payments Liberty became obliged to make in excess of $250,000. Boston Edison was sued 
for personal injury loss but its attorney, who took over the defence, did not notify the 
reinsurer until after the jury returned a verdict for the claimants. The First Circuit decided 
that the controlling date that the reinsured should have given notice was not the date of 
jury’s verdict; Liberty’s duty to notify the reinsurer arose soon after it started defending 
the claim.  
 
                                                 
634 Christiania General Ins. Corp. of New York v. Great American Ins. Co. 979 F 2d 268 CA2 (NY), 1992; 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co. 735 F Supp 492 SDNY, 1990.  
635 Zenith Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau 141 F 3d 300 CA 7 (Wis), 1998, (applying Wisconsin law); 
Centaur Insurance Company v Safety National Casualty Corporation 1993 WL 434056 (ND Ill).
   
636 Christiania v Great American 979 F 2d 268 CA 2 (NY), 1992.  
637 Christiania v Great American 979 F 2d 268 CA 2 (NY), 1992. 
638 Christiania v Great American. 
639 773 F 2d 15 CA1 (Mass), 1985 (applying Massachusetts law).   167
Liberty Mutual v Gibbs was applied in Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. 
Associated Intern. Ins. Co.
640 the clause “notify [Associated] promptly of any occurrence 
which in [ICP]’s estimate of the value of injuries or damages sought, without regard to 
liability, might result in judgment in an amount sufficient to involve this certificate of 
reinsurance”, was found to be analogous to the notice clause in Liberty v Gibbs and it was 
held that the occurrence that presented “reasonable possibility” of resulting in a claim 
under the reinsurance policy should have been notified
641.  
 
12.1.2  The Nature of Notification Clauses 
12.1.2.1  Conditions Precedent  
The remedy for a breach of claims notification provision depends on the nature of the 
clause. As will be seen in the following paragraphs, in some States, if the clause is a 
condition precedent, the reinsurers are discharged from liability without any requirement 
of proof of any prejudice resulting from the breach. However, if the clause is not a 
condition precedent, proof of prejudice would be necessary. It should nevertheless be 
noted that this is not a generally accepted rule and some decisions still look for prejudice 
even though the notification clause is classified as a condition precedent.  
 
12.1.2.2  Clauses that do not contain the words “condition precedent” 
Sometimes reinsurance policies clearly state that a claims notification clause is a condition 
precedent
642. However, in some States, using such terminology is not essential to 
determine the nature of claims notification clauses. For example in Fortress Re, Inc. v. 
Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York
643 the reinsurance policy contained a notice provision 
which provided “Prompt notice shall be given to the Reinsurer by the Company of any 
occurrence or accident which appears likely to involve this reinsurance ...”. The Fourth 
Circuit granted summary judgment for the reinsurers, who claimed that they were not 
liable to the reinsured following the breach of the claims notification clause even though 
the clause did not use the words “condition precedent.”  
                                                 
640 922 F 2d 516 CA9 (Cal), 1990 (applying California law).  
641 The court also referred to a Third Circuit case Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania v Lexington 
Insurance Co (815 F 2d 890, 1987) where a clause “the policy required notice whenever the Insured had 
information from which it might ‘reasonably conclude’ that an occurrence was ‘likely to involve’ the policy” 
was interpreted that under Pennsylvania law the insured had the obligation to notify whenever reasonable 
judgment, based on the information available to insured, suggested that the claim was likely to involve 
insurer. 
642 Constitution Reinsurance Corp. v. Stonewall Ins. Co. 980 F Supp 124 SDNY, 1997. 
643 628 F 2d 860, CA4 (NC), 1980 (applying North Carolina law).   168
Similarly, in Keehn v Excess Ins. Co of America
644, it was held that under Illinois law, 
failure of a third party automobile public liability insurer to give notice to the reinsurer of 
any accident in which reinsurance may probably be involved in compliance with 
provisions of reinsurance contract would bar recovery by original insurer upon the 
reinsurance contract, notwithstanding that the contract did not designate provision 
requiring notice as a condition precedent or contain a declaration of forfeiture for 
noncompliance
645. 
 
In Travelers v. Buffalo
646 the District Court judge put emphasis on the effect of the 
reinsurers’ contractual right to associate
647. Prompt notice was construed to be designed to 
afford an insurance company the opportunity to participate in the defence of a claim on 
which it may ultimately be liable. The fact that reinsurers rarely defend the claim in the 
same manner as original insurers does not make it less important for reinsurers. Therefore, 
as in the primary insurance context, notice from the primary insurer to its reinsurer was 
held to be a condition precedent to the reinsurer’s liability. 
 
12.1.2.3  Cases that put emphasis on the terminology 
In order to construe a clause as a condition precedent, a clear and unambiguous expression 
by the parties that they show their intention to make the clause condition precedent is 
required
648. For example in National American Ins. Co. of California v Certain 
Underwriters At Lloyd’s London
649 the clause “The Company upon knowledge of any 
occurrence likely to give rise to a claim hereunder shall give immediate written advice 
thereof to the person(s) or firm named for the purpose in the schedule” was held not to 
have such a clear expression. The omission of words “condition precedent” was also found 
significant in Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century Cas. Co.
650. However, not only the 
terminology but also the nature of reinsurance and the particular wording of the whole 
policy, were also taken into consideration in the decision. The court found it important 
that the arbitration clause in the contract was expressly stated to be a condition precedent 
whereas such wording was omitted in the claims notification clause. Such an omission in 
                                                 
644 129 F 2d 503 CA7 1942.  
645 See also Highlands Ins. Co. v. Employers’ Surplus Lines Ins. Co. 497 F Supp 169 DC La, 1980. 
646 735 F Supp 492 SDNY, 1990. 
647 A “right to associate” clause gives right the reinsurer to co-operate with the reinsured in settling the 
assured’s claim. See below Heading no 12.3. 
648 Pennsylvania v. Associated 922 F 2d 516 CA 9 (Cal), 1990.  
649 93 F 3d 529 CA9 (Cal), 1996.  
650 531 F 2d 974 CA Colo 1976.   169
the notification clause was held to be an indication that the parties did not intend to make 
the clause a condition precedent. The court also took into consideration that Colorado law 
did not favour construing ambiguous terms as conditions precedent and also any 
ambiguity in a reinsurance contract was to be resolved against the reinsurer unless the 
contract was worded by the original insurer. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
clause was a covenant but not a condition precedent
651. 
  
In Security it was emphasised that in reinsurance contracts, investigating the loss and 
defence of the claim is usually left to the reinsureds. The participation of the reinsurer in 
defending the assured’s claim was not as essential as it is for primary insurers. The court 
found that the reinsured and reinsurer had the same concerns and benefits and loss from 
the claim, and that the reinsured had as much reason as the reinsurer to see that the claim 
was properly investigated and defended; therefore there was little danger of fraud or 
imposition between the reinsured and the reinsurer. If the reinsurers had proved any loss 
by the failure of the reinsured to notify a claim, then damages would have been an 
adequate remedy.  
 
12.1.3  Prejudice 
The classification of a claims notification clause is important because most courts find that 
if the clause is a condition precedent, the reinsurer does not need to prove prejudice in 
order to be relieved from liability where the reinsured did not comply with the notification 
clause. However the determinative point is not if the clause is a condition precedent; much 
depends on the peculiar wording of the clause and the context of the reinsurance policy 
wording as a whole.  
 
12.1.3.1  Cases not requiring proof of prejudice  
It is usually the case that where the claims notification is worded as a condition precedent 
or where the court interpreted the clause in that way because of the importance of the 
provision, breach of such a clause would be a bar to recovery from reinsurers and 
prejudice would be irrelevant. In Constitution v. Stonewall
652 the clause was expressly 
stated to be a condition precedent. The assured sued the reinsured after the latter denied 
coverage but then the reinsured paid $3.25 million in exchange for the assured dropping 
                                                 
651 According to the Tenth Circuit holding the clause as a covenant rather than a condition would prevent 
forfeiture. 
652 980 F Supp 124 SDNY, 1997.   170
its suit. The reinsured became aware of the potential claim under the policy as of 6 June 
1990 but did not notify the reinsurer until 20 November 1992. The court held that the 
notice was not promptly given and the condition operated as a complete bar against 
Stonewall’s recovering under the reinsurance policy without proving prejudice.  
 
The same rule was applied in Liberty Mutual v Gibbs where the court put emphasis on the 
fact that even though Liberty was an experienced underwriter, it did not notify Lloyd’s of 
the accident until several weeks after the jury had returned a verdict
653. 
 
In Travelers v. Buffalo
654 the notification clause was not expressly stated to be a condition 
precedent. It was pointed out that the New York rule treats notification clauses as so 
fundamental that it requires no proof of prejudice in breach of such provisions because 
such clauses aim to make insurers adequately investigate the underlying facts of a claim 
while witnesses and facts remain available, for the purpose of defending the insured and 
maintaining accurate reserve funds. If deprived of this opportunity, the insurer may not be 
able to investigate the claim adequately and this may lead to fraud
655.  
 
12.1.3.2  Cases requiring proof of prejudice 
By contrast, in other cases it has been accepted that if the reinsurer suffers no prejudice 
from an unexcused delay in notice, the purpose of the notice clause has not been frustrated 
and there is no reason to relieve the reinsurer of its contractual obligation
656. In Life and 
Health Ins. Co. of America v. Federal Ins. Co.
657 insured was required to notify the 
reinsurers “as soon as practicably possible” in the event that a suit was initiated against the 
reinsured for which the reinsurers could ultimately be liable under the terms of the 
insurance policy. The district court judge applied the settled rule in the insurance context 
in Pennsylvania to the reinsurance case before him, that an insurer cannot refuse to pay on 
an otherwise valid claim solely because the insured’s notice was out of time, or because 
the insured breached a notice provision of the insurance contract. The reinsurers bear the 
burden of showing that the notice was late, and that they were unduly prejudiced by the 
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lateness. The position is the same in California law: for example, in Pennsylvania v. 
Associated
658 the Ninth Circuit confirmed that the purpose of the notice clause is to 
“protect the insurance company from being placed in a substantially less favourable 
position than it would have been if timely notice had been provided”. Because primary 
insurers will usually provide a proper defence, the likelihood of prejudice from late notice 
is more remote. Likewise, in National American v Certain Underwriters
659 the Ninth 
Circuit looked for substantial prejudice. Similarly, New York law states that in the 
absence of an express provision in the reinsurance contract making prompt notice a 
condition precedent to reinsurer’s obligations under the contract, the reinsurer will not be 
relieved of its indemnification obligations because of the reinsured’s failure to provide 
timely notice, unless it can show prejudice resulting from delay
660.  
 
In North Carolina prejudice is required even though the clause is a condition precedent. 
Fortress Re, Inc. v. Central Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha
 661 traces the development of the law 
in North Carolina. The Fourth Circuit stated that claims notification clauses had long been 
regarded as conditions precedent where prejudice was irrelevant and the bar on recovery 
was absolute. However, referring to Great American Insurance Co v C.G. Tate 
Construction Co. (Tate I)
662 where it was held that the failure to give timely notice to the 
insurer did not relieve the insurer of its obligations unless the delay materially prejudiced 
the insurer’s ability to investigate and defend, the court stated that the rule in North 
Carolina has changed in a way that the designation “condition precedent” no longer has 
this effect and that reinsurers have to prove either: (a) that they have suffered prejudice; or 
(b) that the reinsured acted in bad faith in failing to comply with the clause. The Fourth 
Circuit applied Tate I even though it was an insurance case. By defining reinsurance as an 
insurance contract where one having an insurance company as a policyholder the court 
stated that it could see no reason why a different rule should be applied to reinsurance 
contracts. The Fourth Circuit also noted that in Tate I the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina overruled the two state cases on which Fortress v. Jefferson
663 had been based 
                                                 
658 922 F 2d 516 CA 9 (Cal), 1990. 
659 93 F 3d 529 CA9 (Cal), 1996. 
660Christiania v. Great American 979 F 2d 268 CA 2 (NY), 1992; Unigard v. North River 4 F 3d 1049 CA2 
(NY), 1993. 
4 F 3d 1049 CA2 (NY), 1993; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Central Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha 733 F Supp 522 D Conn, 
1990 (applying Connecticut law); Zenith v. Wausau 141 F 3d 300 CA 7 (Wis), 1998.  
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662 303 NC 387, 1981. 
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and refused to follow Fortress, where the Fourth Circuit decided that the notification 
clause was a condition precedent even though the clause did not use the words “conditions 
precedent” and the reinsurers were held not liable without requiring proof of any 
prejudice. 
 
In British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Safety Nat. Cas.
664 the Third Circuit was of the opinion 
that even if it is assumed that a reinsurer’s right to associate can be impaired by a late 
notice from the reinsured, that risk of impairment is not sufficiently serious to justify the 
prediction that the New Jersey Supreme Court would abandon the prejudice rule.  
 
12.1.3.3  Proof of Prejudice  
Proof of prejudice is a question of fact for the jury
665. Prejudice to the reinsurer depends 
upon whether the reinsurer would have been in a more favourable position had it received 
earlier notice
666. It was clarified in Associated Intern. Ins. Co. v. Odyssey Reinsurance 
Corp.
667 that the reinsurer will have to prove that “with timely notice, and notwithstanding 
a denial of coverage or reservation of rights, it would have settled the claim or taken steps 
that would have reduced or eliminated” the reinsured’s liability.  
 
In California it is also accepted that
668 a mere possibility of prejudice will not suffice. 
Being deprived of the opportunity to join and control the underlying claim or being unable 
to take “evasive action” to protect the reinsurer against the loss is not enough to prove 
prejudice. The court accepted that being unable to claim a tax deduction is a prejudice but 
it was necessary to prove what prejudice had actually been caused. Similarly, in 
Unigard
669 the Second Circuit held that loss of contractual right to associate itself is not 
enough to prove prejudice without showing economic loss (tangible economic injury). 
However in Illinois if the reinsurance policy gives the reinsurer right to associate it is 
likely that failure to give notice will deprive the reinsurer of the ability to use its 
contractual right and opportunity to associate with the reinsured in defence of the third 
                                                 
664 335 F 3d 205 CA3 (NJ), 2003 (applying New Jersey law). 
665 Life and Health v. Federal 1993 WL 326404 ED Pa. 
666 Life and Health v. Federal 1993 WL 326404 ED Pa. 
667 Unpublished Disposition, 111 F 3d 137 CA9 (Cal), 1997. 
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party claim against the assured and this deprivation may be held to constitute prejudice 
without any actual proof that the results of the litigation would have been different
670.  
 
12.1.3.4  Presumption of Prejudice  
It used to be the position under California law that, because both parties are experienced 
insurance companies, who bargained at arm’s length, and  the reinsured acquired all of the 
claims information that the reinsurer lacked, it would be just and equitable to place the 
burden of proving compliance with the notice clause upon the reinsured
671. If the reinsured 
was unsuccessful in meeting its burden, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arose
672. 
The reinsured could rebut the presumption by showing lack of prejudice to the 
reinsurer
673.  
 
However, after the decision of National American v. Certain Underwriters
674 California 
law requires proof of actual and substantial prejudice, ie that it was likely that, with timely 
notice, and notwithstanding a denial of coverage or reservation of rights, it would have 
settled the claim for less or taken steps that would have reduced or eliminated the 
insured’s liability.  
 
In Zenith v. Wausau
675 the reinsurance policy required the reinsured to give prompt notice 
to the reinsurer and also gave right the reinsurer the right to associate to defend the 
assured’s claim. Wausau handled matters on its own and did not notify Zenith the 
existence of the claim until after the jury had returned a massive verdict against the 
assured. The Seventh Circuit noted that according to Wis. Stat. § 631.81
676, where late 
notices arrive within a year of the time required by the policy, the claim will not be 
invalidated unless two criteria are met: the insurer was prejudiced by the late notice, and it 
was “reasonably possible” to give timely notice. The statute, however, does not address 
situations where notice is given more than one year after the time in which notice is 
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required by the policy. The Seventh Circuit noted that, where notice is given more than 
one year after time required by policy, there is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice and 
the burden of proof shifts to the assured to prove that the insurer was not prejudiced by the 
late notice
677. Consequently, it was held that Wisconsin law requires some kind of proof of 
prejudice in all cases in which an insurance company receives late notice.  
 
12.1.4  Exception to the prejudice rule: reinsured’s bad faith 
It was ruled that, where a reinsurer cannot prove prejudice but he proved its reinsured’s 
bad faith in failing to comply with the notification clause, the reinsurer would be 
discharged from liability
678. Bad faith is not to be judged by reference to the conduct of a 
reasonable person. In Fortress v Omaha, following Tate I, the test of good faith was stated 
to be a subjective one, namely that “Anyone who knows that he may be at fault or that 
others have claimed he is at fault and who purposefully and knowingly fails to notify 
ought not to recover even if no prejudice results”. In other words, bad faith is to be 
measured by a subjective standard, based upon actual knowledge, and an intentional, ie, 
purposeful and knowing failure to notify by the insured. 
 
Whether or not an insurance company has acted in bad faith is a question of fact
679.  
In Unigard
680 the minimum standard for bad faith was stated to be gross negligence or 
recklessness. The Second Circuit refused to regard simple negligence in not disclosing a 
material fact as bad faith. The court found that if a reinsured deliberately deceives a 
reinsurer, that deception would amount to bad faith. The Second Circuit also clarified 
gross negligence as meaning that if a reinsured had implemented routine practices and 
controls to ensure notification to reinsurers but inadvertence caused a lapse, the reinsured 
has not acted in bad faith; but if a reinsured did not implement such practices and controls, 
then it had wilfully disregarded the risk to reinsurers and was guilty of gross negligence
681.  
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12.1.5  Waiver  
Waiver is defined as “the intentional relinquishment of a known right”
 682. Therefore it is 
necessary to show that the reinsurer possessed sufficient knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the circumstances with regards to the unasserted defence, and also to 
produce direct or indirect evidence that the reinsurer intended to discard it
683. Waiver can 
be express, or it can be implied where it can clearly be inferred from the circumstances
684.  
 
The Ninth Circuit in National American v Certain Underwriters
685 agreed with the district 
court that the reinsurers’ delay constituted a waiver of any late notice defence they may 
have had. In this case, at the time the litigation commenced, the reinsured, National, was 
unaware of the reinsurance policies. However, after making inquiry via its brokers, on 
May 22, 1989, several years after National had undertaken its role in the assured’s 
defence, but several years before any settlement was reached, the brokers sent National 
copies of the certificates representing the two reinsurance policies. Nine days later, 
National sent a letter to the brokers giving them preliminary notice of a possible claim 
against the policies. By then, National had already incurred legal and investigation costs of 
approximately $1.8 million. 
 
Neither the brokers nor the reinsurers responded to the May letter or to subsequent letters. 
On January 9, 1991, National informed the brokers of the terms of the settlement 
agreement but did not receive any response. On January 25, 1991, National sought 
coverage for the reinsurers’ share of the associated costs as well as the liability coverage.  
 
The Ninth Circuit stated that under California law, a reinsurer may invoke the defence of 
late notice so long as it immediately objected to the late notice, and suffered “actual and 
substantial prejudice.” (Cal. Ins. Code § 554). Despite receiving notice of the claim on 
May 31, 1989, the reinsurers did not object to the late notice until after suit was brought in 
July, 1991. While “promptly” is not specifically defined in Cal. Ins. Code § 554 the court 
found that delay more than two years was found not a prompt objection by any definition. 
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An example of a note which was held to have reserved the reinsurers’ right to contest the 
reinsured’s claim unequivocally is seen in Constitution v. Stonewall where the reinsurers 
wrote in their letter that “we question the late nature of your initial notice and subsequent 
report.” In Keehn v. Excess the reinsured argued that the telegram that was sent by the 
reinsurer saying “Sorry but our records do not confirm Snow-Hartliep ever reported; 
please give us complete information.” constituted waiver. The Seventh Circuit noted that 
an insurer must have knowledge of all the material facts before its conduct could 
constitute a waiver; the telegram indicated that the reinsurer had had no notice of the 
Snow accident and was requesting information. Without knowledge of material facts the 
court held that there could not be waiver.  
 
12.2  Access to Records  
Provisions entitling the reinsurer the right to inspect or audit the reinsured’s books and 
records are known as “Access to Records” “Inspection of Records” or simply “Audit”
686. 
An example of a formulation of an access to records clause is “The reinsurer or its 
designated representatives shall have free access to the books and records of the Company 
on matters relating to this reinsurance at all reasonable times for the purpose of obtaining 
information concerning this Contract or the subject matter hereof.”
687. Access to records is 
of importance for reinsurers, especially in determining if the reinsured acted reasonably 
and in good faith in handling and settling the underlying claims
688. On the other hand, a 
reinsurers’ failure to exercise the right of inspection may be interpreted in favour of 
reinsureds. In Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v Safety Mut. Cas. Corp.,
689 such a 
failure by the reinsurers was held to defeat a fraudulent concealment allegation in the 
absence of any indication that the reinsured failed to honour the access to records 
provision. It should also be noted that reinsurers’ request to access to records must be at 
“reasonable times”
690. Nevertheless, it was pointed out that in drafting an access to records 
clause the clause should provide that: there is a aright to inspect all books and documents 
relating to business transferred to the reinsurer; the right of inspection survives contract 
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termination; the inspection right vests in the reinsurer or in any of its authorised 
representatives; and access for inspection will be allowed at all reasonable times
691. 
 
12.3  Right to associate (claims co-operation) clauses 
A “right to associate”, also called “claims co-operation”
692, is the right of the reinsurer “to 
consult with and advise the reinsured in its handling of the claim.”
693. Association is a 
discretionary right
694, not a duty, although there is a corresponding duty on the part of the 
reinsured to make full and prompt disclosure of the information the reinsurer needs in 
order to decide whether to associate.
695  
 
Reinsurers’ biggest concern in using their right to associate in the handling of claim is that 
they may run the risk of being held directly liable to policyholders or third parties
696. For 
instance in Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp
697 an excess of loss reinsurance 
contract provided that it was “subject to” all of the general and special terms and 
conditions of the policies and endorsements reinsured thereunder. The reinsured became 
insolvent and the assured made claim against the reinsurer by relying on a judgment that 
was against the reinsured, the reinsurer having been involved in the defence of the 
assured’s claim. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that being subject to all of the 
general and special terms and conditions of the contract made the reinsurer liable to the 
assured but only to the extent of the coverage limit of the reinsurance policy. Moreover, 
the court found that, because the reinsurer took charge of and managed the defence of the 
assured’s action, that established a privy between the reinsurers and the assured. 
Consequently, even though the court recognised the general rule that there is no privy 
between the assured and the reinsurers, the abovementioned facts made the court 
distinguished this case from the general principle.  
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12.4  Claims control clauses  
 
Another category of claim procedure clauses is “claims control clauses” which make the 
reinsurer by agreement in control of claims handling and disposition
698. It is submitted that 
“claims control clauses” are wider than right to associate clauses because the former give 
the reinsurer control over claims settlements
699.  
 
Clauses requiring reinsurers’ consent for settlement is found in apparent conflict (or at 
least tension) with a follow the settlements clause if the reinsurance contract contains 
one
700. No reinsurance case has in fact turned on this issue, but in the insurance context, in 
Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co.,
701 the insurer was held not to be liable to 
follow the assured’s settlements entered into without the insurer’s consent contrary to a 
policy term whereby the insured agreed not to settle any claim without the insurer’s 
written consent.  
 
12.5  The effect of claims procedure clauses 
12.5.1  Agency relationship between the reinsured and reinsurer 
Agency is described as a “manifestation of consent of one person to another that the other 
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act”. In 
Reid v Ruffin
702, where the court put forward this definition, the reinsured agreed not to 
settle the assured’s claims falling within the reinsurance without the consent of the 
reinsurer, except in those instances where an immediate decision was necessary and it was 
impracticable to obtain the consent of the reinsurer (Article 8). The assured, Ruffin, was 
involved in an accident which caused serious injury to Reid. Reid brought an action 
against Ruffin, but prior to trial offered to settle the case for the policy amount, $10,000, 
an offer to which the reinsured did not respond or inform the reinsurers. Later, the 
reinsured tried to settle but Reid refused. The matter went to trial and the jury awarded 
Reid a verdict of $80,000. The court construed Article 8 as meaning that it did not require 
all decisions regarding settlement matters involving reinsurance to be approved by the 
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reinsurers. The reinsurers were given no control over decisions by the reinsured not to 
settle a claim and, the reinsurers could not direct the reinsured to accept an offer of 
settlement if for some reason the reinsured was unwilling to do so.  
 
The court saw no general agency relationship, and made it clear that Article 8 authorised 
the reinsured to act on behalf of the reinsurer only “in those instances where an immediate 
decision is necessary and it is impracticable to obtain the consent of the Reinsurer.” 
Otherwise, a settlement was not to be made without the reinsurer’s consent. Thus, if the 
reinsured can be said to be the agent of the reinsurers, it is only to the limited situation in 
which an immediate decision to settle was necessary. Therefore a finding of bad faith was 
the reinsured’s decision not to settle, a decision over which the reinsurers had no control, 
the bad faith of the insurer cannot be imputed to the reinsurer.  
 
However if the clause clearly so states, the reinsured might be regarded as acting as an 
agent of the reinsurer in defending the claim. In Commercial Assur. Co. v. American Cent. 
Ins. Co.
703, where there was no follow the fortunes clause, upon the notification of the loss 
the reinsurer and the reinsured refused to pay. The assured then brought an action against 
the original insurer to recover the loss and the two companies again agreed that the action 
should be resisted and contested, and that the original insurer, as defendant in the action, 
should have the conduct, management, and control of the contest for itself and as agent of 
the reinsuring company. However the reinsured abandoned the defence and compromised 
and settled the claim with the assured. The Supreme Court of California held that such an 
authorisation required the reinsured to defend the action until the question of liability was 
adjudicated. Under the authority it was given by the agreement with the reinsurer the 
reinsured had no power to compromise and settle the claim to bind the reinsurer unless the 
latter had knowledge of the compromise, and consented to it or approved of it.  
 
12.5.2  Attorney-client privilege   
In commercial disputes it is permitted in the US for the parties to request from each other 
documents to help them prove their respective cases
704. However, if a document is subject 
to the attorney-client privilege it will be immune from discovery
705.    
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The documents that are subject to the privilege are stated to be
706:  
1-  Claims counsel reports regarding the defence of the assured’s claim 
2-  Expert reports or analyses of a claim by the insurer’s or insured’s personnel 
concerning the defence of a claim 
3-  Coverage analyses by the reinsured’s in-house or outside counsel; and 
4-  Draft arguments and communications with counsel regarding those pleadings  
 
If the parties have a common interest on a particular issue, disclosure of documents is not 
to be restricted on the basis of the attorney-client privilege
707. In that situation, 
communications made to the shared attorney to establish a defence strategy remain 
privileged as to the rest of the world. However, it is accepted that reinsurers and reinsureds 
do not share a common interest. The issue arose in North River Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. 
Co.
708 where the arbitrator decided that North River was obliged to pay the assured’s 
attorney’s fees in defending third party asbestosis claims. North River then claimed those 
fees from the reinsurers Columbia. The reinsurers requested sight of the documents 
between North River and their attorney in respect of defending the assured’s own claim 
for defence costs. North River argued that those documents were protected by attorney-
client privilege. The Court clarified that the common interest doctrine applies when 
multiple persons were represented by the same attorney and therefore rejected the 
reinsurers’ contention that the doctrine was applicable to the reinsurance relationship. For 
example if an insurer actually retained counsel to provide a defence for the insured, there 
was a common legal interest between them. Therefore, the mere fact that the parties had a 
reinsurer - reinsured relationship was insufficient to find that they shared a common 
interest. The court also noted that North River and Columbia were not represented by the 
same counsel, and Columbia did not contribute to North River’s legal expenses nor 
exercise any control over its conduct of the proceedings. Nor was there any evidence that 
the two parties co-ordinated litigation strategy in any way. While their commercial 
interests coincided to some extent, their legal interests sometimes diverged, as 
demonstrated by the instant litigation. 
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A cooperation clause does not waive attorney client privilege
709. In North River Ins. Co. v. 
Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp.
710 the “co-operation clause” in the reinsurance contract 
provided “The company [North River] shall furnish the Reinsurer with a copy of its policy 
and all endorsements thereto which in any manner affect this certificate, and shall make 
available for inspection and place at the disposal of the Reinsurer at reasonable times any 
of its records relating to this reinsurance or claims in connection therewith.” The court 
recognised that a reinsured may contractually be bound to provide its reinsurer with all 
documents or information in its possession that may be relevant to the underlying claim 
adjustment and coverage determination. However, according to the judge, more explicit 
language was required to achieve that result. A co-operation clause did not mean that the 
reinsured waived wholesale its right to preserve the confidentiality of any consultation it 
might have with its attorney concerning the underlying claim and determination of its 
coverage. The court also stated that under a co-operation clause a reinsurer is not entitled 
to be appraised of legal advice obtained by a reinsured with a “reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality”. It was enough to satisfy its obligations under the cooperation clause to 
make available to the reinsurer all factual knowledge or documentation in its possession 
relevant to the underlying claim or the handling of that claim. 
 
However it should be noted that if a reinsured discloses the documents in any other 
litigation with other parties, such disclosure amounts to a waiver of privilege. In North 
River v. Columbia it was mentioned that North River disclosed documents in litigation 
against CIGNA in circumstances where North River and CIGNA had no common legal 
interest. Therefore North River was held to have waived the attorney-client privilege with 
respect to the documents that it had disclosed in the litigation against CIGNA, and 
Columbia was held to be entitled to see those documents without any attorney-client 
privilege restriction. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Reinsurance is insurance taken out by insurers, in order to maintain their solvency by risk-
spreading, and in order to expand their capacity to write additional risks. Much of the 
world’s reinsurance business is placed in the London market, with substantial benefits to 
the UK economy. Reinsurance is also a means of obtaining business for London which 
would otherwise not be written at all: in many jurisdictions, only local insurers are 
licensed to carry on insurance business, so those that do not have the inclination or 
capacity to write a particular risk may nevertheless do so but then transfer to external 
reinsurers anything up to 100 per cent of that risk.  
      
Reinsurance may be written in many forms, but the focus of this thesis is facultative 
proportional reinsurance, whereby a single risk is reinsured by a reinsurer. Thus, if a 
factory is insured against fire by insurer A, A may transfer a given percentage of the risk – 
say, 30 per cent  – to reinsurer B in exchange for an equivalent percentage of the premium: 
if the factory is destroyed by fire, B indemnifies A for 30 per cent of its payment to the 
assured. This arrangement presumes that (subject to financial limits) the original insurance 
and reinsurance provide identical cover.  
 
Defining the nature of such a transaction is crucially important in the interpretation of 
reinsurance contracts, because classifying reinsurance as a liability cover creates a direct 
link between the sums paid by the reinsured and the reinsurer’s obligation to provide an 
indemnity, with the back-to-back terms of the reinsurance simply confirming that the 
reinsurers will pay when the reinsured has to pay. By contrast, if reinsurance is a further 
contract on the original subject matter, attention focuses on the terms of the reinsurance 
rather than the liability of the reinsured.  
 
In the first part of the thesis an attempt has been made prove that in a facultative 
reinsurance, the reinsurer insures the reinsured’s liability that the latter has undertaken 
under the original insurance with the assured.  
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The issue had not been settled in England until the House of Lords decision in WASA 
International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co
711 where the House of Lords 
unanimously held that reinsurance is a further insurance on the subject matter insured by 
the reinsured. The Court of Appeal’s decision on the issue has been discussed in various 
parts of this thesis. After the thesis was submitted, the House of Lords decided on the 
dispute. Their Lordships’ ruling has been added to the conclusion after the thesis was 
examined. 
     
In Wasa v Lexington, a US insurer, Lexington, insured Aluminum Company of America 
(Alcoa) under an all risks property damage and business interruption policy issued for a 
three-year period from 1 July 1977. The insuring clause covered “all physical loss of, or 
damage to, the insured property …” The insurance also contained a standard Service of 
Suit clause: “In the event of the failure of [Lexington] to pay any amount claimed to be 
due hereunder, [Lexington] at the request of the Insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of 
any Court of Competent jurisdiction within the United States and will comply with all 
requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder 
shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice of such Court”. The reinsurers 
in the present litigation, Wasa and AGF, reinsured 2.5 per cent in total of Lexington’s risk. 
The reinsurance was stated to be a “Contributing Facultative Reinsurance” covering “All 
Risks of Physical Loss or Damage excluding Fire and Allied Perils &/or as original”. 
Period was stated to be for “36 months at date 1.7.77 ... and/or pro rata to expiry of 
original”, conditions were “Full R/I Clause No. 1 amended”. Premium was said to be 
calculated at GOR [Gross Original Rate]. The Full Reinsurance Clause was not identified 
but it was common ground that the wording was “Being a reinsurance of and warranted 
same gross rate, terms and conditions as and to follow the settlements of the Company and 
that said Company retains during the currency of this Policy at least ….. on the identical 
subject matter and risk and in identically the same proportion on each separate part 
thereof, but in the event of the retained line being less than as above, Underwriters’ lines 
to be proportionately reduced.”  
     Alcoa was instructed by the US Environmental Protection Agency to clean up 
contamination which had occurred at various of its sites. Further investigation showed that 
damage had occurred as early as 1940s at some 35 sites within, and 23 outside, the United 
States. Proceedings were commenced against the insurers on risk from 1940s until 1990 
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although a number could not be identified or had gone out of business. The case went to 
the Washington Supreme Court. The Court, applying Washington conflict of laws rules
712, 
held that the governing law was that of Pennsylvania. Applying that law, the Court ruled 
that the wording of the insuring clause in Lexington’s policy meant that Lexington was 
liable for all of the damage as long as any part of it occurred in the three year coverage 
period. The outcome was that Lexington was jointly and severally liable for the damage 
occurring before 1 July 1977, in the three years of coverage and even thereafter. In effect, 
therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the policy was that the insuring clause overrode the 
time period clause in the policy.  
     Lexington settled Alcoa’s claim following the Washington Supreme Court decision and 
then made its own claim against the reinsurers for their respective proportions. 97.5 per 
cent in value paid up, but both Wasa and AGF denied liability and sought negative 
declaratory relief in England. It was common ground that the reinsurance contract was 
governed by English law, and the reinsurers sought a declaration that the duration clause 
was also governed by English law: it was again common ground that under English law 
there could have been liability only for the damage actually occurring in the period of 
coverage
713.  
     Simon J
714 at first instance held that the reinsurance contracts were not proportional,
715 
although he accepted that the contracts were largely written on a back-to-back basis. He 
also ruled that reinsurance was not a liability cover but rather a further insurance on the 
subject matter insured, so that the interpretation of the reinsurance and original insurance 
contracts was independent and a matter for the governing law of each. The mere fact that 
Lexington had established and quantified its liability was not enough to trigger 
reinsurance cover. Simon J emphasised that the contracts were not back-to-back in respect 
of the period clause which was fundamental and had to be construed according to its own 
terms and under English law.  
     Lexington appealed, and in the Court of Appeal
716 the key question was whether the 
time period clauses in the two contracts should be given the same interpretation despite the 
differing applicable laws. The Court of Appeal gave a positive answer, but the House of 
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Lords
717 allowed the appeal and restored Simon J’s judgment. In so deciding their 
Lordships ruled that: (1) reinsurance is not liability insurance so that mere proof by the 
reinsured that it faced liability does not permit a claim to be brought; and (2) the reinsurers 
were entitled to rely upon the English law construction of the reinsurance policy to restrict 
their liability to damage occurring in the 36-month period of cover.  
           
In Wasa the House of Lords was unanimously of the view, expressed by Lord Mance that 
“The insurable interest which entitles the insurer to reinsure in respect of that subject-
matter is the insurer’s exposure under the original insurance”
718. Lord Mance stated that 
the subject matter insured by the reinsurance in Wasa was, by reason of the headings 
“interest” and “situated”, the original assured’s property, rather than the insurer’s exposure 
or liability under the original insurance. However, in the same paragraph, Lord Mance 
added that the insurable interest which entitled the insurer to reinsure in respect of that 
subject-matter was the insurer’s “exposure under the original insurance”. These two 
statements seem to contradict each other because their Lordships state on the one hand that 
the subject matter of the reinsurance contract is the original assured’s property but not the 
reinsured’s liability under the direct policy; but on the other hand their Lordships confirm 
that the reinsured’s insurable interest is its exposure under the primary insurance policy. 
The better view, it is submitted, is that the interest clause merely identifies the insured 
subject matter, and does not seek to define the reinsured’s insurable interest. It identifies 
what the subject matter insured is because that forms the reinsurer’s liability. The liability 
insurance approach is also consistent with the settled rule that the trigger for payment by 
the reinsurer is the establishment and quantification of the reinsured’s loss, and not the 
occurrence of a peril insured against under the direct policy
719. It is also to be commented 
that four of their Lordships, Lord Mance apart, felt that in purely commercial terms there 
was something to be said for treating reinsurance as liability insurance
720, and there was 
unanimity that a policy could (and perhaps should) be drafted in that way if appropriate 
words were used. Their Lordships rejected Lexington’s argument – persuasive in the view 
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of the present author – that the wording of the reinsurance did just that, and indeed that it 
would have been difficult to think of what more could have been done.  
     In Wasa the contracts were worded in more or less identical terms. The original policy 
was for three year period from 1 July 1977 until 1 July 1980. The reinsurance contracts 
were for 36 months from 1 July 1977. The reinsurance was as original and contained the 
Full Reinsurance Clause. Lord Mance accepted that “&/or as original” against the 
headings “form” and “interest” “on any view incorporated the relevant insurance 
provisions relating to the subject matter and risks into the reinsurance”
721. Thus the 
reinsurance wording matched that of the original and it follows that the insuring clause on 
which the Washington Supreme Court based its decision was also a clause of the 
reinsurance contract. The only question was whether the fact that the two contracts had 
different applicable laws required them to be construed differently.  
     In order to recover under a facultative proportional reinsurance the reinsured must, in 
accordance with the Scor
722 case: (a) establish its own legal liability to the assured, which 
it can do by being sued to judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction (or in arbitration) 
by a ruling which is not perverse
723; and (b) show that the loss falls within the terms of the 
reinsurance. In Wasa, the question was with the second limb of the Scor test, ie if the loss 
fell within the reinsurance cover. In relation to this, the question was also how to interpret 
the reinsurance policy which contained identical terms to the original insurance. Even 
though if the reinsurance policy provides a follow the settlements clause, it is always open 
to a reinsurer to raise any defence that is provided for by the reinsurance. However, the 
requirement has to be considered together with the back-to-back presumption. If the 
contracts provide identical cover, in that the reinsurance does not contain any additional 
exclusion clauses, the reinsurer is liable when the reinsured is liable. If the reinsured 
makes an ex gratia payment, eg, when aware that the claim is probably not covered by the 
original insurance contract, the settlement cannot be described as “bona fide and 
businesslike” and consequently the requirements of the follow the settlements clause will 
not be met. On the other hand, if the reinsured settles the claim in good faith, believing 
that the claim is covered by the original insurance, the reinsurer has agreed to follow the 
reinsured’s good faith settlements and will be obliged to make payment to the reinsured 
even if it can subsequently be proved that the reinsured was not liable. In the light of these 
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principles, where the contracts are back-to-back it is difficult to see that the reinsurer can 
have any policy defence to a claim brought by the reinsured under the follow the 
settlements clause
724. However, the courts have been reluctant to accept that the second 
limb of the Scor test is automatically satisfied in this way. In Assicurazioni Generali SpA v 
CGU International Insurance Plc Gavin Kealey QC
725 held that where the reinsurance and 
original insurance are back-to-back and the reinsurance contract contains the full 
reinsurance clause, the reinsurers are not “dictated” to indemnify the reinsured for a 
settlement made in a bona fide and businesslike fashion. The Court of Appeal
726 on 
appeal, relying on Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance
727 and Baker v Black 
Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd,
728 approved this analysis, and held that it 
remained necessary for the loss to fall within the scope of the reinsurance or at  least 
“arguably so”. This reasoning was approved, without detailed analysis, by the House of 
Lords in Wasa.  
 
The issue in Wasa was purely related to the construction of terms of the reinsurance 
agreement. As the reinsurance and original insurance contracts were worded identically, 
the interpretation of the original insurance should have been binding for the reinsurers. 
The precedent cases Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher
729 Groupama Navigation 
et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros
730 established that where the reinsurance and 
original insurance contracts are governed by different applicable laws, the interpretaiton of 
the original insurance contract terms by a foreign law will be binding for English 
reinsurers. In Wasa, the insuring clause which was worded “This policy insures against all 
physical loss of, or damage to, the insured property …” was thus also a clause of the 
reinsurance policy. The original insurance was drafted for three years, the reinsurance for 
36 months. The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the original insurance contract 
terms as a whole, including the insuring clause and the time period clause, and held that 
the words “all loss…” meant there was no exclusion relating to time limits. According to 
the principles of construction of the terms of facultative proportional reinsurance contracts 
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which were established by the House of Lords in Vesta v Butcher and by the Court of 
Appeal in Groupama v Catatumbo, the interpretation of the original policy was in 
principle also applicable to the reinsurance. However, the House of Lords classified Wasa 
as “exceptional” and  that it was to be distinguished from Vesta and Groupama. This was 
so because in the two earlier cases it had been possible at the time when the insurance and 
reinsurance were placed to identify the foreign law which would govern the insurance. 
However, according to their Lordships, it would be fanciful to suppose that in 1977 the 
hypothetical American lawyer asked to advise on what law governed the contract of 
insurance, and what law would govern questions of coverage, would have concluded that 
Pennsylvania law would have applied
731. The distinguishing feature for their Lordships 
was, therefore, the uncertainty created by the Service of Suit clause, and the principle that 
reinsurers could not be expected to follow the reinsured’s liability in circumstances where 
it was not clear which law would govern that liability. It is to be noted that the House of 
Lords did not accept Simon J’s first instance ruling that English law should be applied to 
the reinsurance duration clause by reason of the fact that the interpretation given to that 
clause in the direct policy by the Washington Supreme Court was not one which could 
have been predicted in 1977. As their Lordships emphasised, it was trite law that insurers 
and reinsurers ran the risk of changes in the law or in contractual interpretation. There was 
no attempt by the reinsurers to argue that the Washington Supreme Court’s decision was 
“perverse” and outside the range of rulings capable of being recognised as establishing 
and quantifying the reinsured’s liability, and Lord Brown emphasised that, however 
surprising to English eyes it might have been, the Washington Supreme Court decision 
could not be disputed
732. The determinative uncertainty in the present case was related to 
the law applicable to the direct policy. 
     The main concern of the House of Lords in Wasa appeared to have been that, if the two 
contracts were to be interpreted in the same way, the reinsurers would have been liable for 
losses for the entire period of contamination even had the reinsurance not been for a 
matching period of three years but for some lesser period. Their Lordships thus put 
emphasis on the fundamental nature of the temporal scope of a time policy. Lord Collins 
pointed out
733 that if the reinsurance contracts had been drafted for any lesser period:  
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‘The periods of cover under the insurance and reinsurances would not be back-to-
back. But Lexington would still be maintaining that, in the light of the decision of 
the Washington Supreme Court, if any damage occurred within any relevant policy 
period, of any duration, the relevant reinsurer would be liable for all of the 
damage, including damage occurring before inception or after expiry. That seems 
to me to be wholly uncommercial and outside any reasonable commercial 
expectation of either party’
734.  
 
This, with respect, does not follow. If the reinsurance had not been for 36 months then the 
two contracts would not have been back-to-back and it would have been perfectly proper 
to construe the reinsurance in accordance with English law. But the fact is that the two 
contracts were of the same duration, and this was not doubted by any of their Lordships.  
    What we are left with, therefore, are two cases – Vesta and Groupama – in which 
warranties in a contract governed by English law were construed in accordance with a 
foreign law in order to achieve back-to-back cover with the underlying insurance, and one 
case – Wasa – in which a duration clause governed by English law was construed in 
accordance with English law so as to deny back-to-back cover with an all but identically 
worded direct policy whose terms had been incorporated into the reinsurance. What is the 
general rule in this type of case? The answer is unclear. Lord Collins commented
735 that  
 
‘In the case of proportional facultative reinsurance the obvious commercial 
intention is for the original insurer to reinsure part of its own risk and for the 
reinsurer to accept that part of the risk, and it is therefore equally obvious that the 
relevant terms in the reinsurance contract should be construed so as to be 
consistent with the contract of insurance. This is simply commercial common 
sense. Consequently, in proportional facultative reinsurance the starting point for 
the construction of the reinsurance policy is that the scope and nature of the cover 
in the reinsurance is co-extensive with the cover in the insurance.’ 
 
His Lordship added:
736 
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‘it would almost invariably be the case that losses for which the insurer has 
indemnified the original insured would be within the reinsurance even if the losses 
are payable under a foreign law or a foreign judicial decision which takes a view 
different from English law of what losses are recoverable’ 
 
     What, for Lord Collins, distinguished Wasa from Vesta and Groupama was that in 
1977 there was no identifiable system of law applicable to the direct policy, so the parties 
must have intended English law to apply to the reinsurance. Lords Walker and Brown 
agreed with this judgment. Contrast Lord Mance, who focused on the commercial and 
legal unattractiveness of imposing the over-technical English law of warranties on 
reinsureds
737 and commented that “Absent a common governing law,  reinsurers may still 
sometimes be entitled to respond, with reference to the clear meaning that their contract 
has under the law governing it”
738. So Lord Collins regarded Wasa as highly exceptional, 
a deviation from what would “almost invariably” be held, whereas for Lord Mance the 
warranties cases are exceptional and  Wasa may be closer to the general rule than Vesta 
and Groupama. In a market which demands commercial certainty, their Lordships appear 
to have provided the very opposite.  
 
Another point that now is questionable after Wasa is whether or not a foreign court 
decision is binding on reinsurers if the parties to the reinsurance contract could not 
identify the applicable law to the original insurance at the outset of the contract. In 
Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc v NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd
739 it was held that 
the judgment of a foreign court establishing and quantifying the liability of the reinsured 
will be binding on the reinsurers and thus on an English court charged with determining 
the question whether the reinsured has established and quantified its liability for the 
purposes of a reinsurance claim. The only defence that could be raised by the reinsurers in 
Wasa was that the Washington Supreme Court decision was manifestly perverse but the 
reinsurers did not argue that the decision was perverse, and it was not disputed that the 
Washington Supreme Court was a court of a competent jurisdiction and that the 
proceedings were brought in compliance with the Service of Suit clause. The reinsured’s 
liability was thus established. If reinsurance is liability insurance, the problem would have 
been solved at this stage because where the reinsurance and insurance contracts provide 
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identical cover with almost identical terms and where the reinsured established its liability 
to the assured by a settlement following a judgment against the reinsured, the reinsurers 
will be liable for their reinsured proportion of the risk. The follow the settlements clause 
thus removes from the reinsured the need to establish its own liability as a matter of strict 
law, but, according to the Generali case and to Wasa, this does not remove the need for 
the reinsured to establish the reinsurer’s legal liability under the reinsurance even though 
the two contracts are identically worded. It may be thought that this approach serves to 
undermine, albeit to a limited and as yet uncertain extent, the efficacy of a follow the 
settlements clause, but the law is nevertheless settled. The point as applied to Wasa, 
therefore, was that the reinsurers were entitled to rely upon the terms of their own policy 
despite the cover being back-to-back and the reinsurers being obliged to follow 
settlements.  
      
One comment of Lord Mance is particularly troubling. His Lordship commented, speaking 
of Commercial Union v NRG Victory, that “It is unnecessary to decide upon the 
correctness or otherwise of the Court of Appeal’s obiter observations on the effect under 
reinsurance of a judgment against the insurer.”
740 If this is right, then in the absence of a 
follow the settlements clause it may not be enough for a reinsured who wishes to establish 
and quantify his own liability to the assured, for the reinsured to be sued to judgment in a 
foreign court. This makes the task of a reinsured even more difficult and creates yet more 
uncertainty. 
 
The House of Lords’ decision in Wasa had been awaited by the reinsurance market by the 
hope that it would provide clarity on some of the major issues in the interpretation of 
proportional facultative reinsurance contracts. Their Lordships reached a result that the 
market will doubtless welcome. However, their Lordships’ reasons for distinguishing 
Vesta and Groupama are contradictory and unconvincing, and throw into doubt the 
significance of the presumption of back-to-back cover. It is particularly difficult to 
understand why the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction on the meaning of the 
direct policy should not be regarded as conclusive of that liability whether or not there is a 
follow the settlements clause. 
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It is of course true that the reinsurers are not parties to the proceedings between the 
assured and the original insurer
741. However, attention should be given to the nature of the 
facultative proportional reinsurance contracts and how they are performed. The direct 
policy in Wasa contained a Service of Suit clause, and it was the uncertainty generated by 
that clause which persuaded their Lordships that the reinsurers should be entitled to rely 
upon the English law construction of the duration clause. But if the direct policy had not 
contained any law or jurisdiction clause, the position would have been exactly the same 
because the law applicable to the direct policy could not have been predicted.  
 
Lord Collins stated that “One can…readily assume that a reinsurance contract was 
intended to cover the same risks on the same conditions as the original contract of 
insurance, in the absence of some indication to the contrary”. However, it is hard to see in 
the reinsurance contract in Wasa any contrary intention showing that the reinsurance and 
insurance contracts should not be interpreted in the same way.  Lord Phillips expressed the 
opinion that  if the parties had agreed implicitly that whatever law might be applied to 
interpretation of the primary cover and whatever result this might produce, applied equally 
to the reinsurance then that would effectively treat the reinsurance contract as one to 
indemnify the reinsured in respect of any liability sustained under the primary cover
742. 
This comment would undoubtedly be correct if the original insurer made a claim for an ex 
gratia payment or a claim that was not covered by the reinsurance policy by reason of an 
express reinsurance exclusion which did not appear in the direct policy. But in this case 
the contracts had identical wordings and the insurer paid by reference to the interpretation 
by a court of competent jurisdiction of the original policy term which was reproduced in 
the reinsurance policy. The insurer did not claim for an ex gratia payment, but made a 
claim under the original policy which the reinsurer agreed to cover and which was also 
incorporated by the words of “as original”. 
 
Their Lordships implicitly recognised that their ruling was uncommercial. They went to 
great lengths to explain how the problems created by their decision could be avoided, eg, 
by making both contracts subject to the same applicable law or by framing the reinsurance 
as a liability cover. For the future these solutions may be effective, but for contracts 
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written before the ruling in Wasa the market will continue to be faced with great 
uncertainty as to exactly what the reinsurance covers.  
 
In addition to the discussion on the nature of facultative reinsurance, the thesis also tried to 
identify the scope of the follow the settlements clause. With regards to the reinsured’s 
claim against the reinsurer, there are two different limbs of liability that must be proved: 
1- reinsured’s liability to the assured; 2- reinsurers’ liability to the reinsured. The first limb 
is related to the original insurance policy and where the reinsurance contract provides a 
follow the settlements clause and where the reinsured settles the claim by acting in a bona 
fide and businesslike manner he does not have to prove that he was actually liable to the 
assured. Even though it could be later proved that the reinsured was not liable to the 
assured, the reinsurers will still be obliged to follow the settlements as they agreed to be 
bound by any settlement which is bona fide and businesslike. The second limb is related to 
the reinsurance policy. Where the reinsurance and original policies are back-to-back, 
clearly, the reinsurance policy terms will be no different than those of the original policy 
and the reinsurers will be obliged to follow the settlements where the reinsured’s liability 
to the assured is established. Unless the reinsurance policy contains any terms that the 
original insurance does not provide for, the reinsurer seemingly has no defence against the 
reinsured where the settlement is bona fide and businesslike or where the reinsured’s 
liability is established by a judgment or an arbitration award. However, this principle 
should be approached with caution after Wasa v Lexington. The law is not clear after the 
decision but what is obvious is that if the parties could not identify at the outset of the 
contract which law would govern the contract of insurance, the reinsurer may still be able 
to bring reinsurance policy defences even though the original insurance contract was 
identical to the reinsurance contract and the reinsured was unsuccessful in bringing the 
defence in question against the assured in a court of competent jurisdiction outside 
England. In such a case, even though the original insurance is identical to the reinsurance 
policy, and even though the reinsured brought its policy defences in a dispute before a 
court outside England, if the court interprets the original insurance contract in a way that 
the defence is not valid and the reinsured is liable according to the interpretation of the 
original contract wording which is identical to the reinsurance policy, if the reinsurance 
policy is governed by English law, before an English court the reinsurers will still be able 
to raise the same defences that the reinsured had unsuccessfully pleaded in the foreign   194
jurisdiction. This clearly does not provide for contract certainty but this is nevertheless the 
ruling of the House of Lords in Wasa.  
 
The wording of the follow the settlements clause may be varied or may be qualified. 
Clauses such as where the reinsurer will agree to follow the settlements whether “liable or 
not liable” or “without question” have been held not to change the Scor interpretation of 
the follow the settlements clause. However, if the clause is qualified, as where the 
reinsurer agrees to follow the settlements if the loss is “within the original insurance” and 
reinsurance policy terms, in this case proof of a bone fida and businesslike settlement will 
not be enough and the actual proof of liability under the direct policy will be required.  
 
It is sometimes the case that a reinsurance policy provides a follow the settlements clause 
as well as a claims provision. Claims provisions may be in the form of notification clauses 
which require the reinsured to notify the reinsurers of the assured’s claim; or they may 
require the reinsured to seek the reinsurers’ consent before entering into any settlements 
with the assured. These two categories of claims provisions are called “claims co-
operation” clauses. Claims control clauses are the other form of claims provision, under 
which the reinsured may be obliged to pass to the reinsurers the control of the negotiations 
with the original assured. If a claims control clause or a consent clause is in the 
reinsurance contract as well as a follow the settlements clause the question will be how to 
reconcile these two different types of terms. In other words, on the one hand the reinsurers 
express their trust in reinsured’s settlement, but on the other hand they require the 
reinsured to seek their consent prior entering into any settlements with the assured. The 
answer depends on the status of claims provisions. If the claims provision is a condition 
precedent, in case of the breach of the clause, the reinsurers will be discharged from any 
liability affected by the breach. If the clause is not a condition precedent, according to the 
Scor case, the follow the settlements clause will be emasculated by the breach of the 
claims provision but as it was pointed out in the thesis this solution is not supportable. If 
the claims provision is not a condition precedent but a mere condition or an innominate 
term and if the breach is not so serious that does not go to the root of the contract, the 
reinsured should be entitled to make a claim against the reinsurers where the settlement is 
bona fide and businesslike and the reinsurers will be entitled to claim their damages for 
the breach of the claims provision.  
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The thesis also tried to explore the application of settlement clauses in the United States. 
The research on the law of the United States mainly focused on the settlement clauses 
because the US cases did not demonstrate many disputes on the incorporation clauses. The 
nature of reinsurance contracts is not controversial in the US as it is accepted that 
reinsurers insure reinsureds’ liability under the original insurance policy. Incorporation of 
arbitration clauses however may be possible by virtue of a general incorporation clause. 
Moreover, insurance and reinsurance are assumed to provide concurrent coverage where 
the reinsurance policy is “subject to the same terms and conditions as original”.  
 
In the US the terminology of the settlement clauses may differ that follow the settlements 
may be expressed as follow the fortunes in some of the reinsurance policies. However, it is 
now commonly accepted that these two forms of clauses are used interchangeably, the 
meaning of the two clauses are not different from each other. The settlement clauses are 
interpreted in the same way as in England, and they operate to prevent the reinsurers’ from  
making a “de novo” review where the reinsured’s settlement is in good faith and where the 
loss falls within the reinsurance cover.  
 
By way of contrast with English law, in the US there is an issue as to whether a follow the 
settlements clause is implied into all reinsurance contracts. The majority view is that 
unless the reinsured proves that there is a custom as to the implication of the clause, 
implication into all reinsurance contracts is to be rejected. The dispute has not arisen in 
England yet but in the US reinsureds’ post-settlement allocations as regards long tail risks 
such as asbestos and environmental claims has led to a good deal of litigation. The law,  
however, is now settled that it is almost impossible to distinguish post-settlement 
allocations from settlements to the effect that where the settlements are made in bona fide 
and businesslike manner, the post-settlement allocations are binding for the reinsurers. 
The only situation in which the reinsurer may object to a post-settlement allocation is 
where the reinsured includes an ex-gratia payment within the post-settlement allocation.  
 
Claims provisions are in use in the US as well. The terminology however may differ and 
claims co-operation clauses may be defined as “right to associate” clauses. It should be 
noted that most of the cases on claims provisions in the US are on claims notification 
clauses as in that jurisdiction the reinsurers are worried that if they interfere with the 
settlement process with the assured or if they are involved in the defence process in a   196
dispute between the assured and the reinsured, the assured may argue that such an 
interference or involvement by the reinsurers has established privity between the assured 
and the reinsurers which would entitle the assured to bring a direct action against the 
reinsurers. The remedy for breach of claims provisions in the US also depends on the 
nature of the clause. Where the clause is a condition precedent, the reinsurers are 
discharged from liability that is tainted by the breach. However, the law differs from state 
to state. For instance in New York and in California, where the clause is not a condition 
precedent, the reinsurers have to prove that they are prejudiced by the breach and 
prejudice is not required where the claims provision is a condition precedent, but in North 
Carolina proof of prejudice is required even though the clause is a condition precedent. 
Some jurisdictions such as New York and California do not recognise any presumption of 
prejudice. However, being deprived of their contractual rights to control the negotiations 
with the assured creates the assumption that the reinsurers are prejudiced by the breach 
and the reinsured has to prove the contrary. If reinsurers cannot prove that they are 
prejudiced, but can prove that the reinsured acted in bad faith in failing to comply with the 
claims provision. They may also be discharged from liability. Proof of bad faith requires 
showing gross negligence or deliberate recklessness by the assured. However, in 
Wisconsin the Appeal court has refused to accept the “bad faith” exception.  
 
The main question that the thesis has tried to prove is the nature of facultative reinsurance 
contracts, and the thesis adopted the view that reinsurers insure reinsureds’ liability 
undertaken by the latter under the original policy. The subject matter insured only forms 
the reinsurers’ liability and the reinsured has no insurable interest on the subject matter 
insured. However, the House of Lords in Wasa adopted the contrary view, although the 
law remains in part uncertain in England. Lord Mance found the warranty cases (Vesta 
and Groupama) exceptional and did not apply those cases to Wasa, whereas Lord Collins 
and Wilkinson found Wasa exceptional and did not apply the earlier cases where the 
applicable laws to the reinsurance and original insurance were different. In conclusion, 
now we do not know what the law is as for the interpretation of facultative reinsurance 
contracts. However it is clear from the decision of the House of Lords that reinsurance is 
not a liability insurance but a further insurance on the subject matter insured and the 
reinsured has an insurable interest on the subject matter insured by virtue of its original 
insurance contract. Where the law that will govern the original insurance cannot be 
identified at the outset of the contract, for instance where the original insurance provides a   197
Service of Suit clause, it is now possible for the reinsurers to argue that a foreign court 
interpretation of the original insurance policy may not be binding for an English reinsurer 
even though the policies provide identical cover with identical words.      
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APPENDIX  
 
US REINSURANCE WORDING 
 
 
FOLLOW THE FORM CLAUSES 
 
   Imperial Fire Ins. Co. of London v. Home Ins. Co. of New Orleans 68 F 698 CA5 
1895.  
 
‘This policy to be subject to the same risks, conditions, valuations, indorsements, 
assignments, and mode of settlement as are or may be assumed or adopted by the 
HOME INSURANCE CO., and the loss, if any, payable pro rata, at the same time 
and in the same manner as by said company.” 
 
 
   Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co. 4 F3d 1049 CA2 (NY), 1993.  
 
“A. ... [T]he liability of [Unigard] shall follow that of [North River] and, except as 
otherwise provided by this Certificate, shall be subject in all respects to all the 
terms and conditions of [North River’s] policy except such as may purport to 
create a direct obligation of [Unigard] to the original insured or anyone other than 
[North River].” 
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FOLLOW THE FORTUNES / SETTLEMENT CLAUSES 
 
 
   Commercial Union Insurance Company v Seven Provinces 9 F Supp 2d 49 D 
Mass,1998 aff’d 217 F3d 33 CA1 (Mass), 2000  
 
“[1] Being a reinsurance of and warranted same NETT
743 rate, terms and 
conditions as and to follow the settlements of the EMPLOYER SURPLUS LINES 
INSURANCE COMPANY and that the local office of the said Company retains 
during the currency of this insurance at least $225,000.00 BEING 50% OF 
$450,000.00 EXCESS $50,000.00 COMBINED SINGLE LIMIT ([2] subject to 
reduction by any general excess loss or excess catastrophe reinsurance whether 
effected by the head office or local office of the Company) [3] on the identical 
subject matter and risk and in identically the same proportion on each separate part 
thereof, but [4] in the event of the retained line being less than as above, 
Underwriter’s lines to be proportionally reduced
744.”  
 
 
   Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co. 4 F3d 1049 CA2 (NY), 1993. 
  
“D. All claims covered by this reinsurance when settled by [North River] shall be 
binding on [Unigard], who shall be bound to pay their proportion of such 
settlements. In addition thereto, [Unigard] shall be bound to pay (1) their 
proportion of expenses, other than [North River’s] salaries and office expenses, 
incurred by [North River] in the investigation and settlement of claims or suits, and 
(2) their proportion of court costs, interest on any judgment or award and litigation 
expenses (provided their prior consent to legal proceedings has been obtained from 
the Underwriting Managers) as follows: (a) with respect to reinsurance provided 
on an excess of loss basis, in the ratio that [Unigard’s] loss payment bears to 
[North River’s] gross loss payment.” 
 
 
   City of Renton v. Lexington Ins. Co. (USA ) 2007 WL 2751356 WDWash.  
 
There were two reinsurers, Lexington UK and Lexington US. Lexington UK 
reinsurance policy provided: “[t]his Reinsurance is subject to all terms, clauses and 
conditions as original except as provided herein, and to follow the settlements or 
other payments of whatsoever nature made by the Original Underwriters arising 
out of and in connection with the original insurance and to bear its proportion of 
any expenses incurred whether legal or otherwise in the investigation and defense 
of any claim hereunder.” 
  
Lexington US policy states that : “[t]he liability of the Reinsurer shall follow the 
terms and conditions of the Company's policy furnished to the Reinsurer at the 
effective date of this Reinsurance Certificate unless otherwise specifically 
provided herein by endorsement made a part of this Certificate.” 
                                                 
743 The court clarified that this is a British spelling of “net” which means “net of commission paid to an 
agent or broker”.  
744 The bracket numbers were not in the original text, the court added them.    200
 
 
   Excess Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Factory Mut. Ins. 3 NY3d 577, 2004. 
 
“ CONDITIONS: As original and subject to same valuation, clauses and 
conditions as contained in the original policy or policies but only to cover risks of 
All Risks of Physical Loss or Damage but excluding Inventory Shortage. 
…Reinsurers agree to follow the settlements of the Reassured in all respects and to 
bear their proportion of any expenses incurred, whether legal or otherwise, in the 
investigation and defence of any claim hereunder.” 
 
 
   Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Constitution Reinsurance Corp. 
2004 WL 2387313, ED Mich.  
 
“... The liability of the Reinsurer [CRC], as specified in Item 4 of the Declarations, 
shall follow that of the Company [Travelers] and shall be subject in all respects to 
all the terms and conditions of the Company’s policy except when otherwise 
specifically provided herein or designated as nonconcurrent reinsurance in the 
Declarations....” 
“All loss settlements made by the Company, provided they are within the terms 
and conditions of the original polic(ies) and within the terms and conditions of this 
certificate of reinsurance, shall be binding on the Reinsurer. Upon receipt of a 
definitive statement of loss, the Reinsurer shall promptly pay its proportion of such 
loss as set forth in the Declarations ...” 
 
 
   Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. North American Reinsurance Corp. 
182 Mich App 410, 1990. 
 
“The liability of the Reinsurer shall follow the terms and conditions of the 
Company's policy [umbrella policy] furnished to the Reinsurer at the effective date 
of this Reinsurance Certificate....” 
 
“F. LOSS PAYABLE. All insurance policy claims involving this reinsurance, 
when settled by the company, shall be binding upon the reinsurer, which shall be 
bound to pay its proportion of such settlements promptly following receipt of proof 
of loss in the following manner....” 
 
 
   Independence Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. 447 SW 2d 462 Tex Civ App, 
1969.  
 
“Whenever a claim is made under a policy of the CEDING COMPANY which has 
been reinsured hereunder, whether the claim is under the strict policy conditions or 
under a compromise or otherwise, the settlement made by the CEDING 
COMPANY shall be unconditionally binding on the REPUBLIC NATIONAL.” 
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CLAIMS PROVISIONS 
 
Notice of Loss Clauses  
 
 
   British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Safety Nat. Cas.335 F3d 205 CA3 (NJ), 2003  
 
“The Company shall advise Reinsurer promptly of any claim and any subsequent 
developments pertaining thereto which, in the opinion of the Company, may 
involve the reinsurance hereunder.... The Company, when so requested, will afford 
the Reinsurer an opportunity to be associated with the Company, at the expense of 
the Reinsurer, in the defense or control of any claim, suit or proceeding involving 
this reinsurance, and the Company and the Reinsurer shall cooperate in every 
respect in the defense and control of such claim, suit or proceeding.” 
 
 
   Travelers Indem. Co. v. Scor Reinsurance Co.
 62 F3d 74 CA2 (Conn), 1995. 
 
Notice of Occurrence. The Company shall notify the Reinsurer promptly of any 
occurrence which in the Company’s estimate of the value of injuries or damages 
sought, without regard to liability, might result in judgment in an amount sufficient 
to involve this certificate of reinsurance. The Company shall also notify the 
Reinsurer promptly of any occurrence in respect of which the Company has 
created a loss reserve equal to or greater than fifty (50) percent of the Company's 
retention specified in item 3 of the Declarations: or, if this reinsurance applies on a 
contributing excess basis, when notice of claim is received by the company. While 
the Reinsurer does not undertake to investigate or defend claims or suits, it shall 
nevertheless have the right and shall be given the opportunity, with the full 
cooperation of the Company, to associate counsel at its own expense and to join 
with the Company and its representatives in the defense and control of any claim, 
suit or proceeding involving this certificate of reinsurance.  
 
 
   Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co. 4 F3d 1049 CA2 (NY), 1993. 
 
“C. Prompt notice shall be given by [North River] to the Underwriting Managers 
on behalf of [Unigard] of any occurrence or accident which appears likely to 
involve this reinsurance and while the Underwriting Managers or [Unigard] do not 
undertake to investigate or defend claims or suits, the Underwriting Managers, 
directly or through its representatives and/or counsel, shall nevertheless have the 
right and be given the opportunity to associate with [North River] and its 
representatives at [Unigard's] expense in the defense and control of any claim, suit 
or proceeding which may involve this reinsurance with the full cooperation of 
[North River].” 
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Right to associate / Claims co-operation clauses 
 
 
   Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp. 345 Mo. 650, 1939. 
 
“The corporation shall have the right to participate jointly with the reinsured in 
investigation, adjustment and settlement of claims upon which, in the judgment of 
the officers of the corporation, it is, or might become interested or exposed, and the 
reinsured agrees to cooperate with the corporation to the end that settlement may 
be made in each case where legal liability apparently exists, with a minimum of 
expense to the corporation.” 
 
 
   North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp.797 F Supp 363 DNJ0, 
1992. 
 
“The company [North River] shall furnish the Reinsurer with a copy of its policy 
and all endorsements thereto which in any manner affect this certificate, and shall 
make available for inspection and place at the disposal of the Reinsurer at 
reasonable times any of its records relating to this reinsurance or claims in 
connection therewith.” 
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ULTIMATE NET LOSS CLAUSE  
 
   Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of America 136 Ohio St 49, 23 NE2d 839 Ohio 1939  
 
“Section II. The term ‘ultimate net loss’ shall be understood to mean and shall 
mean the sum actually paid in cash in settlement of losses for which the company 
is liable, after making proper deductions” 
 
 
ADDENDUM NO 5 in Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp. 99 Wis 2d 635, 1981. 
 
   “ADDENDUM NO. 5 
 
“1. The following wording shall be added to the first paragraph of Article III 
LIABILITY REINSURED : 
 
‘Notwithstanding the foregoing it is also agreed that should the Company become 
legally obligated to pay a loss in excess of its policy limits the Reinsurer agrees to 
assume seventy-five percent (75%) of that part of such loss (plus proportionate 
loss expense) which is in excess of the policy limit. However, in the event the 
applicable policy limit is less than the Company's retention at the time of the loss, 
the amount hereby assumed by the Reinsurer shall be limited to seventy-five 
percent (75%) of that part of the loss (plus proportionate loss expense) which is in 
excess of said retention. In no event, however, shall the liability of the Reinsurer, 
respecting such loss, exceed the maximum amounts of liability set forth in the 
Exhibits attached hereto.’ ”  
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